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Abstract 
The issue of port security raised concerns at the highest levels after the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 against the United States. Security threats against 
ports and vessels acquired a new perspective and in 2002 the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) adopted amendments to the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, introducing Chapter XI-2 - Special measures 
to enhance maritime security. This set of regulations enshrines the International 
Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code), which entered into force on 1 
July 2004. 
This Code establishes a set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port 
facilities. It encompasses two parts. Part A establishes the mandatory provisions, 
the non-mandatory (“recommended”) and part B provides guidelines about how to 
comply with the obligatory requirements of part A.  Together with a critical analysis 
of the national legislation about the enactment of the ISPS Code into national law, 
this dissertation examines the level of implementation and compliance of this 
instrument in Mexico with special focus on port security. This dissertation also 
provides a transparent incident-reporting instrument developed and tested through 
this research effort in Mexico for reporting of port and maritime security incidents.  
This tool joins three primary port/maritime security functions: 
a) Reporting of port and maritime security incidents;  
b) Classification and investigation of serious security incidents that require 
reassessments of the Port Security Assessments, (PSA), Port Facility 
Security Assessments (PFSA), and amendments to Port Security Plans 
(PSP) and Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) and finally;  
c) Collection of evidence material related to the security incident. 
This instrument, combined with statistics, provides nations with crucial information, 
about threats, needs and challenges for allocation of economic, material and human 
resources. It also provides essential information material to set up strategies for the 
development of a National Maritime Security Policy. Its flexibility and adaptability 
makes possible its implementation at any State of the world.  
The results of this analysis reflect the conflictive cooperation between the Secretaría 
de Marina (SEMAR)1, and the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, (SCT)2. 
This, together with the ambiguities and contradictions of the National Maritime 
Regime, even though the extensive reforms of 2016 limits the exercise of authority 
                                                     
1 Secretariat of the Navy, in English. 
2 Secretariat of Communications and Transportation, in English. 
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of SEMAR and the operation of the CUMAR(s), the organ responsible for 
implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code, at all ports across the country. 
This doctoral dissertation comprises six introductory chapters, which are referred to 
as the kappa and five annexed papers. It aims to contribute to the maritime realm 
within the area of maritime security, with special focus on port security through the 
following general objectives:  
• Elaborate a critical analysis of the current port security situation of Mexico, 
with special focus on implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code, 
including the state of the art and harmonization of international legislation 
with national law; 
• Identify the most relevant security threats to port facilities in Mexico, 
including oil terminals and offshore installations; 
• Develop an analytical instrument for security incidents-reporting & incident 
investigation, to strengthen the continual evolution of PSA/PFSA and 
PSP/PFSP and useful for setting up the strategies of a national maritime 
security policy with possibility for implementation worldwide. 
The approach adopted in this study is mainly based on qualitative methods, 
combined with action research and a limited use of statistics. The research 
objectives call for classical documental analyses examining the elements of relevant 
international legislation against its implementation into national legislation in the 
referred nation-state. The methods were selected on their usefulness and efficacy 
for analysis of law and policy. Action Research was used for implementation test 
and improvement of the reporting incident instrument, which can also be used for 
setting up the strategies for the development of a National Maritime Security Policy. 
Action Research is recommended when it is intended to improve understanding, 
develop his/others learning and influence other’s learning, taking action for social 
improvement.  
The findings related to serious deficiencies in the implementation and compliance 
of the ISPS Code in Mexico, concerning reporting of security incidents and its re-
evaluation with the PFSA and respective amendments to PFSP, the poor exercise of 
authority from the representatives of SEMAR at the CUMARs in respect of 
fulfilling its obligations and responsibilities concerning port and maritime security; 
and the identification of necessary legal amendments to national law, as well as the 
remarkable improvement in reporting security incidents after the implementation of 
the “transparent security-incident-reporting tool”, that enables port/maritime 
security incident investigation and can serve to identify the problem areas; 
contributing to set up the strategies for the development of a national maritime 
security policy, together with the instrument itself, are some of the most relevant 
contributions of this dissertation.   
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List of papers included in this dissertation 
The list of papers and respective presentation of articles does not follow a 
chronological order after the publication date (those with empirical data were 
approved and published earlier than those focused on theoretical analysis). Instead, 
the discussion of the papers is conducted under the approach of the background 
information in relation to the development of the research topic. This, to provide a 
comprehensible sequence of analysis of theory and data. Following this approach 
the literature review is presented in paper 1. The justification of the problem is 
presented in Paper 2, whereas the analysis of empirical data and recommendations 
are presented in paper 3, 4 and 5, from different perspectives.    
1) Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Implementation and 
compliance of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code in 
Mexico: A literature review and selected issues. TransNav, International 
Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, 12(2). 
P.363-373. DOI: 10.12716/1001.12.02.18. 
This paper provides a literature review of the state of the art on 
implementation and compliance of the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS Code), for the case of Mexico. This investigation was 
initially oriented solely towards Mexico, but due to the absence of research 
within this subject for the referred country the review had to be done 
through subcategories with the conditional connection of Mexico and 
relevant issues were selected. The primary data confirmed the absence of 
research within this subject in Mexico. The secondary data, is related to the 
ISPS Code used for the search, and allowed for a wider geographical 
coverage and expanded on general basis the scope of the analysis. Ten (10) 
different academic databases were exploited. The literature review from an 
author centric approach is initially presented; then, it is used as the basis to 
further develop (and examine) the concept centric approach through eight 
selected categories. The careful screening of literature, constructed on 
specific concepts allowed the identification of cross fertilisation of such 
concepts in the respective fields. It is observed that the research efforts 
focused on the ISPS Code and the development of a Port Facility Security 
Plan (PFSP) have an integrated perspective where the categories of 
terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as maritime security management 
and the issue of port security have a strong interaction and dominant status. 
The results demonstrate the limited number of academic contributions in 
the areas Central and South America and in relation to other parts of the 
globe, as well as the total absence of research efforts about the ISPS Code 
in Mexico. In the scientific contributions on the subject where Mexico is 
included; it is in reference to isolated cases of armed robbery, drugs 
19 
organizations or proliferation of crime on general bases, but not regarding 
the ISPS Code itself. The absence of scientific research on this area for the 
specific country might also be related to the lack of a national maritime 
security policy and a poor maritime security culture as the authors have 
pointed out in other contributions. 
2) Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Opening of offshore oil 
business in Mexico and associated framework to cope with potential 
maritime security threats. TransNav, International Journal on Marine 
Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, 12(1). P.173-179 DOI: 
10.12716/1001.12.01.20 
After 75 years of State oil monopoly, Mexico performed the first business 
oil auction in 2015 involving the private sector. This auction offered 14 oil 
exploration fields located on the Continental Shelf to private companies. 
The development and exploitation of these hydrocarbon fields face 
significant challenges regarding security. The economic loss for theft of 
hydrocarbons through illegal connections to pipelines is estimated to 973 
million, 125 thousand U.S. dollar, for the year of 2014 alone. While 
productive research has been made, it has mainly focused on transportation 
systems and basically, pipelines. The development and establishment of 
policies prioritising maritime security and protection of critical offshore 
infrastructure against theft of hydrocarbons, drugs organizations and terror 
attacks needs to be included in the national agenda to improve maritime 
security and mitigate potential security risks at sea. This could increase the 
trust of investors and stakeholders and would contribute to the faster 
development of new exploration and production fields. While the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) is the 
cornerstone for the construction of the port’s security program and 
establishes the requirements of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), 
including oil port facilities, has not been fully implemented in several 
important Mexican ports. It is concluded that some important ports lack 
many of the core security processes, procedures and controls that should be 
included in any PFSP. This article briefly reviews the situation of the oil 
industry from a security perspective and discusses key elements of maritime 
security; addressing the necessity of the inclusion of maritime security and 
the protection of critical oil infrastructure offshore in the national agenda 
which would provide for future research directions in the maritime security 
domain and contribute to the establishment of a national maritime security 
policy. 
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3) Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2017. Enhancing maritime 
security in Mexico: Privatization, militarization, or a combination of both? 
In: Chaumette, P. (ed.) Economic challenge and new maritime risks 
management: What blue growth? Nantes, France. P. 81-101 Gomylex. 
ISBN: 9788415176862  
The current analysis examines three different options/solutions that Mexico 
implemented within its ports and offshore installations in order to improve 
the country’s maritime security framework, as well as ensuring compliance 
with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code): 
privatization, militarization and finally, their combination. Findings of an 
ongoing research effort include inconsistencies within the data of the 
necessary security incident records, or even their total absence; inadequate 
competence and training among the Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) 
also stands out. Another important issue was the use of different procedures 
among the ports under investigation for dealing with exactly the same 
security issues. The clear conclusion is that after twelve years of the ISPS 
Code implementation, Mexico, which is leading the Inter American Port’s 
Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS), does not 
comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code at an acceptable level; the 
lack of a national maritime security policy has resulted in a poor (maritime) 
security culture, despite the severe (security) challenges that this nation is 
facing. It is also true that the country under discussion is currently 
reorganizing its maritime security apparatus with some positive results; 
tools/recommendations for enhancing the Mexican maritime security 
operating framework are therefore provided, along with areas of potential 
future research. 
4) Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Mexico's reorganisation 
of maritime security regime: A new role for the navy and emphasis on 
energy related infrastructures. In:  Ölçer, A.I., Kitada, M., Dalaklis, D., 
Ballini, F. (Eds.) Trends and Challenges in Maritime Energy Management. 
Springer. P. 95-108  DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-74576-3 
International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) member-States have a strong 
and invested interest in securing their energy supply routes and interrelated 
ports. Preventing incidents in relation to this type of infrastructure is 
essential for commerce and requires careful planning and rigid actions. 
Apart from ensuring the optimal use of energy resources through energy 
efficiency initiatives and policies, eliminating (or, at least reduce) losses 
that are related to theft and/or subversive actions associated with terrorism 
is essential for national security reasons. The legal framework used by the 
United Mexican States government to shift the National Maritime Authority 
21 
from a civil institution (Secretariat of Communications and Transportation, 
in English and referred to as SCT hereafter) towards a military one SEMAR 
(Secretariat of the Navy, in English and referred to as SEMAR hereafter) 
provides the starting point of the analysis at hand. Previous failures of the 
country’s Maritime Designated Authority are associated with an extended 
number of security incidents and various accidents. In an attempt to improve 
the country’s maritime safety and security regimes, a relevant Presidential 
Decree approved in December 2016 transferred the oversight of all Harbour 
Masters from SCT to SEMAR. Research activities on the field testify that 
this initiative achieved high acceptance rates between the four pillars of 
representatives of authorities/institutions directly related to duties and 
operations within these two important domains, a prerequisite for success. 
Apart from the recent Decree, extensive reforms to several laws are still 
necessary to ensure an improved maritime security apparatus. The National 
Congress heavily focused on port security and rather neglected to consider 
that part of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS 
Code) regarding Ship Security Plans and all its related subjects to vessels 
since the previous reform, in 2014. It is also noteworthy that the Decree is 
unnecessarily complicating the tasks of the Maritime Authority; while it 
designates the SEMAR as the National Maritime Authority, it provides the 
tasks of Port Authority (including port state’s privileges and obligations) to 
SCT. This could potentially impact negatively on the conduct of operations 
in the future and indicates a need of improvement in the implementation 
process of IMO’s instruments into national legislation. Amendments to 
regulations concerning security of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units 
(MODUs) and other offshore installations should also be considered to be 
included in the type of vessels obliged to comply with the ISPS Code, since 
a poor security situation in the specific category also strongly affects the 
Mexican oil energy market. 
 
5) Ávila-Zúñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Integrating the 
procedures of reporting port security incidents and the follow-up 
investigation to build a national maritime security policy: A case study in 
Mexico. Accepted for publication by the WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 
(in press, 2018). 
Developments within both the maritime and port security domains are 
regulated by international standards, with the influence of the International 
Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS Code) clearly standing out. The analysis at hand is 
putting forward the idea to improve port security measures in developing 
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countries via integrating the procedures of incident reporting and the 
associated follow up investigation, hinging on the Mexican experience. The 
specific research effort examined port security at Mexican ports; Harbour 
Masters, Commanders of the Mexican Navy as representatives from the 
CUMAR, Directors of Customs Maritime Units, Port Facility Security 
Officers and Port Directors were interviewed on the subject in order to 
identify the challenges and opportunities for security incident reporting, 
updating of security incident records and facilitation of the follow up 
investigation. Then, a qualitative security model was developed; under this 
new framework, incident reporting, incident investigation, the reassessment 
of security threats through the Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) 
and the necessary modifications to the Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) 
were all integrated. These subjects were all incorporated into a “transparent 
port security incident reporting tool”. This tool was then implemented at all 
ports in Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, by the National Maritime 
Authority. This demonstrated in a real case through “action research”, the 
improvement of port security framework in the country. Measurements 
were executed every quarter throughout the year 2017 and the incident-
reporting instrument was adjusted accordingly. The results demonstrated a 
significant improvement in reporting security incidents, with the increase 
from absolutely nothing (zero) to 57 providing a strong indicator of success. 
In addition, 56% of those reported maritime incidents were also associated 
with recommendations to be integrated into the PFSA and respective PFSP. 
Collecting accurate and immediate information/evidence material while 
reporting security incidents is crucial for effective incident investigation 
and continuous improvement of the PFSP. 
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Other works by the respondent 
1) Ávila-Zúñiga-Nordfjeld, A., 2008. Towards a cross-border unitization 
agreement between Mexico and USA for the exploitation of the common oil 
reserves in the Gulf of Mexico. Master Thesis to obtain the degree of Master 
of Laws in Maritime Law. University of Oslo. Norway.  
2) Ávila-Zúñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Assessing the need of 
ISPS Code instruments implementation to Customs Maritime Units. 
Manuscript submitted for publication as a book chapter in:  Il Diritto 
Marittimo – Quaderni. 
The analysis in hand conducts an assessment of the need of implementing 
the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) 
instruments, from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and 
particularly the Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and Port Facility 
Security Plan (PFSP) at Customs Maritime Units. This research effort 
examines the security at Mexican Customs Maritime Units’ installations at 
different ports from the ISPS Code perspective. To study these phenomena, 
Harbour Masters, the Commanders of the Navy, Directors of Customs 
Maritime Units, Port Facility Security Officers and Port Directors from 
eighth of the most important Mexican maritime ports were interviewed on 
the subject to identify the challenges and opportunities for improving 
maritime and port security. Additionally, the Customs Maritime Units’ 
installations were visited for direct observation. The results demonstrate the 
negative effect of customs agents rotation between Customs Airport Units, 
Customs Border Units and Customs Maritime Units, as well as the need for 
the development and implementation of PFSAs and PFSPs not only at ports 
and port terminals, as required by the ISPS Code; but also at the Customs 
Maritime Unit’s installations, which are within the port installations. The 
findings show that more than 40% of port and maritime security incidents 
occurred at the Customs installations during the year of 2017, in Mexico. 
The lack of security assessments and security plans at Customs Maritime 
Units put at risk the whole port facility and its terminals. Therefore it is 
recommended the establishment of a national department within the 
Customs Authority to lead the development of security assessments and 
security plans but in accordance with the specifications of the ISPS Code, 
aiming for a harmonization between “Customs Security Plans” and PFSP, 
in order to establish security procedures at Customs Maritime Units that are 
synchronized with those from the port facility in case of serious security 
incidents. Finally, it was identified the urgent need for providing maritime 
and port security training related to ISPS Code requirements and procedures 
to customs’ police personnel serving in Customs Maritime Units. 
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Theoretical and practical implications are discussed for researchers and 
practitioners in the areas of maritime security and future research directions 
are provided. 
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1. Introduction 
“They [PFSP] may exist in paper form but are rarely pulled off the shelf to test their 
effectiveness. The key to successful port security management in terms of the FSP is 
to understand it as a living document. (…). The FSP should not be written as a one-
time effort, but should truly be a working document that addresses the security threats 
facing the port facility twenty-four hours a day, seven days at week. This means that 
the FSP, like the security function itself, must be continually updated and tested to 
be certain that it mitigates the threats identified is risk assessment”. 
-Kenneth Christopher (2009). 
Concerns about maritime security have grown heavily during last decade due to the 
increase in terror attacks around the globe, as pointed out by Christopher K. (2009), 
who said that “the evolution of organized security processes in the maritime sector 
can be understood as a product of increasing governmental and commercial 
concerns about the criminal exploitation of seaports, […] and the rising threat of 
global terrorism”. Maritime and port security is a topic that has been discussed for 
several decades at the International Maritime Organization (IMO)3 and that received 
exceptional attention after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, against the 
United States of America, who immediately adopted the highest security measures 
to protect its ports and infrastructure.  
In 2004, after the referred tragic events of September 11th, 2001, the IMO 
established a set of maritime security regulations with the aim of improving 
maritime and port security worldwide. These provisions are established in the new 
Chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, (SOLAS Convention), 
comprising the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). Part 
A of the ISPS Code establishes the mandatory provisions, while the non-mandatory 
(“recommended”) part B covers guidelines about how to comply with the mandatory 
requirements established in part A. However, implementation and compliance of the 
ISPS Code and submission of related information is only mandatory for Contracting 
                                                     
3 IMO – the International Maritime Organization – “is the United Nations specialized agency with 
responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by 
ships” (IMO official website, 2018). 
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Governments to the SOLAS 1974 Convention4. The IMO relies on market forces 
and economic factors to ensure compliance of the ISPS Code and therefore, there is 
no penalty mechanism for Contracting Government States that do not comply with 
the ISPS Code requirements (official website IMO, SOLAS 1974). After almost 14 
years of the ISPS Code implementation, market forces and economic factors have 
not been sufficiently powerful to lead to full compliance in several countries around 
the world. One of these is Mexico, where, at the time when this research effort was 
conducted, serious deficiencies were detected. 
The focus of recent research regarding maritime security has been on piracy at sea, 
while port security and security of offshore installations has not received the same 
attention, even when offshore installations have been defined by several researchers 
as vulnerable strategic infrastructure [Lewis (2006); Espin-Digon, Burns-Herbert, 
& Bateman (2008); Weinberg (2008); Christopher (2009); Schulz (2011)]. Yet, 
maritime and port security has not been considered seriously enough in the national 
agenda in Mexico, a country that have suffered several tragic incidents caused by 
organized crime stealing oil and gas from oil installations, including oil terminals at 
ports where drugs, weapons, psychotropic material and money in containers, have 
illegally been transported in ships and continuously confiscated. In this nation, the 
topic remains widely unexplored from the academic perspective as well, as 
discussed in Paper 1 and Paper 2 of this dissertation. 
Even if Mexico does not comply with the ISPS Code at a satisfactory level, a 
significant improvement is recently recorded. During the course of this research 
effort a lot of improvements to harmonize the maritime legislation with maritime 
politics have already been carried out, including the legislative initiative presented 
by the President of Mexico and approved by the National Congress to reform the 
country’s maritime legal framework and allow the shift of maritime safety and 
security responsibility, as well as Port State Control from a civil authority (SCT)5 
towards a military one (SEMAR)6, which entered into force on 17th June, 2017. 
This maritime reform was recommended by the researcher in Paper 3 prior for its 
approval. The reform transferred the control of all Harbour Masters, from SCT to 
SEMAR, which set the SEMAR under structural organizational changes to cope 
with its new responsibilities and duties. However, as discussed in Paper 4 of this 
dissertation, the international legislation concerning the ISPS Code is not fully 
enacted or adopted into national law, which limits the strategies of SEMAR to cope 
with maritime security threats. Despite the extensive maritime reform that enter into 
                                                     
4 The SOLAS Convention is usually referred to as “SOLAS, 1974, as amended”. It is addressed as the 
most important of all international conventions concerning the safety of merchant ships. 
5 The Secretariat of Communications and Transportation, in English, and referred to as SCT here 
thereafter. 
6 The Secretariat of the Navy, Secretaría de Marina (SEMAR) in Spanish, and referred to as SEMAR 
here thereafter. 
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force in 2017, there is still an urgent need of new reforms to national legislation in 
México, to include the part of the ISPS Code related to security of vessels, like 
appointing of Ship Security Officers (SSO), development and approval of Ship 
Security Assessments (SSA) and implementation and compliance of Ship Security 
Plans (SSP), as explained in paper 4 of this dissertation. This research contribution 
not only set light on the need of adequate security training of Port Security Officers 
(PSO), Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) and port security authority 
representatives from the CUMAR7, but also in the poor knowledge about the 
maritime domain on the part of legislation drafters and the National Congress 
representatives. 
The poor performance of the previous Designated Authority (SCT) to comply with 
its obligations under international Conventions from the IMO was documented by 
the researcher in Paper 3, 4 and 5 from various perspectives. SEMAR has been 
responsible for maritime security, including implementation and compliance of the 
ISPS Code since the previous maritime reform of 21st April, 2014, when the 
presidency of the CUMAR was transferred from Harbour Masters to the Admirals, 
Commanders of the Navy sector, zone or region for the specific port. Their duties 
included inspection, revision and approval of Port Security Assessments (PSA), Port 
Facility Security Assessments (PFSA), Port Security Plans (PSP), and Port Facility 
Security Plans (PFSP) at the appropriate maritime security levels. Due to absence 
of cooperation between SCT and SEMAR, Harbour Masters did not explain or 
comment on the changes to Admirals and representatives from the CUMAR, who’s 
lack of knowledge and poor training, resulted in becoming unaware of their duties 
and responsibilities due to these changes. Maritime and port security were left in a 
vulnerable situation for a period of almost three years from 2014 to 2017, when the 
last reform entered into force. These findings as well as poor development of PSA, 
PFSA and PSP, PFSP are among the findings presented in Paper 5 of this doctoral 
dissertation, which were discovered as a result of several research visits to different 
ports in Mexico, where the five pillars of port and maritime security were 
interviewed, including Harbour Masters; Commanders of the Mexican Navy and 
functioning as Presidents of the CUMAR; Directors of Customs Maritime Units; 
Commanders of the UNAPROP (Navy Unit for Port Protection with duties of Coast 
Guard, Unidad Naval de Protección Portuaria, in Spanish, represented with the 
acronym UNAPROP, and called with this acronym here thereafter); Port 
Administration Directors, Port Security Officers (PSO) and Port Facility Security 
Officers (PFSO). 
                                                     
7 Centro Unificado para la Protección Maritíma y Portuaria and represented with the acronym 
“CUMAR”, in Mexico, in Spanish and will be referred to as CUMAR here thereafter. It could be 
translated to “Unified Centre for Port and Maritime Security”, but there is no official translation. 
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These serious findings thoroughly discussed in Paper 5, are central to the topic of 
this doctoral dissertation. Another aspect is that due to the gravity of those findings, 
the researcher decided to make a further effort to integrate action research to the 
study in a determination to contribute improving port and maritime security in 
Mexico.  
In 2017 important solutions were implemented. ISPS Code related training was 
provided to Commanders of the Navy, functioning as Presidents of the CUMAR 
and Commanders of the UNAPROP, who were made aware of their duties and 
responsibilities related to the ISPS Code first by the researcher and later directly by 
the International Maritime Organization, upon requirement of the National 
Maritime Authority, in México, SEMAR.  
The National Maritime Authority implemented at all ports the transparent incident-
reporting tool, developed by the researcher. This brought a significant improvement 
on increasing reporting of incident security incidents and updating of incident 
security records, increasing from zero to 57, during the first year of its 
implementation; the redacted PSP and PFSP were requested and are under revision 
by representatives of the CUMAR.  
These actions implemented by the Maritime National Authority were to a certain 
extent harmonized with the aim of this dissertation, which was first to contribute to 
the maritime world by developing a tool that could be used to set up the strategies 
at a macro level for building a national maritime security policy in any Contracting 
State to the SOLAS Convention around the globe, and at the same time, improve 
security incident reporting and incident investigation. Secondly, to implement it in 
Mexico, testing its usability, improving it through systematic periodical 
measurements to assist the referred country in this duty and offer it to the world. 
This was achieved through several phases of research work, which included 
examination of the national legal framework for port and maritime security related 
to the enactment of the ISPS Code into national legislation; second, to analyse 
current security threats at Mexican ports and oil terminals at port facilities and 
finally; to contribute to the understanding of the value of reporting security incidents 
and updating of security incident logs through the use of “action research” and the 
implementation of the referred tool above.  
Emphasis was also put in the value of reporting incidents classified as “serious,” as 
well as results of security drills and exercises for reassessment of PSA/PFSA, with 
the consequent amendments to PSP/PFSP, recalling that such changes must be 
tested and updated accordingly to manage security threats and maintain the security 
of the port at an acceptable level. 
As mentioned in the abstract, this doctoral dissertation encompasses six (6) 
introductory chapters referred to as the “kappa”, in addition to five (5) annexed 
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papers, which are the result of research conducted over the last three years. Chapter 
one contains this overall introduction to the research presented in this document. It 
is followed by relevant background information presented in Chapter 2. Objectives 
are presented in Chapter 3 while research methods and instruments used in this 
research are explained in Chapter 4, followed by Chapter 5 presenting results and 
findings. General discussion and conclusions are discussed in Chapter 6, including 
future research directions. 
Two of the annexed papers to this kappa have been published as book chapters, one 
more was published in an international peer review journal, and two more were 
published in an international journal. Another one has been submitted to another 
international peer review journal and is currently under review. 
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2. Frames of reference 
The following subsections cover relevant background information to understand the 
importance of this research and its contributions and provide the adequate context 
to the objectives of this dissertation, which will be presented in Chapter 3. The 
subsequent subsections present international legislation related to port and maritime 
security, national legislation in Mexico related to the same topic, current threats to 
port and maritime security for the case of Mexico and finally, the value of testing 
and updating PFSP through sufficient security drills exercises and after assessment 
of serious incidents. 
2.1 International legislation for port and maritime 
security 
Maritime security has been defined as “the state of being free from the threat of 
unlawful acts such as piracy, armed robbery, terrorism, or any other form of 
violence against ships, crews, passengers, port facilities, offshore installations, and 
other targets at sea or in coastal areas” by Mejia, (2007). As it is observed, port 
security is incorporated to the different areas of maritime security. Under this 
approach, port security can be understood as the state where a port facility, including 
its terminals, personnel and all its related infrastructure, as terminal berths and 
navigations channels, vessels at the port, its crew, passengers, service providers 
during operations at the port, Customs Maritime Units and in general, customers of 
the port, are free from any unlawful act of violence such as terrorism, sabotage, 
armed robbery and illegal transportation of drugs and weapons among others.  
A difference between “port security” and “maritime security” as two different study 
areas is appointed for the purpose of this dissertation. However, even if both 
concepts involve different type of risks or threats, in practice they are 
interdependent. This research effort will mainly focus on the part of port security.  
Among the lessons from the terror attack of September 11th, 2001 is that terrorist 
are acquiring a higher level of training and coordination required for aviation and 
maritime targets. Even if land-based infrastructure represents a higher security risk 
and probability factor than terror attacks to the port industry as bomb threats or other 
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scenarios like sinking a vessel in navigation channels, or using it as a weapon against 
the port facility or oil terminals, among others, these are not impossible. Neither is 
the fact of using the ship to smuggle drugs or weapons. 
Jones (2012) argues that “port facilities are inherently vulnerable because they must 
provide access by land and sea and because they are sprawling installations, often 
close to population centres”. The referred author adds that smuggling of drugs, 
contraband, weapons or other illegal products and goods is a well-established 
security threat to shipping and highlights the inherent duty of the master to keep the 
vessel free of illegal items, pointing out the importance of the relationship between 
the charterer and the Port Facility Security Officer in safeguarding both the vessel 
and the port facility. Where there is a suspicion of smuggled unlawful items onboard 
the vessel, a search regime must be carried out. 
To keep the port facility, including its berths and navigation channels on one side 
and vessels on the other side, free of drugs and weapons is a shared responsibility 
from the ship’s Master and the PFSO. The ISPS Code has addressed the risks of 
smuggling items at the interface between the vessel and the port facility and 
establishes the responsibilities and duties of each of the parts for these port 
operations. However, cooperation between both sides is a prerequisite to achieve to 
manage properly such situations. 
Huge differences in security levels can be found at different ports even within the 
same country. These differences in security are even more evident when studying 
ports in different geographical areas. Non the less, some elements of physical 
security must be included in general at all ports to comply with minimum 
international standards concerning security measures established by the ISPS Code, 
regardless of its location. The elements that must be considered in the development 
of PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP include an effective port perimeter security, 
surveillance and patrols, as well as strict access controls by sea and land, Intruder 
Detection System (IDS), CCTV systems to keep control over sensitive areas, metal 
and explosives detectors and establishment of security procedures. 
As Jones (2012) explains, “a port security regime also needs to be able to assess 
the security implications of cargoes and shipments inside, or arriving at, the port. 
This involves investing in X-Ray technology and scanners to pick up security 
breaches such as people, drugs, explosives, radiation and illegal shipments”. 
Considering that security risks can be reduced to an acceptable level through 
implementation of security measures, but never be totally eliminated, the candidate 
defines port security as the comprehensive set of security measures and instruments 
implemented at a port, after security risks has been assessed appropriately, 
continuously and systematically in relation to the port facility (including its 
terminals, personnel, service providers, customers and all its related infrastructure) 
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through security risks assessments, security drills, exercises and the fully 
implementation of a security plan; to manage threats and mitigate results of security 
incidents. 
In reality, there is no port around the world that can claim to be 100 per cent free of 
security threats and, therefore, it is necessary to have performed a PSA/PFSA and 
have implemented a PSP or PFSP, for port terminals, with all its related procedures 
and security measures to respond to security incidents and mitigate the results of 
unlawful actions that threaten the security of ports, port terminals, personnel, 
maritime customs facilities, vessels, and the public in general. 
2.1.1 The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS 
Code) 
Concerning maritime security, one of the most important instruments of 
international law is the set of maritime security regulations developed by the IMO, 
after the tragic events of September 11th, 2001. These provisions were established 
in Chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, (SOLAS Convention), 
containing the ISPS Code. This Code is defined by the IMO as “the comprehensive 
set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities, developed in 
response to the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 
attacks in the United States” (International Maritime Organization, 2012). Whereas 
part A of the Code establishes the mandatory provisions, the non-mandatory 
(“recommended”) part B comprises guidelines about how to comply with the 
mandatory requirements of part A.  
Paper 3 of this dissertation makes it clear that the ISPS Code “only apply to 
passenger ships, high speed passenger vessels and cargo vessels of 500 gross 
tonnage and upwards; as well as Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) in 
transit and at ports (but not to fixed and floating platforms and MODUs on the oil 
field); and all type of port facilities serving vessels offered for international 
voyages”.  It is also explained in Paper 3, that, “the extent to which the guidelines 
apply on ships will depend on the type of the ship, its cargo and number of 
passengers, as well as its sailings routes and the features of the port of or port 
facilities visited by that specific ship. Regarding the application of guidelines to port 
facilities, it will depend on the type of carriages and vessels visiting that particular 
facility and its ordinary trading routes”. 
The mandatory Part A of the ISPS Code, describes that contracting governments 
have to appoint the Designated Authority to carry out certain maritime security 
duties/responsibilities established in the Code. This Designated Authority holds the 
responsibility of setting Maritime Security Levels and ensuring compliance with the 
maritime security measures at all ports (where the ISPS Code apply) through the 
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PSA and PFSA; the revision, approval and control of compliance of the PSP and 
PFSP, which shall be based upon the PSA and the PFSA. The development of 
PSP/PFSP is also within the responsibilities of the PSO/PFSO. The PSO/PFSO must 
identify critical assets within the port when developing the PSA, and plan for 
adequate security measures to meet specific needs in case of security incidents. 
As established by IMO, there are three different security levels: Security Level 1 
(normal) requires the minimum protective security measures at all times. Security 
Level 2, which requires additional protective security measures for the specific 
period of time that the risk of a security incident is heightened and Security Level 
3, which requires specific protective security measures which shall last only for a 
limited period of time when risk for a security incident is probable or imminent, 
even when it is not possible to identify the target. Security Level 3 involves the 
strictest security measures and its priority is the security of the port, port facilities, 
vessels and society that may be affected by a security incident and may result in the 
suspension of commercial operations. Security response under Level 3 is transferred 
to the government or other organizations responsible for dealing with significant 
incidents (International Maritime Organization, 2012). 
K. Christopher (2009) describes the PFSP as: 
 “The plan developed to ensure the application of security measures designed to 
protect the port facility and its serving vessels or those vessels interfacing with the 
facility, their cargoes, and persons on board at the respective MARSEC  levels”. 
Christopher correctly points out that the PFSP is the cornerstone for the construction 
of the port’s security program and includes personnel and physical security systems 
and processes, access control, security force management and vessel and cargo 
operations. He emphasizes the need to develop contingency and emergency 
operations plans and to work efficiently with the federal agencies, port authorities 
and private enterprises in coordinating both routine and emergency response 
mechanisms. According to the IMO Guide to Maritime Security and the ISPS Code 
(2012), threat Level 1 is considered to be “background”, threat level 2 is considered 
to be “moderate” and threat level 3 is considered as “high”. 
However, governments can authorize a Recognized Security Organization (RSO) 
outside the government to carry out part of their responsibilities regarding the 
Maritime Security Measures.  
Never the less, the level of delegating security duties to RSOs is limited to 
performance of PSA/PFSA (which must be approved by the government); approval 
of SSP and subsequent amendments, but only in the case that that specific RSO has 
not been involved in the development and implementation of the Ship Security Plan; 
as well as guidance and assistance on security issues, including advices related to 
SSAs, SSPs, PFSPs and PFSAs. The verification and issuance of the Statement of 
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Compliance (SOC) for port facilities and International Ship Security Certificates 
(ISSC) that comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code are responsibilities of 
the Designated Authority.  
Governments are not allowed to delegate the setting of security levels to RSOs. The 
setting of security levels according to the ISPS Code focuses on the alert for the 
perceived risk of terrorism attacks, but governments may include other type of 
threats in their risk evaluation like armed robbery against vessels and platforms. 
Security levels apply both to ships sailing over their territorial sea and port facilities. 
The governments can decide on the implementation of different security levels for 
different ports, port facilities and different areas of their territorial waters. However, 
the change of security levels must be clearly communicated to port, port facilities 
and vessels attempting to call that port or port facilities and vessels in transit or 
attempting to transit those areas. 
Other duties which governments are not allowed to delegate to RSOs include the 
establishment of requirements for the Declaration of Security (DoS); determining 
the type of port facilities that must appoint a PFSO as well as those facilities that 
must develop and implement the PSP/PFSP; authorization of PSA/PFSA and 
amendments, approval of PSP/PFSP and amendments; exercise of control of 
compliance of security measures of ships with flags from other SOLAS signatory 
states, and issuance of security certificates to personnel on board ships for 
compliance of requirements of the International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers 1978 (STCW) Convention 
and the STCW Code. 
The ISPS Code does not apply to offshore activities. Instead, the IMO has left it up 
to SOLAS contracting Governments to decide whether to extend its application to 
Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) and to fixed and floating oil platforms, 
located in the Continental Shelf. Some Governments with high level of offshore 
activities related to oil and gas exploration and production have developed their own 
regulations extending the application of the ISPS Code security measures to vessels 
engaged in offshore activities, MODUs on location and to fixed and floating 
platforms. In addition, “when foreign-flagged ships are engaged in offshore supply 
or support activities on a State’s Continental Shelf, they can be covered by both, the 
requirements of the Maritime Security Measures and any additional requirement set 
by the coastal state” (International Maritime Organization, 2012). 
In this particular subject a significant case is the model adopted by Brazil, which 
extended the application of the ISPS Code to MODUs and vessels engaged in 
offshore activities. By 31st July, 2009, and through national regulations with specific 
guidelines established by CONPORTOS, the Code (adapted) also applies to vessels 
doing cabotage and support operations to MODUs, according to the Direction of 
Ports and Coasts of the Ministry of Defence, Marine of Brazil.  
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Concerning security for oil platforms, the Brazilian government, under national law, 
launched a series of special regulations adapted from the ISPS Code, where fixed 
and floating platforms located in the Continental Shelf have been treated as port 
facilities and are required, in practice, to adopt the Maritime Security measures 
applied to port facilities as the appointment of a PFSO, the development of PFSA 
and the consequent implementation of PFSP. This facilities, as well as the MODUs 
on location and vessels that under international law are not required to comply with 
the ISPS Code requirements, do not get their certification in direct accordance with 
the ISPS Code; instead, they get issued a “Security Certificate” with the observation 
that it is only accepted in their national territory and not valid for international travel 
or operations at other nations, as established under NORMAM 01/DPC related to 
“Naval Craft Used at the Open Sea8” and NORMAM 08/DPC related to “Traffic 
and Permanence of Naval Craft in Brazilian Jurisdictional Waters”.  
Regrettably, the ISPS Code is mainly focused on terrorism and leaves up to each 
government to determine the extent to which PSO/PFSO/SSO shall reflect threats 
related to armed robbery; drug smuggling; stowaways; illegal migration; and the 
security of dangerous goods, into the evaluation of risks in the PSA/PFSA/SSA and 
their consequent implementation into the respective security plans (International 
Maritime Organization, 2012). However, for many countries these are threats with 
a much higher probability factor of occurrence than terror attacks.  
Raymond & Morrien (2009), criticize that the ISPS Code was sold on the misleading 
premises that it would fundamentally address the threat of terrorism to the shipping 
industry; which according to them was not achieved, neither was this set of 
regulations able to support the shipping industry regarding other type of security 
challenges as armed robbery and traffic of humans and drugs at sea. 
Certainly, the ISPS Code focuses on terrorism and leaves up to each government to 
determine the extent to which this instrument applies to threats related to armed 
robbery, drug smuggling, stowaways and illegal migration; but, the security 
measures established in the Code implicitly cover these areas. If there is a 
framework created by security measures including access control and monitoring, 
restricted security areas, strict control of unauthorized persons, fencing, lightening 
and CCTV monitoring the perimeter area of the port facility, together with intruder 
detection sensors, X-Ray cargo screening, boat patrolling sea waterways, combined 
with floating waterside barriers to protect waterborne access to docks, vessels and 
in general to the harbour area and, if necessary, underwater detection and monitoring 
with security trained divers for underwater surveillance and inspections of vessels 
and the docking area; these should be sufficient to keep port facilities free of drugs, 
weapons, stowaways and unlawful items. 
                                                     
8 EmbarcacionesEmbarcações Empregadas na Navegação em Mar Aberto, in Portugese. 
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2.1.2 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watch keeping for Seafarers, 1978  
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch 
keeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW Convention), is another international 
convention with important provisions regarding port and maritime security. It was 
adopted on 7 July 1978 and entered into force on 28 April 1984 is also extremely 
important concerning training for both, safety and security. And according to the 
IMO, the main purpose of this Convention is to promote safety of life and property 
at sea and the protection of the marine environment by establishing international 
standards of training, certification and watch keeping for seafarers. The Manila 
amendments to the STCW Convention and the Code were adopted on 25th June 
2010, marking a major revision of both, the Convention and STCW Code.  
The 2010 Manila Amendments include, among other things, measures to prevent 
fraudulent practices related to the expedition of certificates of competency and 
strengthen the evaluation process and new requirements related to training in 
modern technology such as electronic charts information systems (ECDIS) and 
Dynamic Positioning Systems; as well as marine environment awareness training 
and training in leadership and teamwork; updating of competence requirements for 
employees serving on board all types of tankers, including new requirements for 
personnel serving on liquefied gas tankers and for personnel serving on board ships 
operating in polar waters; and provisions to ensure that seafarers are properly trained 
to cope with a situation where their ship comes under attack by pirates (International 
Maritime Organization, 2015). 
The set of regulations about training standards for seafarers contained in the 
Convention are reinforced by sections in the STCW Code, from which Part A is 
mandatory, while Part B contains recommended guidance to help contracting 
governments to implement the Convention. The minimum requirements of training 
concerning security awareness are established in Section A-VI/6, paragraph 4 of the 
STCW Code. The minimum standards of competence required for seagoing 
personnel are presented in detail in a series of tables. The measures, suggested in 
Part B, are non-mandatory and the examples given are intended to explain how some 
particular Convention requirements may be complied with. However, the 
recommended guidance represents a harmonized approach between IMO and other 
international organizations.  
It is important to highlight that there are several areas of the STCW Code that 
overlap with some provisions of the ISM Code, as well as the ISPS Code. Adequate 
competence and training are areas addressed in the STCW Code, the ISM Code, and 
the ISPS Code. The concepts of maritime safety and security involve competent and 
sufficient crew/personnel for the respective vessel, port and port facility (port 
terminal). 
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2.1.3 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation, (SUA Convention), Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf 
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), as well as its Protocol for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental 
Shelf are other instruments to deal with terrorism and activities associated with 
terrorism in the Continental Shelf. The SUA Convention and the Protocol relating 
to Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf were adopted on March 10th 
1988; and entered into force on March 1st 1992. The SUA Convention and the 
Protocol were revised in 2005, when the 2005 Protocol was added, after being 
adopted on October 14th 2005 and which entered into force on July 28th 2010. A 
total of 166 countries members of the IMO have ratified the SUA Convention of 
1988 and 154 ratified the corresponding SUA Protocol of 1988. However, by March 
20th. 2018, only 42 countries around the globe have ratified the SUA 2005 
Convention, from which only 36 ratified the 2005 protocol (International Maritime 
Organization, 2018). 
The ISPS Code is complemented by the SUA Convention and its 2005 Protocol, 
“providing a legal basis for the arrest, detention and extradition of terrorist in the 
event of a terrorist attack against shipping” as explained by Jones (2012). 
In the case of Mexico, the SUA Convention 1988 and its Protocol was ratified. 
However, the Mexican authorities have yet to ratify the SUA Convention 2005 and 
Protocols 2005. This is a gap between international and national legislation that 
must be revised by the Mexican authorities. 
2.1.4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) & 
Port State Control 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is the 
comprehensive regime of law and order that regulates the oceans and seas of the 
world in the international jurisdiction, establishing rules for the governance of all 
uses of oceans and their natural resources. The Convention entered into force on 16 
November 1994 and it is globally recognized as the international regime dealing 
with all subjects related to the law of the sea, such as delimitation, environmental 
control, economic and commercial activities in international waters and the 
settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters, among others. It encompasses 320 
articles and nine annexes (United Nations, 1982). 
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The importance of the UNCLOS in relation to port and maritime security is 
associated to some of its articles dealing with Port State Control (PSC) and 
international criminal activities. Port State Control can be described as the exercise 
of the right of protection of the coastal state, as established in Article 25 of 
UNCLOS. The international IMO Conventions; such as SOLAS, including the ISPS 
Code, STCW and MARPOL 1973, as amended9 amongst others, provide the basis 
for carrying out inspections of foreign ships in national ports under PSC. 
The primary obligation to ensure effective implementation and compliance with 
IMO requirements lies with the flag state, through flag state implementation, but 
simultaneously the concept of PSC provides a "safety net" to prevent substandard 
ships from entering/leaving the port (International Maritime Organization). Article 
94 of UNCLOS establishes the duties of the flag State, requiring that: 
“Every state shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, 
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag”. Provision 3 of this article 
reads as follows: “Every state shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as 
are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to: (b) the manning of 
ships, labour conditions and the training of crews [including security 
requirements], taking into account the applicable international instruments [ISPS 
Code]”. Provision 5 of this Article requires each State “to conform to generally 
accepted international regulations, procedures and practices and to take any steps 
which may be necessary to secure their observance”. 
Through Resolution A.1052(27) adopted on 30 November, 2011, the IMO launched 
the new procedures for Port State Control (2011) that established guidelines for 
carrying out inspections under PSC. These guidelines were issued to update them, 
considering the amendments to IMO instruments, which had entered into force or 
become effective since the adoption of previous PSC resolutions. PSC procedures 
establish that vessels larger than 500 tons are subject to inspection of a valid 
International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) on board, as required by the ISPS 
Code.  
In cases where there are “clear grounds” for believing that the ship does not comply 
with the requirements of Part A of the ISPS Code (when inspecting security 
matters), further control measures shall be imposed, such as inspection, delaying or 
detention of the ship and restriction of operations within the port or even expulsion 
from the port, following the established in Regulation XI-2/9.1 (which applies to 
control of ships in port) and Regulation XI-2/9.2 (which applies to control measures 
to ensure compliance to ships intending to enter a port of another Contracting 
                                                     
9 It is the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, with Protocol 
1978 (MARPOL), it covers prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from 
operational or accidental causes (International Maritime Organization, 2018). 
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Government and introduces a totally different concept of control that applies to 
security only) of the SOLAS Convention. These regulations are established in the 
ISPS Code, Part B through sections 4.29 - 4.46 about “Control and Compliance 
Measures”. 
Currently there are nine (9) regional agreements about the implementation of PSC 
(Memoranda of Understanding, MoUs). Among these agreements is the Latin 
American one (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar). At present this MoU encompasses 
cooperation between Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras Mexico, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay (Official 
Website of the Latin American Agreement of Viña del Mar). The Annual Report on 
Port State Control for the year 2016 in relation to the Latin American Agreement 
reveals that the highest number of deficiencies discovered through application of 
PSC in the region corresponds to Brazil with 1,432; from this number 940 were 
rectified, equal to 65.64% success rate. According to the same source, Colombia 
was the State member with the highest level of success, with 81.94 % with respect 
to 454 of deficiencies discovered, from which 372 were rectified. In the case of 
Mexico, there is a rather poor level of resolution (37.65%), with 85 deficiencies 
discovered through PSC, from which only 32 were effectively corrected. 
Another relevant article from UNCLOS and associated to port and maritime security 
and directly or indirectly to PSC is Article 108, dealing with Illicit traffic of narcotic 
drugs or psychotropic substances. This Article reads as follows:  
“All States shall cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high seas contrary to international 
conventions. Any State which has reasonable grounds for believing that a ship flying 
its flag is engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances may 
request the cooperation of other States to suppress such traffic”. 
This provision is especially important in the case of Mexico, due to the fact that the 
highest number of port security incidents during the implementation of the 
“transparent port security incident reporting tool”, through this research effort, 
involved confiscation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, as presented 
in Paper 5. 
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2.2 National legislation in Mexico for port and maritime 
security 
To understand the evolution of maritime legislation in Mexico, it is necessary to 
comprehend the development of the maritime transport in the country and the 
changes of its control among governmental institutions. Therefore, a brief 
introduction of the maritime realm in Mexico is presented below. 
2.2.1 Evolution of the maritime realm in Mexico 
Mexico has experienced a period of extreme violence during last decades when 
“extortion payments” by Port Directors, concessionaries and port terminals 
operators to members of the organized crime to avoid damage to their installations, 
started, as denounced by the Federal Deputy from the Deputy Chamber of the 
Federal Congress, LXII Legislature, Germán Pacheco Díaz, before the National 
Parliament, Chamber of Deputies on 5th of November, 2013, (Cámara de Diputados 
del Honorable Congreso de la Unión, LXII Legislatura , 2013).   
This resulted in the reorganization of maritime and port security in the country, 
reforms to several laws and the approval of new regulations since 2014, including 
the Law of Ports10, the regulation of the CUMAR and the Law of Navigation and 
Maritime Trade11, amongst others. Additionally, the creation of the UNAPROP(s) 
was decided. Later, on 3rd March, 2016 the President of Mexico, Enrique Peña 
Nieto presented a legislative initiative to reform, add and derogate diverse 
provisions of the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration12, Law of 
Navigation and Maritime Trade and the Law of Ports to transfer the control, 
inspection, vigilance and other activities related to the merchant marine and the 
maritime industry, including Harbour Masters and the National Maritime Authority 
from a civil authority (SCT) towards a military one (SEMAR), but excluding port 
development and its administration. This legislative initiative was approved by the 
National Congress without any change and published as a decree on the Official 
Diary of the Federation and called DOF here thereafter 13 on 19th December, 2016. 
The decree establishes the new attributions of SEMAR, which entered into force on 
17th June, 2017. 
The then President “Don Porfirio Díaz” (1876-1911), instigated the development of 
the maritime industry in Mexico with the construction of ports as Veracruz, 
                                                     
10 Ley de Puertos, in Spanish. 
11 Ley de Navegación y Comercio Marítimos, in Spanish. 
12 Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública Federal, in Spanish. 
13 Diario Oficial de la Federación, in Spanish and represented with the acronym DOF. 
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Tampico, Coatzacoalcos, Manzanillo and Salina Cruz, as explained in a chronicle 
written by the National Congress about the development of the Mexican Merchant 
Marine. The maritime economic vision of Porfirio Diaz was truncated with the 
Mexican Revolution and recommenced during the government of General Manuel 
Avila Camacho, with the creation of the SEMAR, in 1940. During the government 
of Adolfo Ruiz Cortinez together with Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada, as the Secretary 
of SEMAR, started the first maritime industrial program, called “Towards the Sea”, 
which had the goal of the integration of a national maritime and port network; 
exploit the maritime resources; transfer population from the cities to the coast; 
establish shipyards and finally; develop the merchant marine.  
According to historical records, until 1976 the SEMAR kept control of ports and the 
merchant marine; but in 1977 the then President José López Portillo (1976-1982) 
reformed the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration, allocating to the 
SCT all activities related to the development and promotion of merchant marine, as 
well as the construction of port infrastructure and its respective administration and 
operation, including port and maritime security. As a part of this reform, it was also 
integrated into the SCT the National Commission for Coordination of Ports, the 
escrow for port and maritime equipment; the port services enterprises, the escrow 
for the Nautical Merchant School and the pilot service. It is also necessary to 
highlight that Lopez Portillo consolidated the tanker fleet and established the four 
biggest shipyards in the country: Veracruz, Mazatlán, Guaymas and Ensenada.  
However, naval crafts, including patrol vessels, helicopters and other associated 
equipment were left to the Navy (SEMAR). SCT and particularly the Harbour 
Masters, never received the necessary human and material resources to exercise its 
authority in a satisfactory manner regarding its functions and duties related to 
maritime safety and security, port state control and inspection of vessels, port 
facilities and port terminals. In 2017, almost 40 years later, these functions were 
reallocated to the authorities of the SEMAR. 
2.2.2 Port & maritime security legislation in Mexico 
The IMO communicates via its web site the information that 35 different countries 
located in the American Continent have signed and ratified the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974; Mexico is included in the 
aforementioned group. Thus, Mexico, as Contracting Government to the SOLAS 
1974 Convention, which includes Chapter XI-2 concerning special measures to 
enhance maritime security, and Regulation XI-2/3 that enshrines the International 
Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code), must fully enact the ISPS Code 
into national legislation. 
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The ISPS Code was implemented by Mexico since it entered into force in July 2004. 
Later it was integrated into national law through the Regulation of the CUMAR, 
which was published in the DOF on April 21st 2014 and is comprised of 21 articles. 
Its object is to regulate the organization and operation of the CUMAR, which is 
responsible for implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code. 
The ISPS Code applies to 16 Federal Integrated Port Administrations (FIPA) in 
Mexico, which operate under concessions given by the SCT and are the following: 
Altamira, Tampico, Tuxpan, Veracruz, Coatzacoalcos, Dos Bocas, Progreso, 
Ensenada, Guaymas, Topolobampo, Mazatlán, Puerto Vallarta, Manzanillo, Lázaro 
Cárdenas, Salina Cruz y Puerto Madero, (Secretariat of Communications and 
Transport, 2016).  
As explained before, there are three different security levels: Security Level 1 
(normal); Security Level 2, (which requires additional protective security measures 
for a specific period of time) and; Security Level 3, (which requires specific 
protective security measures). In Mexico, it is the CUMAR which is responsible to 
ensure implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code at all security levels, as 
established in the Law of Ports, Article 19 TER and is responsible for decision-
making, coordination and execution of all security operations under Security Level 
3. The commander of the Naval Military Zone (from SEMAR) of each jurisdiction 
where a CUMAR is established, shall be appointed as the Chairman of that 
respective CUMAR, as established in provision 8 of the CUMAR’s Regulation 
published on the DOF   on 21st April, 2014. This provision adds that the Harbour 
Master (which now belongs to SEMAR), shall be nominated as the Vice-Chairman 
of the CUMAR, plus three employees of each of these institutions, who shall be 
selected as advisers. A CUMAR shall be established at each of the 16 ports (FIPAs) 
designed to receive vessels of over 500 gross tonnage or receiving vessels trading 
in international traffic, according to Provision 6 of the referred regulation. 
Contrariwise, the Law of Ports Article 19 BIS, establishes that the CUMAR is a 
group of inter institutional coordination between the SEMAR and the SCT for the 
application and compliance of the ISPS Code. However, since the Harbour Master’s 
authority figure has been transferred from SCT to SEMAR, the application of this 
“inter institutional character” must be reassessed, as discussed in Paper 4 of this 
dissertation. Article 19 TER, paragraph II of this law highlights that “the CUMAR 
shall apply all the dispositions and response measures within the framework of the 
Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 1974 Convention, comprising the ISPS Code and ensure 
the establishment of a series of functions and actions for each of the respective three 
security levels”. This is part of the maritime security reforms that took effect on 
April 21st 2014. But because of lack of knowledge about the reform itself, the 
SEMAR did not fully exercise its authority and the Harbour Masters, which under 
this reform relinquishes the chairmanship of this operative organ to the Commander 
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of the Navy Military Zone from SEMAR, were still erroneously recognized as the 
authority by PFSOs and port agencies until 2017. The CUMAR is responsible for 
the revision and approval of the PSA and PFSA, which covers the security risks 
evaluation for ports or port facilities, which shall be the base for developing the PSP 
or PFSP, which then, shall be submitted for revision and approval to the CUMAR. 
Once the Plan is approved, the Designated Authority (SEMAR from June 2017 and 
SCT before that) must verify its implementation and compliance through the 
CUMAR and issue the Statement of Compliance (SOC), which shall not exceed five 
years.  
The responsible person for developing the PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP is the PSO or 
PFSO, including compliance of all requirements established in the ISPS Code and 
reflected in the PSP/PFSP as training, exercises, practices, inspections audits and 
modifications via formalised procedures to the plan.  
As established in Paper 3, PSO/PFSO must attend security incidents and keep 
incident security records updated, which must be considered in the risk evaluation 
and integrated into the security plan to achieve a constant reduction of risks and the 
continuous improvement of port and maritime security. The CUMAR shall verify 
among other aspects, that security incidents are properly recorded in the security 
incidents register and even if it is the UNICAPAM (Unit of Harbour Masters and 
Maritime Affairs)14 from SEMAR, the responsible institution for the issuance of 
certification of security plans, the CUMAR is responsible for its approval and the 
organ that must instruct to UNICAPAM (after the last maritime reform) the issuance 
of the respective certificate. This, due to the established in the Law of Ports, Article 
19 TER, which as explained before, says that the CUMAR is the responsible for 
control and compliance of the ISPS Code and co-responsible for the revision and 
approval of PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP, according to its Regulation, Article 7, 
paragraph II, which reads as follows: 
 “[CUMAR] shall participate in the evaluation of risks of maritime and port 
security, previous to the elaboration of the security plans and it shall propose the 
necessary modifications and updating to those plans”. Paragraph III of this article, 
adds that, once the plan has been approved, the CUMAR shall participate in the 
verification and control of compliance of plans ensuring its effective 
implementation. 
This means, from a strict judicial perspective, that all current certificates of 
approved PSP and PFSP and even Ship Security Plans (SSP) not originally approved 
by the CUMAR and issued directly by the SCT were not issued in accordance to the 
juridical procedures. As mentioned before, the CUMAR representatives did not 
                                                     
14 Unidad de Capitanías de Puerto y Asuntos Marítimos, in Spanish and represented with the 
acronym UNICAPAM. 
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understand their duties and responsibilities, which were practically ignored and 
most PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP were approved directly by FIDENA15 and the 
certificates issued by the previous National Maritime Authority, SCT, without 
following the established legal procedures concerning approval by the CUMAR. 
The SCT renewed an agreement with FIDENA on 7th March, 2013, to practically 
allow them operate as a Recognized Security Organization (RSO) and delegate 
some functions of the Designated Authority, including the revision and approval of 
PSA and PFSA, as well as the audits and verification of its implementation, without 
taking into consideration the established in the Law of Ports and the Regulation of 
the CUMAR, concerning the responsibilities of the CUMAR. Moreover, the validity 
of this agreement between the SCT and FIDENA can also be questionable, since the 
Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration, Article 16, third paragraph, 
establishes that “the agreements through which attributions are delegated to other 
administrative organs must be published in the DOF”. This agreement, which has a 
hypothetical validity of six years and expires in 2019, was never published in the 
DOF. 
Therefore, the validity of Statements of Compliance of Mexican Ports should be 
revised concerning the issuance´s procedures, under a strict juridical perspective. 
Unfortunately, the majority of ports and terminals in Mexico are facing this 
situation. Vessels calling to ports that do not hold a  valid SOC should not be able 
to call to American or European ports, due to their strict regulations. However, since 
the legality of such SOCs and ISSCs has not been evaluated yet, there has not been 
recorded any problem in respect of Mexican vessels calling on American ports or 
the case were American or European ports denied entrance to vessels that have 
previously conducted loading and unloading operations at Mexican ports.  
Vessels that do not hold a valid ISSC or that report in the Advance Notice of Arrival 
(ANA form) or Advance Notice of Arrival and Departure (ANAD form, for the 
United States of America) to have previously performed operations at ports or 
terminals that do not comply with the ISPS Code, may be denied entrance to ports 
and port facilities that fully comply with the ISPS Code requirements, through PSC 
inspections for that particular port. The last 10 calls at port facilities at which the 
ship conducted a ship-port interface must be reported in the ANA/ANAD when 
vessels attempt to call a port. 
Consequently, the implementation of a national program for recertification of 
compliance with the ISPS Code at Mexican ports and vessels to which this 
                                                     
15 Fideicomiso de Formación y Capacitación para el Personal de la Marina Mercante Nacional, in 
Spanish, in Mexico (Fund of Education and Training for the National Merchant Marine, in 
English, own translation). 
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international regulation applies is critically urgent, to avoid possible and severe 
international and economic consequences. 
Accordingly with the CUMAR’s regulation and until this law provisions change, 
SEMAR must instruct the CUMARs to perform an extensive revision and approval 
of PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP at all ports in the country, and instruct/advise to 
UNICAPAM the issuance of the respective certificates and SOCs, and do it properly 
according to current procedures established by law. 
2.2.3 The maritime reform of 2017 that transferred Harbour Masters 
from SCT to SEMAR 
This legislative initiative was presented on 3rd March, 2016, by the current 
President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto before the Chamber of Senators of the 
National Congress to reform the country’s legal framework and allow the shift of 
maritime safety and security responsibility, as well as port state control from a civil 
authority (SCT) towards a military one (SEMAR). Additionally, to improve the 
level of maritime safety and security at sea at all ports, as well as in the Mexican 
ocean territory. It also covered the control change of all Harbour Masters, from SCT 
to SEMAR. It was approved by the National Congress without any change and 
published as a decree on the DOF on 19th December, 2016; establishing the new 
attributions of the SEMAR, which entered into force after 180 “natural days” of its 
publication in the DOF, on 17th June, 2017. 
As described in Paper 4 of this dissertation, the initiative emphasized the 
convenience of defining one National Maritime Authority to be able to comply with 
the national and international obligations, and the need to limit and redistribute the 
attributions that both SEMAR and SCT actually exercise. However, after the 
reform, several duties and responsibilities are shared and the amendments do not 
specify clearly enough the change from SCT to SEMAR, creating a duality of some 
serious attributions concerning the existence of only one entity to represent the 
country before international organizations for the negotiations of international 
treaties, and executing its obligations derived of such international conventions. 
Whereas SEMAR is the “Maritime National Authority” concerning maritime safety 
and security; SCT was also appointed as the “Maritime National Authority” for ports 
and its economic development. Additionally, it is attributed to SCT the “port 
authority”. 
The legislative initiative stressed that the SEMAR as an institution of the Federal 
Public Administration currently has the human and material resources necessary to 
comply amongst other attributions, with the exercise of the national sovereignty and 
authority in the Mexican marine zones; guarantee the compliance of the port and 
maritime national legal framework; protect the maritime and fluvial traffic; 
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intervene in the prevention and control of marine pollution; and safeguard human 
life at sea, “without prejudice of the attributions that correspond to SCT in the area 
of merchant marine”.  
The initiative, which was approved without any change, has several ambiguities. 
The reform to the Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade empowers both, the 
SEMAR and the SCT to represent the country in the negotiations with international 
conventions in the maritime realm; and to be the executor organ and its interpreter 
in the administrative sphere with respect to the attributions that according to this 
law, to each of them corresponds. It précises that Harbour Masters are transferred 
to SEMAR, redistributing the attributions that they currently have, leaving uniquely 
to SCT those related with the regulation, organization and administration of the 
merchant marine and economic administration and development of ports. 
In summary, the reform provides attributions to SEMAR to approve and issue the 
licenses for passenger & tourism maritime transport services with small boats; 
authorize the vessels to bear away and bear off as well as customs clearance; flag 
and register of vessels, administrate the national registers both, of maritime crew 
and ships; inspect and verify national and foreign vessels; the compliance of 
international conventions as well as national legislation and official Mexican norms 
related to maritime safety and security; safeguard human life at sea and the 
prevention of marine pollution; the imposition of sanctions; as well as appointing 
and removing Harbour Masters. Whereas it confirms SCT to continue leading the 
administration of ports, stimulate port development, training and control of 
merchant marine; construction of port infrastructure and ocean dredging, maritime 
and fluvial passages; development of the maritime industry; concessions, 
permissions and maritime fees and in general, all maritime business related to 
productive activity generator of economic resources. Another inconsistency is that 
it will be the SCT which will be the responsible institution for planning, formulating 
and conducting the political programs for the development of water transport and 
the merchant marine and which will regulate and verify that the pilot service is 
offered in a safe and efficient form. The pilot service is an important part of maritime 
safety and security; often, it is the pilot as the first person on board who can 
determine if the vessel represents a risk for safety/security of ports. Currently in 
Mexico vessel inspections are performed at the dock in the ports, while it is 
recommended to carry this activity in the 12 to 24 mile Contiguous Zone. With the 
reform, the resources of SEMAR can allow Harbour Masters to comply with their 
obligations as established by law.  
The reform modifies Article 7 of the Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade and 
establishes that the “National Maritime Authority” is exercised by the Federal 
Executive Power through SEMAR for the exercise of national sovereignty; 
maritime safety and security; as well as the Right of the State to be applied in the 
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marine Mexican zones; all this without prejudice to the attributions that correspond 
to other institutions. Concerning areas related to the merchant marine, the authorities 
are: 
I. "Both, the SCT and the SEMAR according to their respective attributions; 
II. Master Mariners of Mexican vessels; and 
III. The Mexican consul abroad, authorized at the port or place where the vessel 
that requires the authority intervention is required for the effect that the 
referred law determines”. 
Supporting this provision, the law decree reforms Article 8 of the Law of Navigation 
and Maritime Trade establishing the new attributions of the SCT, without prejudice 
of other institutions that belong to the Federal Public Administration. These 
attributions are: 
I. "To plan, formulate and conduct policies and programs for the development 
of water transport of the merchant marine and national ports respecting the 
provisions established in this law and other juridical provisions applicable; 
II. To represent the country in the negotiations in international treaties in the 
maritime domain respecting the attributions that conforming to this law 
corresponds, being the executor of them and its interpreter in the 
administrative sphere; 
III. To keep the Maritime National Public Register; 
IV. To integrate the statistical information of the maritime merchant transport; 
V. To grant permissions and authorization of navigation to offer services in the 
general passages of water communication, as well as verifying its 
compliance, revocation or suspension of them if necessary, in the case of 
major naval craft; 
VI. To organize, regulate and offer services of control of navigation at the ports 
and anchoring area. 
VII. To regulate and oversee that the pilot service is offered both safely and 
efficiently and according to this Law and its Regulation; 
VIII. To organize, promote and regulate the education and training of marine 
merchant’s personnel, as well as granting certificates of competence in the 
terms of this law and its regulation, vigil its compliance and revoke or 
suspend them, in cases when necessary; 
IX. Participate with the SEMAR in safety of navigation and safeguard human 
life at sea; 
X. Establish in coordination with SEMAR, the port security measures that 
must apply the CUMAR, conforming to the settled in the Law of Ports; 
XI. Establish terms and regulations for the fees of maritime services in national 
territory including coastal and fluvial waters, when in the opinion of the 
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Federal Commission of Economic Competition, where conditions for an 
effective competition do not exist. 
XII. To apply for the intervention of the Secretariat of Economy, when assuming 
the existence of international commercial practices breaching the national 
legislation with respect to foreign trade as well as international treaties; 
XIII. To apply for the intervention of the Federal Commission of Economic 
Competition, when assuming the existence of practices that breach the 
Federal Law of Economic Competition, as well as assisting in the respective 
investigation; 
XIV. To impose sanctions for breaches to this law and its regulations and current 
international treaties in the areas that correspond to this order; 
XV. Other provisions from other laws and regulations juridical applicable”. 
The decree also reforms Article 8 BIS of the referred Law to establish the new 
attributions of the SEMAR, without prejudice of other institutions that belong to the 
Federal Public Administration. These attributions are: 
I. "To flag and register the Mexican vessels and naval artefacts; 
II. Certify navigation days, issue the sea ledgers and identify the maritime 
personnel sailing of the Mexican merchant marine; 
III. Oversee that the general communication of water passages and navigation 
comply with the safety conditions and maritime signalling; 
IV. Oversee the safety of navigation and safeguard human life at sea; 
V. Organise, regulate and, if necessary, offer services to help the navigation 
and maritime radio communication; 
VI. Inspect and certify the Mexican vessels for compliance with the 
international treaties, national legislation, regulations and other Mexican 
norms in the area of safety navigation and human life at sea as prevention 
of marine pollution from ships; 
VII. Inspect foreign vessels and naval craft, conforming to the established in 
international treaties; 
VIII. Grant authorisation of inspectors as physical persons to perform the 
verification and certification of compliance of international treaties and the 
applicable national legislation, keeping supervision over such persons; 
IX. Establish and organize a body of vigilance, safety and help for the 
navigation in fluvial waters; 
X. Carry out investigations and proceedings as well as designing experts 
professionally empowered in the area and terms of the respective regulation 
to emit dictates concerning maritime and fluvial accidents and incidents; 
XI. Help in the boundaries of competence with the labour authority for the 
compliance of resolutions maritime conflicts of labour nature; 
XII. Impose sanctions for breaches to this Law and its Regulation, as well as 
current international treaties in the terms corresponding to this provision; 
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XIII. Appoint and remove Harbour Masters; 
XIV. Establish and coordinate with the SCT, the maritime security measures that 
shall apply the CUMAR, conforming to the established in the Law of Ports; 
XV. Direct, organize and carry out the search and rescue for safeguard of human 
life at sea in the maritime Mexican zones, as well as coordinating help and 
rescue in the case of accidents and incidents of vessels and port installations; 
XVI. Integrate the statistical information of accidents in the marine Mexican 
zones; 
XVII. Administrate the national registers of sea crew and vessels, conforming to 
the established in the respective regulation; 
XVIII. Represent the country in the negotiations of international treaties in the 
maritime area, with respect to the attributions that conforming to this Law 
correspond; and being the executor organ of such treaties and its interpreter 
in the administrative sphere; 
XIX. Other provisions from other laws and regulations juridical applicable”. 
Concerning Fraction XIV of this Article, it is important to recall that according to 
the Law of Ports Article 19 BIS, the CUMAR is a group of inter institutional 
coordination between SEMAR and SCT. This part was not amended with the 
reform. However, since SEMAR will have the control of both, Harbour Masters and 
the CUMAR itself; the “inter institutional character” of this group should be re-
evaluated to analyse to which extent the inter institutional coordination is necessary. 
As described in Paper 4 of this dissertation, SCT kept the control of FIDENA, which 
in practice has some functions of a RSO. It is the authorized institution for giving 
the courses 18.1 (PFSO course), 18.2 (personnel with specific security duties) and 
18.3 (rest of port facility personnel) concerning the ISPS Code, and in practice, since 
2004, it has been the only authorized institution for performing PSA and PFSA and 
erroneously, performing the respective approval’s revision of PSA/PFSA, as well 
as inspections and audits for approval of PSP and PFSP [and also the part concerning 
vessels], which should had been conducted by the CUMARs. Until 2017 there was 
no regulation dealing with Recognized Security Organizations. Consequently, there 
was no RSO operating in Mexico. Because of the lack of exercise of its authority, 
on the part of SEMAR and the CUMARs at each port, FIDENA is also executing 
the annual inspections to revise compliance with PSP/PFSP.  
These duties are responsibility of the CUMARs, as established in Article 12 -17 of 
its Regulation, where it is clear that the CUMAR is responsible for revision of 
PSA/PFSA and to make modifications when necessary, also to the PSP/PFSP.  All 
these revisions, inspections and audits that should have been performed by the 
CUMAR and in international practice are free of charge, since these obligations 
provided by the National Maritime Authority, were performed and economically 
charged by FIDENA to port and terminal operators. 
51 
After the extensive reform of 2016, concerns have been expressed about the validity 
of the “inter institutional character” of the CUMAR, due to this, SCT has demanded 
representatives in the CUMAR. But, as discussed previously, the Regulation of the 
CUMAR, Article 8 establishes very clearly how it shall be constituted. The 
Commander of the Navy Military Zone of each jurisdiction where a CUMAR is 
established shall be appointed as the Chairman of that respective CUMAR, while 
the Harbour Master shall be nominated as the Vice-Chairman, plus three employees 
of each of these institutions [the Navy and the Harbour Master], who shall be 
selected as advisers. Currently both belong to SEMAR and therefore SCT is out of 
the CUMAR.  
On the one hand, with the reform, the Article 8 of the CUMAR’s regulation is not 
harmonized with the “inter institutional character” of Article 19 of the Law of Ports. 
On the other hand, if they include representatives from SCT to the CUMAR, it 
contravenes the specifications of Article 8 of the Regulation of the CUMAR about 
how it shall be constituted. In both cases the constitution of the CUMAR might be 
declared invalid.  
Yet, SCT argues that because of the inter institutional character between SCT and 
SEMAR, the conformation of the current CUMAR is unacceptable, while SEMAR 
refuses to include SCT in this organ. Therefore, in practice, the CUMAR has not 
been fully operating after the last reform either. To clarify these aspects, 
coordination between these two institutions is still necessary.  
The CUMAR is currently performing the responsibilities of a Port Security 
Committee (PSC)16, which is a committee recommended by the ISPS Code to 
coordinate security procedures and measures. Under the CUMAR is also established 
the Port Security Advisory Committee, which is integrated by the CUMAR, 
UNAPROP, customs and immigration authorities operating at the port; as well as 
management of the port operator and port terminals; municipal and regional 
authorities with interests in that specific port or jurisdiction.  
The UNAPROP, which currently functions as coast guard, is under the control of 
the Commander of the navy zone at each port, who is the President of the CUMAR. 
However, as recommended in paper 4 and appended to this dissertation, the duties 
and responsibilities of the UNAPROP should be evaluated and confirmed. This unit 
currently has duties of a port and maritime police and its main function is the 
security of vessels (in territorial waters and those flagging the Mexican flag), ports 
and port facilities. According to UNAPROP’s guidelines concerning duties and 
responsibilities, in addition to port security; this unit is responsible for control and 
                                                     
16 This is also an ambiguity of IMO, which established the same acronym for both, Port Security 
Committee (PSC) and for Port State Control (PSC). Therefore, when referring to the Port Security 
Committee in this dissertation, it will be called by its full name. 
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compliance of the ISPS Code at the port and port terminals. But this document it’s 
not clear enough with respect to its duties and responsibilities under the CUMAR.  
The development of rules/protocols with specific and concrete duties for the 
UNAPROP is examined in Paper 4.The recommended duties for this unit are as 
follows: 
• Revision and control to ensure all maritime ports and port facilities are 
operating with an updated and valid Statement of Compliance (SOC). 
• Revision and control that all ports and terminals have employed a certified 
PSO/PFSO with an updated and valid certificate. 
• Revision and control that all personnel from ports and terminals with 
security duties have been certified with the necessary training concerning 
the required course 18.2 as established in the ISPS Code. 
• Revision and control that all personnel from ports and terminals without 
specific security duties have been certified with the necessary training 
concerning the required course 18.3 as established in the ISPS Code. 
• Develop and keep the official register of maritime security incidents for that 
specific port. 
• Revise and control that all PSO/PFSO keep updated their own register for 
reporting maritime security incidents. 
• Participate in the revision and analysis of PSA and PFSA (for terminals). 
• Participate in the inspections for approval of PSA and PFSA (for terminals). 
• Participate in the revision and analysis of PSP/PFSP and make observations 
for necessary modifications to those plans. 
• Participate in inspections and audits to verify the implementation of 
PSP/PFSP before the issuance of the SOC. 
• Carry out random inspections onsite and general inspections to verify the 
compliance of PSP/PFSP during the validity period of SOCs, including the 
inspection areas concerning documents and records; access control; 
restricted area access control; availability and maintenance of security 
equipment; training for security equipment; handling of cargo; delivery of 
ship’s stores and bunkers; security procedures for monitoring security 
vulnerabilities acknowledged in the PSP/PFSP; procedures for threats and 
security incidents; security and communications; internal audits and 
amendments to PSP/PFSP; procedures for shore leave and visits to the ship; 
procedures for the interface between the ship and terminals related to ship 
security activities; evacuation procedures and the security procedures for 
protecting the PSP/PFSP from unauthorized persons and handling of 
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security information. All these points with specific procedures for each of 
the three maritime security levels (1, 2 and 3). 
• Plan, coordinate and carry out security exercises (level 3) at a minimum 
interval of once per annum with a maximum of 18 months intervals. 
• Participate in the evaluation of security exercises (level 3). 
• Participate and make the necessary observation for the external security 
audit, which shall be performed with a minimum interval of once a year. 
• Develop and keep updated the register of approved PSA/PFSA; PSP/PFSP; 
drills, exercises; inspections and other relevant operations for availability to 
IMO, in the case of mandatory audits. 
The agreement number 039 was published on 31st of March, 2014 in the DOF, for 
the creation and activation of 19 UNAPROPs at the maritime ports of Ensenada 
(B.C.N.); La Paz (B.C.S.); Guaymas (Sonora), Mazatlán (Sinaloa); Puerto Vallarta 
(Jalisco); Manzanillo (Colima); Lazaro Cárdenas (Michoacán); Acapulco 
(Guerrero); Salina Cruz (Oaxaca); Puerto Chiapas (Chiapas); Matamoros, Altamira 
and Tampico (Tamaulipas); Tuxpan, Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos (Veracruz); Dos 
Bocas (Tabasco); Ciudad del Carmen (Campeche); and finally Progreso (Yucatán). 
However, from these 19 authorized UNAPROPs only 14 have been created and 
activated. It lacks its activation at the ports of La Paz, Puerto Vallarta, Matamoros 
and Dos Bocas. This last port also lacks the official creation of the CUMAR! This 
means that since the creation of the CUMAR, there has not been any authority 
performing port security duties and control of compliance with the ISPS Code at the 
Port of Dos Bocas, in which there are located some of the most important and 
vulnerable terminals involved with handling hydrocarbon resources. 
The CUMAR and respective UNAPROP should also be created at the Federal 
Integrated Port Administration (FIPA) of Topolobampo and the State-owned Port 
Administration of Cozumel as well as at ports with Integrated Port Administrations 
from the National Board of Tourism17 at Cabo San Lucas and Huatulco, due to the 
type of operations of these ports and its importance concerning security inspections; 
since most of their operations are related to passenger transport and the cruise vessel 
industry, which could represent a target for terrorist groups.  
A terror attack against a ferry that transported passengers and mainly foreigner 
tourists occurred on February 21st 2018, when the ferry arrived at the Cozumel port 
facility from Playa del Carmen, both close to Cancun (Sputnik, 2018). The referred 
source pointed out that the explosion left 18 persons seriously injured and that more 
explosives ready to be detonated were found by Federal Authorities of Mexico on 
March 1st in another ferry at the same port facility. The Embassy of the United States 
                                                     
17 Fondo Nacional de Turismo, and represented with the acronym FONATUR, in Spanish. 
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of America stated that the event was a terror attack and recommended American 
tourists to avoid travelling to that destination. Thus, it is recommended to extend the 
application of the ISPS Code to ferries of less than 500GRT sailing in main national 
touristic routes, which might be a target for terrorist organizations. 
As mentioned in Paper 4, due to the lack of resources at the Harbour Masters offices, 
vessel inspections are currently performed at the dock in the ports of Mexico, which 
for safety and security reasons, should be done preferably outside, in the open ocean, 
between 12 and 24 miles in the Contiguous Zone. To allow Harbour Masters to 
comply with their obligations as established by law, the SEMAR should evaluate to 
allocate to them some of the interceptor-patrols they already have or assess the 
acquisition of some additional Ocean Patrol Vessel(s) Defender II, which is a 
relatively small naval vessel designed to perform coastal defence duties, but large 
and seaworthy enough to patrol offshore areas in the open ocean. Another option is 
to allocate interceptor patrols to the UNAPROP at least at the four hub ports of 
Manzanillo, Lázaro Cárdenas, Altamira and Veracruz; and also Ciudad del Carmen 
which encompasses the offshore area of Campeche, where the oil exploration and 
production zone is located; performing joint inspections between Harbour Masters 
and the UNAPROP, in a way that, inspectors belonging to Harbour Masters perform 
the verification of required certifications, and if necessary, registers, machinery, 
lightening, communication, and navigation equipment, anti-fire systems, life boats 
and marine insurances; among other aspects, while the UNAPROP may perform the 
inspection for issues related to the ISPS Code. 
2.2.4 The decree about safety & security zones for navigation and over 
flight in the surroundings of offshore installations 
The decree on the agreement for the establishment of safety and security zones for 
navigation and over flight in the surroundings of offshore installations, and integral 
and sustainable exploitation of fishery and aquaculture resources in Mexican marine 
areas, is another recently published ruling worthy to discuss. This ruling was 
presented by the current President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto and published in 
the DOF on 11th October 2016. The decree has a direct impact in maritime safety 
and security around the oil platforms located at the Continental Shelf in the Gulf of 
Mexico and vessels conducting loading and unloading operations at the area.  
This decree changed the provisions also established by another decree published on 
the DOF on 11th September 2003, where it established safety and security measures 
for the offshore area of Campeche. This decree established that in the “Prevention 
Areas” no activity would be allowed, excepting those related to oil exploration and 
production; but permitted the fast and uninterrupted traffic of fishery vessels en 
route to their fishing areas located outside the exclusion areas. The traffic of naval 
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vessels and aircraft entering the zones was controlled. On the other hand, it did not 
permit all naval traffic or aircraft, including fishing vessels, in the “Exclusion 
Areas”, excepting those required by the platforms. In addition the decree also 
required the Automatic Identification System (AIS) on board aircraft and vessels 
transiting in the prevention and exclusion areas already in 2003. 
These provisions were derogated with the purpose of increasing the productivity of 
the country and reactivating the economy of those provinces, with the new decree 
published in the DOF on 11th October, 2016; and which entered in force already the 
day after its publication, on 12th October, 2016. It was decided and published 
without conducting any risk assessment on the impact of such decision concerning 
maritime safety and security. Article 1 of the new ruling established a “Security and 
Safety Zone” in the surroundings of oil drills, platforms and other installations for 
oil exploration, extraction and operation in the Mexican marine zones an area of 
“500 metres from its external border”; where it will only be allowed the traffic of 
vessels and aircraft required for the operation of such installations.  
It also established a “Security and Safety Zone” of 5,500 metres in the surroundings 
of hydrocarbon’s export areas as the oil operation buoys or floating units for oil 
production, warehousing, charge and discharge; to preserve the manoeuvres of 
conduction, mooring, unmooring and bearing off of tankers authorized to access 
them; whereas the anchorage of transiting vessels not related to the activities of oil 
exploitation and production will only be allowed at 2,500 meters of distance from 
oil installations. 
Article 2 of this new decree establishes that areas located outside the “Security and 
Safety Zone” referred to in Article 1 and where installations exist for oil exploration 
and extraction of hydrocarbons of submarine type; such as marine oil heads, cables 
or pipelines; shall not be used for anchorage, but only navigation. It adds that 
activities regulated in the General Law of Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture 
and other provisions deriving therefrom, can be made at a distance of 1,000 meters 
from these facilities, with the exception of trawling. This ruling says that only in the 
case of emergency when safety of human life at sea or the ship itself is in danger, 
will be allowed the access to these “Security and Safety Zones”, previous 
authorisation of that particular installation. It emphasizes that naval craft, including 
small vessels transiting in the surroundings of such “Security and Safety Zones”, 
shall have the Automatic Identification System (AIS) on board at all times, while 
the fishing vessels shall have the System for Localization and Monitoring of Fishing 
Vessels. 
Article 4 of this ruling states that it will be the SCT and the SEMAR, the institutions 
responsible to establish the navigation rules applicable to these areas to avoid 
maritime accidents and incidents with the tankers that regularly operate in the zone, 
stressing that, “the fishing vessels shall not hinder the traffic of any tanker sailing 
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in the marine passages, but that it will not be forbidden to fish in the sea roadways 
or marine passage areas”.  
Even though the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, establishes that it shall be 
the coastal State member, who determines the total extension of security zones, 
having in mind the applicable international regulations, concerning the rule of 
minimum 500 metres for exclusion areas from the artificial islands and offshore 
installations; it is priority to make a study on how such decision will affect maritime 
safety and security of offshore installations and operations. Piratical acts against oil 
platforms located in the Gulf of Mexico increased after the security zone was 
reduced to 500 metres from its external border, as discussed in the next section of 
this dissertation. 
2.3 Current security threats at Mexican ports 
This part includes identified security threats to port facilities, oil terminals and oil 
platforms located in the Continental Shelf. Unlawful actions related to theft of 
hydrocarbons represent a security threat not only for the affected oil terminal, but 
also for the whole port facility and even for the whole community and marine 
environment of the port, in the case of explosions caused by such crimes. However, 
this risk will be assessed from a strict security perspective, including the risk of 
hiring personnel that passes confidential information to criminal organizations, 
leaving out risks connected to safety and marine environment. It is important to 
highlight that the Government has not been able to determine how much oil or oil 
products have been stolen from the different oil facilities, including port terminals. 
This part is based on port security incidents, which were documented in Paper 2, 3 
and Paper 5. 
These are the reasons and justification for one of the recommendations to the 
Government of Mexico discussed in Paper 4, which is to extend the application of 
the ISPS Code to offshore activities, including mobile offshore drilling units on 
location and to fixed and floating platforms by defining them as port facilities and 
extending all the requirements of maritime security measures required to port 
facilities under the ISPS Code; as the appointment of PFSO, the development of 
PFSA and the implementation of PFSP. 
2.3.1 Security threats related to port oil terminals 
Mexico faces large security challenges regarding the security of oil production, its 
transportation, commercialization and maritime infrastructure, even though the 
importance of the oil industry as the major source of income for the social 
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expenditure. In spite of hundreds of soldiers and navy workers, protecting the 
refineries, oil terminals and other important oil installations, the theft of oil products 
continues to increase through illegal connections to oil terminals, oil pipelines and 
the theft of oil tanker lorries that transport diesel and gasoline in the country. 
As one of several measures to fight corruption, Mexico established in 2002 the 
Federal Institute of Access to the Information and Protection of Data (Instituto de 
Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos, in Spanish and represented with the 
acronym IFAI), which in May 2012, changed name to the National Institute of 
Transparency, Access to the Information and Protection of Personal Data (Instituto 
Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos 
Personales in Spanish, and represented with the acronym INAI (called here 
thereafter with this acronym), to comply with the provisions of the new General 
Law of Transparency also promulgated in 2012. This law establishes that 
information from public institutions and all public or private persons that receive 
and operate money from the federal budget or national resources shall be open to 
the public scrutiny and the exceptions where information cannot be public to protect 
the national security. It also establishes that the INAI must organize the applications 
and send them forward to the respective institution or authority and the time limit 
for the delivery of information. 
Exercising this right of information, an application with number 1857200255715 
and dated on October 10th, 2015, was sent to the INAI to request some information 
from Pemex, which included several questions regarding the security and 
economical aspect of theft, robbery and smuggling of hydrocarbons. Among other 
data, it was requested statistics about tons/litres of hydrocarbons that has been stolen 
from oil facilities from 2000 to 2015; the number of illegal connections discovered 
and employees or ex-employees that had been arrested for participating in the theft 
of hydrocarbons; as well as the level of education and expertise of these. 
On 29th October, 2015, Pemex sent the requested information by email through the 
INAI with the answer marked with register number SISI 1857200255715. The 
document only included figures for 2014 and up to October 27th 2015. However it 
did not include the information about the academic level of education and expertise 
of the employees that have been involved in theft of hydrocarbons. This was 
considered crucial information by the researcher since a very high level of education 
and training is required to make the illegal connections to pipelines and to 
disconnect valuable equipment from abandoned oil platforms.  
As presented in Paper 2 of this dissertation, the number of legal claims and number 
of litres of crude oil recovered from the crime organizations for 2014 is also offered 
in table 1 below; while figures for the year 2015 are presented in Table 2. However, 
the tables do not include the amount of stolen oil not recovered by the federal police. 
As it can be observed in table 1 below, it is the province of Tamaulipas, where one 
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of the biggest oil port terminals from Pemex is located, in the Port of Tampico, 
which reports the highest number of theft of hydrocarbons. 
Table 1  
Number of litres of crude oil stolen, 201418 
Legal claims for theft of crude oil after federal entity, 2014 
Federal Entity Nr. of Legal Claims Nr of litres recovered 
Mexico, DF 1 20,000 
Mexico State 3 64,780 
Guanajuato 4 80,000 
Hidalgo 2 17,556 
Jalisco 1 24 
Oaxaca 1 76,702 
Puebla 3 45,274 
Queretaro 1 35,127 
Tamaulipas 4 2,327,443 
Tlaxcala 1 27,000 
Veracruz 2 31,000 
TOTAL 23 2,724,906 
 
Table 2  
Number of litres of crude oil stolen 2015 
Legal claims for theft of crude oil after federal entity, 2015 
Federal Entity Nr. of Legal Claims Nr of litres recovered 
Aguascalientes 1 200 
Jalisco 1 57,654 
Puebla 3 33,094 
Tamaulipas 4 72,000 
Tlaxcala 1 40,000 
Veracruz 1 29,640 
TOTAL 11 232,588 
 
The number of Pemex employees or ex-employees legally prosecuted for crimes 
relating theft of hydrocarbons for both 2014 and 2015 is presented in table 3, while 
figures of illegal connections to Pemex’s pipelines discovered and disconnected 
during the years 2014 and 2015 (up to October 27th 2015) are presented in Table 4.  
                                                     
18 Tables 1 and 2 were elaborated with data received from the application of information to the INAI 
number 1857200255715. Several of these tables are also presented in Paper 2. 
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Table 3  
Pemex employees prosecuted for theft of hydrocarbons, 2014-201519 
Pemex’s employees or ex-employees arrested for crimes involving theft of hydrocarbons 
 2014 2015 
Persons arrested and prosecuted before a Court of Justice 5 6 
Persons condemned with absolute sentence to jail 1 0 
TOTAL 6 6 
 
Table 4  
Number of illegal connections to Pemex's pipelines discovered, 2014-1015 
Illegal connections (IC) to Pemex’s pipelines discovered 
Year Quantity of Illegal Connections 
2014 3,635 
2015 4,298 
 
In another official document with number SISI 1857200171515; Pemex informed 
the number of employees and ex-employees investigated for theft of hydrocarbons 
during the years 2006-2015; this is illustrated in Table 5.  
Table 5  
Number of employees/ex-employees investigated for theft of hydrocarbons per year. Period 2006-2015. Source Pemex 
answer to INAI, SISI 1857200171515 
Nr. of Employees and ex-employees involved and investigated 
in theft of hydrocarbons 2006-2015 
Year Nr. of employees investigated for theft of 
hydrocarbons 
Nr. of ex-employees investigated for theft of 
hydrocarbons 
2006 10 0 
2007 7 3 
2008 19 0 
2009 10 0 
2010 14 2 
2011 5 2 
2012 11 2 
2013 15 1 
2014 33 1 
2015 12 1 
TOTAL 136 12 
 
                                                     
19 Table 3 and 4 are elaborated with data received from the application of information to the INAI 
number 1857200255715. 
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Table 6  
Number of employees arrested theft of hydrocarbons by working division. Source Pemex’s answer to INAI, SISI 
1857200171515 
Nr. of employees & ex-employees arrested for of hydrocarbons 2006-2015 
Year Department Nr. of Employees & ex-employees 
2006 Pemex Oil Refining 14 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals 0 
Pemex Exploration and Production 2 
Pemex Petrochemicals 1 
2007 Pemex Oil Refining 9 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals 2 
Pemex Exploration and Production 1 
Pemex Petrochemicals 0 
2008 Pemex Oil Refining 12 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals 1 
Pemex Exploration and Production 1 
Pemex Petrochemicals 0 
2009 Pemex Oil Refining 9 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals 1 
Pemex Exploration and Production 4 
Pemex Petrochemicals 0 
2010 Pemex Oil Refining 5 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals 1 
Pemex Exploration and Production 8 
Pemex Petrochemicals 0 
2011 Pemex Oil Refining 2 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals 0 
Pemex Exploration and Production 7 
Pemex Petrochemicals 0 
2012 Pemex Oil Refining 8 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals 0 
Pemex Exploration and Production 2 
Pemex Petrochemicals 0 
2013 Pemex Oil Refining 13 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals 0 
Pemex Exploration and Production 0 
Pemex Petrochemicals 3 
2014 Pemex Oil Refining 6 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals 0 
Pemex Exploration and Production 1 
Pemex Petrochemicals 0 
2015 Pemex Oil Refining 3 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals 1 
Pemex Exploration and Production 4 
Pemex Petrochemicals 2 
TOTAL 123 
Table 6 above presents also the data of table 5, regarding number of employees and ex-employees investigated for 
theft of hydrocarbons during the years 2006-2015, but by division to which they were working at Pemex. Figures for 
other type of crimes committed by Pemex employees are presented in table 7. 
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Table 7  
Pemex's employees investigated for other crimes, 2006-201520 
Pemex’s employees investigated for other crimes (2006-2015) 
Crime Nr. of employees 
Possession of Cocaine 9 
Possession of Cannabis 25 
Falsification of company’s card 1 
Possession/bearing of fire arms 7 
Violence with weapons 8 
Explosion Threat 1 
Theft of production material, ferric material, working tools, machinery, cable, pipes, 
car parts, cooper and cranes among other Pemex’s property items. 115 
Murder 1 
Kidnapping 2 
Corruption regarding employment of staff 4 
Improper (unmoral) Behaviour at work 2 
Psychotropic medicine drugs  1 
Stealing other employees properties 4 
Falsification of fuel tickets 1 
Car accident 1 
Fraud 1 
Attack/assault & Violence 2 
Being member of the “Z” narcotic organization 1 
Alcohol at work 3 
TOTAL 189 
 
During the period 2006-2015, 136 employees from Pemex have been investigated 
in relation to theft of hydrocarbons. Likewise several employees were arrested and 
put under investigation for other type of crimes including possession of cocaine at 
work installations, cannabis, and falsification of company’s card, terror attempts 
and murder (SISI1857200171515).  
2.3.2 Criminal acts in relation to oil platforms located in the 
continental shelf 
The definition of piracy established in UNCLOS Article 101, provides several 
conditions for what is to be considered piracy. These conditions include that the 
incident must involve violence, detention or depredation; that it must occur on the 
                                                     
20 Elaborated with information from Pemex’s answer to the INAI, SISI 1857200171515 
62 
high seas, in other words, outside the jurisdiction of any nation; that it must be 
following private ends (economic motives); and finally, that it must be committed 
on board a ship and “against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside 
the jurisdiction of any State”, as subsection a (ii) of the referred article reads. 
Following this definition, acts of armed robbery against oil platforms located in the 
Continental Shelf of Mexico and within its territorial waters or national jurisdiction 
are not considered piracy, but unlawful acts with piratical elements. Jones (2006), 
criticize the UNCLOS definition and particularly the restrictive factor of the high 
seas, arguing that based on reports from IMO member States, most of pirate attacks 
take place within territorial waters or while the ship is on a berth or at anchor, which 
creates uncertainty about the piracy data registers might slow the juridical process 
against perpetrators. The referred author highlights the following definition adopted 
by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) for acts of piracy: 
“An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft 
or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of 
that act”. 
The IMB’s piracy definition does not restrict the pirate attack to the high seas, but 
on the contrary to the one established by UNCLOS, they restrict it to be against a 
“ship”, leaving out elements like “aircraft, persons or property” covered in the 
UNCLOS definition. This means that under the IMB’s definition piratical acts 
against an oil platform are not considered piracy either (oil rigs/platforms are not 
ships), even when the location factor is irrelevant and involves territorial waters.  
Additionally, the piracy definition provided by the IMB does not require that the 
pirate attack must be committed for private ends, since it refers to theft or any crime, 
as opposite to the UNCLOS definition. Thus, an attack against a ship for political 
or terrorist motivations would not qualify as piracy under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea but it would point towards that direction under 
the IMB’s piracy definition.  
However, piratical acts against oil platforms located in the Continental Shelf are 
criminal activities that put in distress the security of offshore installations. The 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention), was complemented with the Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 
Continental Shelf, 1988, which extended the requirements of the SUA Convention 
to fixed platforms, as those used in the oil and gas industry for offshore operations. 
Its last Protocol was adopted on 14 October 2005; with entry into force on 28 July 
2010 (International Maritime Organization). It is the most important international 
regulation concerning unlawful acts against fixed platforms offshore. However it 
has been critisized by several authors, as Mejia (2007) who wrote “The 
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Convention´s Title refers to unlawful acts but foes not provide a generic characterto 
the offenses it identifies; it ostensibly purports to combat terrorism at sea and yet 
fails to define it”. 
Therefore it is necessary to improve the security of this type of critical infrastructure 
in Mexico. According to reports about security incidents and damages to marine oil 
platforms for the year 2016, from Pemex, and provided by one of the research 
participants, the number of security incidents against oil platforms increased in 
2016, as presented in figures 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Illustration 1 Security incidents at oil platforms January-September 2016, area of Tabasco by month 
 
Illustration 2 Security incidents at oil platforms, January-September 2016, area of Tabasco by oil facility 
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Illustration 3 Security incidents at oil platforms January-September 2016, area of Tabasco, by type of incident 
Regarding the category of Robbery, it refers to equipment for the system of closing 
of wells, and specifically, tubing, cabling, battery banks, lifeboats and equipment to 
prevent or against fire. Vandalism is used when there was no robbery but only 
destruction of equipment and part of the installations like doors and looks; 
Unauthorized Access refers to the introduction of civilians without authorization to 
the platforms that when they see personnel from the company the intruders threat 
them and leave.  
Besides, one of the reported incidents at the platform MANIK-A included the 
unauthorized access of persons armed with machete, which resulted with the few 
crew on board rescued by helicopters, while at platform ETKAL-101 in addition to 
several fire prevention equipment, a lifeboat was also stolen.  
They also explained that 65 per cent of reported incidents occurred within the 
Tisimin Xux area and 25 per cent in the area of the oil field Cantarel, specifically 
100 percent of these to the platform Akal-N. It can also be observed that 70 per cent 
of the incidents have occurred at satellite platforms; that 80 per cent of the incidents 
have occurred during the months of July (65%) and August (15%). It is also 
reflected that 70% of the security incidents are produced by robbery, while 30% are 
connected to unauthorized access of civilians at the marine platforms. 
Jones (2006) classifies piracy in the following types, but specifically against vessels: 
• “Opportunistic Crime (OC) 
• Low Level Armed Robbery (LLAR) 
• Medium Level Armed Assault and Robbery (MLAAR) 
• Major Criminal Hi-jack (MCHJ)” 
9
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If Jones’s classification is applied to the type of incidents that are registered against 
Pemex’s oil platforms located in the Gulf of Mexico, it would be LLAR were 
perpetrators, considered as “simply petty criminals” use high-speed boats and 
weapons to board the vessel, and as long as the ship’s crew “do not act harshly, they 
would not be in too much danger”. Other incidents also fall in the type of MLAAR, 
were the “attack is often meticulously planned. Experienced seafarers and a mixture 
of criminal elements are often involved. They come together to form formidable 
pirate gangs. There is a very high risk of injury or death for innocent seafarers 
(…)”. 
On the other hand, the type of incidents that fall in the MLAAR type are those where 
the lifeboat was stolen, since to launch this kind of naval craft requires a high degree 
of training, as well as those of stolen heliports and valuable operative equipment, 
which require the use of bigger craft to be transported and special expertise to be 
disconnected from the rest of equipment. 
 
Illustration 4 Cuts to monitors and fire prevention equipment 
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The document about the incident’s report for Pemex oil platforms, specify that the 
possible consequences of such crimes are the following: a significant reduction in 
oil production caused by closing of wells; extensive damage to the marine 
environment caused by oil pollution, casualties and loss of life caused by over-press. 
2.3.3 Security threats related to ports and port facilities in general 
Diverse documented security incidents at ports and port facilities are presented and 
analysed in Paper 3 and Paper 5 of this dissertation. The analysis is made on the 
bases of the requirements and specifications of the ISPS Code, presented in section 
2.1.1 of this dissertation.  
The methodology for paper 3, included a questionnaire about the ISPS Code 
implementation, security incidents and incident reporting, sent through the INAI to 
Port Directors of nine different ports located in the Gulf of Mexico. However, to 
each of the specific questions about security incidents concerning armed attacks for 
robbery at the port/port facility; confiscation and smuggling of weapons and drugs 
or other dangerous restricted substances in the cargo; cargo theft at the port/ port 
facility; theft of material and other items or machinery on the part of employees, 
property of the port/ port facility; personnel working under the effects of drugs and 
psychotropic substances; situations of vandalism and sabotage; and kidnapping of 
port/terminal personnel, with the exception of one port, where a weapon was 
confiscated, the respondents from the other eight ports and Pemex terminals replied 
that there has never been any security incident of that nature. This significantly 
differs from the findings of the document analysis through Google, presented in 
paper 3 annexed to this dissertation. 
On the other hand, security incidents and threats to ports, port facilities, oil terminals 
and their personnel documented in Paper 3 and 5, included transport of drugs and 
psychotropic material in cargo transported in vessels, which varied from the 
confiscation of more than eleven tons of cocaine, significant amount of weapons, 
confiscation of stolen crude oil transported in large tankers, kidnapping of port 
personnel, Armed attack against an oceanic patrol from the Mexican Navy, illegal 
traffic of stolen hydrocarbons, and inclusive plundering of marine oil platforms 
where it was stolen a whole heliport.  
Furthermore, Paper 5 presents a deep analysis of security incidents documented 
throughout the year 2017 with the establishment of the “transparent port security 
incident reporting tool” developed by the researcher. The records illustrate the high 
risk of smuggling of weapons, drugs and illegal items. 
67 
2.4 The value of incident reporting and updating of 
PSA/PFSA & PSP/PFSP 
The value of incident reporting and keeping updated incident security records in 
relation to the assessment of security threats and risks (PSA/PFSA) and its 
implementation to PSPs/PFSPs relies on the fact that security incident reports are 
the foundation for the evaluation of threats.  
From this approach, if a security incident that was not considered earlier in the 
development of the PSA/PFSA, such assessments must be re-evaluated integrating 
this incident and updating security plans with the necessary amendments in 
accordance to the results of such re-evaluation. This is extremely valuable because 
it allows the continual improvement of security plans, as it should be, since ports 
and port facilities are subjects to constant changes and therefore the evaluation of 
security measures and plans must also be constant, accordingly. 
As highlighted in Paper 3 of this dissertation, “the analysis of security incidents’ 
root causes is the cornerstone of the PFSA, which is the base of the PFSP, but if a 
new security threat is identified, adjustments are necessary. Therefore it is crucial 
to keep security incident records updated”, recalling that the ISPS Code has been 
designed to counter terrorism, drug smuggling, and cargo theft, among other crimes, 
establishing an international cooperation framework between most of the 
governments of the world, its government’s agencies and the shipping industry to 
detect security threats, as emphasized by Christopher, (2009). 
As mentioned before, the IMO left to signatory governments of SOLAS the decision 
to extend the application of maritime security measures derived from the ISPS Code 
to subjects related to piracy; drug smuggling; stowaways; illegal migration; and the 
security of dangerous goods. However, for the case of Mexico, these types of threat 
have a higher factor of probability of occurrence, as presented in Paper 5 annexed 
to this dissertation. Under this approach these types of security incidents are 
included in a “transparent port security incident reporting tool”, which is also 
presented in paper 5, developed by the researcher and implemented at all ports in 
Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, by the National Maritime Authority, through 
UNICAPAM, from SEMAR.  
This instrument included a series of incident security codes related not only to 
terrorism, but also to armed robbery, armed attacks against security personnel from 
ports and port terminals, drug smuggling; stowaways; illegal migration; 
unauthorized access and the security of dangerous goods among others. By applying 
this instrument to all Mexican ports through the official channel of SEMAR and the 
CUMARs and UNAPROPs at the different ports, Mexico is automatically extending 
the application of the ISPS Code to this type of security threats. 
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The application of this instrument demonstrated in a real case through “action 
research,” the contributions of this tool to improve incident reporting, incident 
investigation, PFSA and PFSP, as the ISPS Code requires. Measurements were 
carried out every quarter throughout the year 2017 and the incident reporting 
instrument was adjusted accordingly. The results show a significant improvement 
in reporting security incidents in the country, increasing from zero to 57, some of 
them considered very serious, during the first year of this tool implementation. In 
addition, 56% of the reported maritime incidents were associated with 
recommendations to be integrated into the PFSA and to be considered for 
improvement of PFSP.  
Furthermore, the use of this tool provided PFSO with accurate information and 
evidence material from security incidents, which facilitated the re-evaluation of 
threats; proving that reporting security incidents is the key not only for re-
assessment of PFSA and modifications to PFSP but also for effective incident 
investigation and strengthening of port security awareness. 
2.5 Summary 
The ISPS Code represents a structural change in port and maritime security 
management and should be seen as a basic framework for port and maritime 
security, and international cooperation, covering specific standardised security 
measures. Unfortunately and despite the increase of terrorist attacks and piracy, the 
implementation of a “security culture”, including implementation and compliance 
of the ISPS Code has not yet reached the level achieved by the institutionalisation, 
application and operation of the “safety culture” in the shipping industry. It is also 
important to note that security is closely related to safety; a serious security incident 
would put at risk the safety of the whole port, its infrastructure and personnel. 
Certain SOLAS Contracting States will need to make further regulations, related to 
the implementation of the ISPS Code for port and maritime security, giving special 
focus to security challenges that affect most their territory, like armed robbery to 
port and port terminals; drug smuggling; and illegal migration, for the case of 
Mexico.  
Other Contracting States, including Mexico, will have to make further regulations 
and a deeper risk evaluation of the threats threatening their territorial waters and 
other maritime installations, concerning subjects related to armed robbery on 
offshore installations, theft of hydrocarbons, and illegal transport of stolen 
hydrocarbons.  
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Contracting States are free to extend all or some of the ISPS Code requirements to 
other type of vessels than those SOLAS-class ships and port facilities addressed by 
the Code; and to impose greater security measures on vessels and port facilities 
concerning traffic of drugs and people, but respecting the provisions of other 
international treaties. The authorities cannot carry this out unilaterally. 
Governments need to involve not only the shipping industry, but all stakeholders 
involved, including seamen and crew organizations in order to help them understand 
that port and maritime security is a responsibility of everyone involved in the 
maritime realm, including, ship owners, crews, port administration, port terminal 
operators, its whole personnel, service providers, customers and even the society of 
the communities in which they are operating, which may contribute by informing 
port security authorities of suspect items or activities around the port.  
The integration of everyone in the process of strengthening port and maritime 
security will ensure continuous, effective and satisfactory commercial operations. 
Authorities from neighbouring countries could also be involved in this process to 
strengthen an open international cooperation neutralizing the fear of violence of 
sovereignty rights for the States, especially in consideration that terror actions 
against offshore and port facilities located close to the border lines may result in 
extensive environmental and economic damage for both nations. 
Yet, it may be argued that an international harmonisation of the implementation of 
the Code is desired to ensure international cooperation between Contracting States; 
in that case States will be free to enforce greater security measures than those 
established in the ISPS Code, if the protection of port facilities and sea waters in 
their country requires that. In this process, they must also procure efficient and 
continuous commercial operations at ports, and respect the provisions of other 
applicable international treaties, for example those that are protected by diplomatic 
principles. It is important to stress that this international set of regulations allows 
for differences in the implementation and compliance regarding the implementation 
of greater security measures than those established in the ISPS Code, but not less. 
This is to ensure the harmonisation of the rules to the minimum level established by 
the Code.  
Finally, the main instruments and key concepts related to port and maritime security 
are addressed in the ISPS Code. If these are efficiently implemented according to 
the principles, provisions and guidelines established by the same Code; its 
compliance is verified systematically; and they are updated in accordance with new 
security threats, they are good enough to ensure the security of port facilities, vessels 
and territorial sea waters, to an acceptable risk level. 
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3. Research objectives 
As stated in the introduction, the aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the 
maritime world by developing an instrument that can be used to set up the strategies 
at a macro level for building a national maritime security policy in any Contracting 
State to the SOLAS Convention around the globe, and at the same time improve 
security incident reporting and incident investigation. The development of this 
instrument is under the context of the maritime and particularly, port security 
situation of Mexico, but with application to other regions of the world facing similar 
security threats, as smuggling of drugs and weapons, illegal goods, theft of 
hydrocarbons, dissemination of port security classified information, unauthorized 
persons in port and seaways restricted areas, and misuse of access identity cards, 
among others. 
As a part of this, another aim of this research effort is to study the current situation 
of maritime security and particularly port security in Mexico, including a critical 
analysis of the national legal framework for port and maritime security related to 
the enactment of the ISPS Code into national legislation in Mexico; as well as the 
current security threats at Mexican ports and port facilities. Additionally, this 
research intends to contribute to the understanding of the value of reporting security 
incidents, and updating of security incident logs, by taking into consideration those 
security incidents classified as “serious,” results of security drills and exercises for 
reassessment of PFSA/PSA, with the consequent amendments to PFSP/PSP. It is 
important to recall that such changes must be tested and updated accordingly to 
manage security threats and maintain the security of the port at an acceptable level. 
This, to develop an analytical transparent incident-reporting tool useful not only for 
updating of Port Facility Security Assessments and respective Security Plans, but 
also, to provide official security incidents investigators with all the necessary 
information to investigate the event and instruct the implementation of measures 
that could prevent the re-occurrence of such incident. This Instrument can also be 
used to establish the necessary strategies to develop a national maritime security 
policy. The goal is also to implement this instrument in Mexico, helping the State 
to improve maritime and in particular port security, testing it through action research 
and improving it in the process, to finally offer it to other regions of the world that 
might benefit from it. 
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As Mejia (2007) pointed out, “one of the many challenges facing policy makers is 
the lack of useful tools for the multilevel analysis of the security seascape [port 
facilities in our case] to facilitate the identification of problem areas and the 
formulation of appropriate, perhaps even proactive, actions plans”. The author 
referred to Schröder (2005) to highlight the paucity in tools available for assessing 
and managing risk in maritime security. It is important to recall that under his 
approach maritime security covers port security, which means the extension of the 
problem to the port security area as well. Currently, the tools used in port security 
are developed for application at an operational level for port facilities and not at a 
national level. This tool will provide the State with crucial information at a macro 
level that can be used to set up the strategy for developing a national maritime 
security policy. 
Based on these goals, the general research objectives are developed and presented 
in this section with the specific objectives of each of the annexed papers. 
3.1 General research objectives 
As mentioned previously, this doctoral dissertation intends to contribute to 
improving maritime and port security worldwide by developing an instrument 
useful to set up the strategies to build a national maritime security policy. To do this, 
it is a prerequisite to understand the legal framework of the State where it will be 
implemented, as well as security threats for that particular Nation; Mexico, in this 
case, studying the level of compliance with the ISPS Code by the Mexican 
government, both from a legal and practical perspective. 
From the legal perspective, it attempts to identify the legal gaps between 
international and national legislation in relation to the enactment of the ISPS Code, 
and its harmonization in national law to allow full compliance from all actors 
involved.  
From the practical perspective, it strives to identify threats to port security, including 
oil terminals as well as oil platforms; improve the development of PSA/PFSA AND 
PSP/PFSP, increasing the focus on security incident-reporting and security incident 
investigation by extending the application of the ISPS Code to both:  
1) MODUs on location, fixed and floating oil platforms through the development of 
national regulations by defining these type of offshore installations as “port 
facilities” to be covered by the requirements of the ISPS Code regarding the 
appointment of a PFSO, the development of PFSA and the implementation of PFSP 
and;  
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2) Subjects concerning drug smuggling; stowaways; illegal migration; and other 
serious security threats not directly covered by this set of regulations. 
The identification of security threats is necessary to develop an analytical 
transparent incident-reporting tool suitable to support security incident reporting, 
improve PFSA and PFSP and port/maritime security incident investigation. To 
create an instrument that would also be useful to set up strategies for building and 
implementation of a national maritime security policy. This innovative instrument 
will be tested through action research in Mexico, with the support of the Mexican 
Government. Action research will allow to discover the strengths and weaknesses 
of this tool and improve it during the testing period (2017), through its application 
in a real case.  
This is intended to be achieved by pursuing the subsequent general objectives: 
3.1.1 Elaborate a critical analysis of the current port security situation 
of Mexico, with special focus on implementation and compliance of the 
ISPS Code, including the state of the art and harmonization of 
international legislation with national law. 
This objective is first, to study the state of the art related to the implementation and 
compliance of the ISPS Code within the context of port security and oil terminals in 
Mexico, covering the need of understanding the fundaments and evolution of the 
topic to set up the theoretical framework for this research effort. Secondly, to 
establish the directions of the study, it’s priority to critically analyse the enactment 
of the ISPS Code into national law in Mexico; understanding the strengths and 
deficiencies of the port and maritime security legal framework of the referred 
country in relation to Chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, 
(SOLAS Convention), covering the need to understand the legal framework, from a 
strict juridical perspective, that establishes the bases for compliance of the ISPS 
Code in this Contracting State. Additionally, elaborating a critical evaluation of the 
level of implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code, by the Mexican 
government, with focus on port facilities from a practical perspective, covers the 
need to find the deficiencies and areas of opportunity for improvement including 
security incident reporting and incident investigation. 
3.1.2 Identify the most relevant security threats to port facilities in 
Mexico, including oil terminals, and offshore installations 
This objective will cover the need to discover the most relevant security threats at 
ports and port facilities in Mexico to study them in relation to the reported security 
incidents. Identifying security threats and areas that can represent a security risk for 
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the port facility, its whole infrastructure, personnel, customers and in general, all 
persons involved with the port operations is necessary to develop the analytical 
transparent incident-reporting tool. Identification of security threats is also essential 
to implement security measures, plan for security incident response and be able to 
mitigate its consequences. 
3.1.3 Develop an analytical instrument for security incidents-reporting 
& incident investigation, to strengthen the continual evolution of 
PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP and useful for setting up the strategies of a 
national maritime security policy 
The third general objective of this dissertation is to develop an analytical transparent 
incident-reporting tool to support security incident reporting and incident 
investigation, which simultaneously is useful to establish the strategies to build a 
national maritime security policy. This is intended to be done, by acquiring all 
relevant information of a particular event in this security incident-reporting tool, 
thereby facilitating a learning process from that particular security incident and use 
it not only for updating of PSA/PFSA and respective PSP/PFSP, but also, to provide 
official security incidents investigators with all the necessary information to 
investigate the event and instruct the implementation of measures that could prevent 
the re-occurrence of such event. Moreover, acquiring all data related to all security 
incidents at all ports and port facilities across the country would provide the State 
with crucial information at a macro level useful to set up the strategies, including 
allocation of material, economic and human resources, which would be the 
foundation for developing a national maritime security policy. 
3.2 Objectives of the individual papers 
This doctoral dissertation incorporates five articles. Two of these have been 
published as book chapters, two more were published in an international journal, 
and another one has been accepted for publication and is currently in press. The 
objectives for each of these papers are presented below: 
Paper 1 Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Implementation 
and compliance of the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Code in Mexico: A literature review and selected issues. TransNav, 
International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea 
Transportation, 12(2). P.363-373. DOI: 10.12716/1001.12.02.18. 
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The objective of this paper is to examine the state of the art related to the 
implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code, within the context of port 
security in Mexico, based on a cross-disciplinary approach among eight selected 
categories. 
Paper 2 Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Opening of 
offshore oil business in Mexico and associated framework to cope 
with potential maritime security threats. TransNav, International 
Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, 
12(1). P.173-179 DOI: 10.12716/1001.12.01.20 
 
The objective of paper 2 is to review the situation of the oil industry from a strict 
security perspective and discuss key elements of port and maritime security; 
addressing the necessity of the inclusion of port and maritime security and the 
protection of critical oil infrastructure located in the Continental Shelf in the national 
agenda, which would provide for future research directions in the maritime security 
domain and contribute to the establishment of a national maritime security policy. 
Paper 3 Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2017 Enhancing 
maritime security in Mexico: Privatization, militarization, or a 
combination of both? (2017) In: Chaumette, P. (ed.) Economic 
challenge and new maritime risks management: What blue growth? 
Nantes, France. Gomylex. P. 81.101. ISBN: 9788415176862 
 
The objective of paper 3 is to examine three different options/solutions that Mexico 
implemented within its ports and offshore installations in order to improve the 
country’s maritime security situation, as well as ensuring compliance with the ISPS 
Code: privatization, militarization and finally, their combination.  
Paper 4 Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018 Mexico's 
reorganisation of maritime security regime: A new role for the navy 
and emphasis on energy related infrastructures. In:  Ölçer, A.I., 
Kitada, M., Dalaklis, D., Ballini, F. (Eds.) Trends and challenges in 
maritime energy management. Springer. P. 95-108 DOI: 
10.1007/978-3-319-74576-3 
 
The objective of paper 4 is to examine the latest maritime reform in Mexico, which 
provides the legal framework to shift the National Maritime Authority from a civil 
institution (SCT), towards a military one (SEMAR). As well as its extent of 
harmonisation with international law in respect of the ISPS Code implementation 
and compliance; and the critical situation that the shipping and oil industry is facing 
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in this country. Another objective of this article is to study the level of acceptance 
concerning the shift of the National Maritime Authority from SCT to SEMAR, 
between the four pillars of representatives of authorities/institutions directly related 
to duties and operations within these two important domains, a prerequisite for 
success.  
Paper 5 Ávila-Zúñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D. (2018) Integrating the 
procedures of reporting port security incidents and the follow-up 
investigation to build a national maritime security policy: A case 
study in Mexico. Accepted for publication by the WMU Journal of 
Maritime Affairs (in press, 2018). 
 
The first objective of paper 5 is to develop an analytical transparent incident-
reporting tool to be used to support security incident reporting, improve PFSA and 
PFSP and port/maritime security incident investigation. By acquiring all relevant 
information of a particular event in this security incident-reporting tool would 
facilitate learning from that particular security incident and use it not only for 
updating of Port Facility Security Assessments and respective Security Plans, but 
also, to provide official security incidents investigators with all the necessary 
information to investigate the event and instruct the implementation of measures 
that could prevent the re-occurrence of such event. The second objective of this 
article is to examine port security at Mexican ports from an incident reporting and 
investigation perspective by implementing this instrument at all ports in Mexico 
where the ISPS Code applies, with the support of the National Maritime Authority, 
demonstrating in a real case through “action research,” the contributions of this 
instrument to improve incident reporting, incident investigation, PFSA and PFSP, 
as the ISPS Code requires. The third objective of this paper, is to demonstrate the 
use of this tool for a multilevel analysis of port security threats to identify the 
problem areas and contribute to set up the strategies for the development of a 
national maritime security policy. 
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4. Materials and methods 
The methodological approach adopted in this doctoral dissertation is principally 
based on qualitative methods, including action research with a limited use of 
statistics, which are mainly used in paper 5, for the development of the analytical 
transparent incident-reporting instrument to be used to support security incident 
reporting, improve PFSA and PFSP and port/maritime security incident 
investigation.  
Based on this, it was developed a Model for Port and Maritime Security Incident 
Investigation. On the bases of this Model, a new and “transparent incident-reporting 
tool” was developed, building the bridge between PFSA, PFSP and port security 
incident investigation, as illustrated in the model below. 
 
Illustration 5 Model for port and maritime security incident investigation 
Port Facility Security 
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Ship Security Plan 
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The selection of methods is based on their suitability in both, law and social 
sciences, disciplines where they are widely used, in accordance with the exploratory 
nature of political themes as in this case; where one of the general objectives is to 
contribute to the development of a national maritime security policy. These were 
combined in the last phase of the study with action research, which is necessary to 
implement, test and improve the above-referred tool. 
The research objectives call for classical documental analyses examining the 
elements of the relevant international legislation against its implementation into 
national legislation in the referred nation-state. The objectives also require the use 
of semi-structured interviews and participant observation to identify security threats 
at the field study.  
The questionnaires used to perform the semi-structured interviews include questions 
for the different papers and therefore, the same questionnaire, but different questions 
were used to develop the different articles annexed to this doctoral dissertation.  
Structured and semi-structured questionnaires with open questions, helped the 
researcher to avoid being obtrusive and engaging in active listening strategies during 
the interview. McCracken (1988) pointed out that active listening strategies, must 
not be used by the qualitative researcher because they are obtrusive and likely to be 
almost completely destructive of good data. This can be avoided through the use of 
the construction of a well-designed questionnaire, which has several functions; it 
ensures covering all subjects in the same order for each respondent; establishes 
channels for the direction and scope of discourse; and allows the scientist to give all 
his/her attention to the informant’s testimony.  
By referring to Merton, Fiske and Kendall (1956), McCracken (1988) emphasized 
that the use of questionnaires does not pre-empt the “open-ended” nature of the 
qualitative interview; because within each of the questions, the opportunity for 
exploratory, unstructured responses remains.  
Structured questionnaires with open questions help researchers to give order to the 
subjects during the interviews, which simplify data analysis while developing 
categories or themes. 
As mentioned above, during the last phase of the study, Action Research was used. 
It is a form of interactive inquiry process that balances problem solving, actions 
implemented in an interactive context with data-driven and collaborative analysis 
or research, allowing practitioners to evaluate their job and understand the 
underlying problem causes, enabling organizational change (Reason & Bradbury, 
2001).  
The figure following illustrates an action-reflection cycle for action research. 
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Illustration 6 Action-reflection cycle (Mcniff, 2011) 
Figure 6 illustrates how the researcher identifies a particular subject, investigates 
different ways of doing their job, reflects on what is happening and why, check out 
any new understandings with others - and in light of those reflections - try new ways 
or methods to do their tasks that may or may not be more successful. If the trials 
show that the tested methods are better, then the individual or the group moves 
forward in that new direction.  
Mcniff (2011) stated that Action Research is meant to be a systematic process and 
recommends to use this type of research when the goals of the researcher are to 
improve his/others understanding, develop his/others learning and influence other’s 
learning. He places the emphasis of the study on the researcher’s intent to take action 
for social improvement. This is highly relevant to the general objectives of this 
research study and the objectives of paper five, which are the following: 
a) Develop an analytical transparent incident-reporting tool to be used to 
support security incident reporting, improve PFSA and PFSP and 
port/maritime security incident investigation;  
b) Examine port security at Mexican ports from an incident reporting and 
investigation perspective by implementing this instrument at all ports in 
Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, with the support of the National 
Maritime Authority, testing and demonstrating in a real case the 
contributions of this instrument to improve incident reporting, incident 
investigation, PFSA and PFSP, as the ISPS Code requires.  
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c) Demonstrate the use of this tool for a multilevel analysis of port security 
threats to identify the problem areas and contribute to set up the strategies 
for the development of a national maritime security policy. 
In accordance with these objectives, the researcher is expected to actively participate 
in testing the instrument and apply the necessary changes through the testing period, 
which in coordination with the SEMAR of Mexico, is set up to the entire year of 
2017. After which, they will continue operating the instrument on their own. Due to 
its extent, the transparent incident-reporting tool is presented as annex to this 
dissertation, both in English and in Spanish. 
This is the first time that an external academic institution was allowed to conduct a 
scientific study involving the direct participation of the Mexican Navy and Customs 
authorities and that results were published openly and made available for anyone. 
The methodological approach of “Action Research” used to test and improve the 
proposed transparent security-incident reporting tool required a strong interaction 
between the researcher and the representatives of the Mexican Navy and indirectly 
from Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) at all ports in Mexico as well, during 
the complete testing period of the year 2017. The use of Action research in this 
academic effort makes this a distinctive research undertaking that provides a unique 
insight into port security threats, port security systems and the naval world. 
The methodological approach of “Action Research” also demanded a close joint 
analysis of data between the researcher and the representatives of the institution 
(research setting). As mentioned before, data was collected every quarter through 
2017 and scrutinized to analize security incidents, with special focus on the 
discovery of new security threats not considered in the security incident-reporting 
instrument. New codes were allocated and the respective incidents were followed 
up. This would not have been possible without the direct participation of the 
Mexican Navy and the selected research methods. 
4.1: Paper 1: Implementation and compliance of the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code in 
Mexico: A literature review and selected issues 
Research methodology for paper 1 involved a review of the published literature on 
the subject. Webster & Watson (2002, p. xiv) explained that a high quality review 
must cover all relevant literature on the topic and should not be confined to a limited 
set of journals. The literature search method encompassed querying ten (10) 
different scientific databases as proposed by Webster & Watson (2002, p. xvi).  
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Apart from articles, the literature review also included book chapters and other 
relevant documents captured during the search process. The analysis of the relevant 
literature was made on the bases of eight categories. This allowed the conversion 
from the author-centric approach towards the category-centric approach and 
synthesise the relevant literature, developing a category matrix in relation to the 
selected categories with a cross-discipline fertilisation approach. The selected 
literature was then analysed with a geographical approach. After the first search, in 
2015, a second search in 2018 was conducted to update data and verify the 
inexistence of research contributions for the specified search parameters. 
4.2 Paper 2: Opening of offshore oil business in Mexico 
and associated framework to cope with potential security 
risks 
The methodology for Paper 2 included documental analysis and critical review of 
the actual situation of port and oil terminals with special focus on the oil industry in 
Mexico from the security perspective. The data was gathered from different sources 
that included official information from Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), the Mexican 
oil agency and various authorities. In addition some very relevant information was 
requested from Pemex and port administrations through the National Institute of 
Transparency, Access to the Information and Protection of Personal Data (INAI). 
Once the relevant documents for this topic were gathered, they were further selected 
and classified according to their relevance to the study.  
4.3 Paper 3: Enhancing maritime security in Mexico: 
Privatization, militarization, or a combination of both? 
The research methodology for paper 3 included the use of an extended questionnaire 
with 71 open questions concerning maritime security, sent to eight (8) ports of 
Mexico; through the INAI. A questionnaire of 70 similar questions (but, specifically 
addressed to oil port terminals) was also sent to “Pemex Exploración y Producción,” 
through the INAI to acquire information for their port and terminals. An inquiry 
about the establishment of the UNAPROP at the different ports of Mexico was sent 
to the SEMAR, whilst another request of information about the total number of 
persons employed at private security companies that have got the courses 18.2 and 
18.3 as required in the ISPS Code was sent to the FIDENA, also through the INAI. 
The INAI was created to comply with the provisions of the General Law of 
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Transparency promulgated in 2012. This law establishes that information from 
public institutions operating money from national resources shall be open to public 
scrutiny with exceptions related to national security.  
These actions were combined with a six-day visit of the researcher in one of the 
three largest ports of Mexico with port oil terminals conducted in April 2016, where 
she performed interviews and “participant observation.” The questionnaire that was 
sent to the other ports through the INAI; was also answered by respondents at that 
specific port. At this port, the researcher participated as observer at the preparations, 
performance and post-evaluation of an exercise at level 3, of those required by the 
ISPS Code. Listening to arguments in many different directions while the 
preparations and execution of the exercise for security incident response and its 
evaluation awarded the researcher with a unique insight about deficiencies and 
adequate actions of the actors involves when undertaking such exercises.  
The results from the questionnaire were examined using document analysis with an 
exploratory approach, to confirm or reject the inexistence of security incidents at 
the selected ports and oil terminals trough a critical review of security incidents 
reported in national newspapers and media sources, using Google to have a wider 
coverture within the period of 2004-2015.  
4.4 Paper 4: Mexico's reorganisation of maritime security 
regime: A new role for the navy and emphasis on energy 
related infrastructures   
The research methodology of the current study includes semi-structured interviews 
made to Harbours Masters, Directors of Customs Maritime Units, Port 
Administration Directors, PFSOs from ports and certain number of hydrocarbons 
terminals, Presidents of CUMAR (1st Commander of the Navy Zone, Navy Sector 
or Navy Station) and Commandants of the UNAPROP. Additionally, participant 
observation at the terminals and harbours master’s installations and ports, including 
not only the land areas but also the maritime passages took place; they were visited 
on board oceanic patrols from the Mexican Navy. The visit to the mentioned ports 
in Mexico had an average duration of one week at each port. The observation of 
normal daily operations at the different areas of the ports, including the Customs 
Maritime Unit installations, the oil port terminals and the navy security areas 
provided the researcher with a unique insight of the strengths and weaknesses of 
port security in México, as well as the opportunity areas for improvement, by 
identifying the most relevant security threats and problem areas, as well as the level 
of cooperation between these institutions at the ports. 
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The poll of data included the leaders of the mentioned institutions from the ports of 
Altamira and Tampico (Tamps.), Tuxpan, Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos (Ver.), Dos 
Bocas (Tab.), Ciudad del Carmen (Campeche); Progresso (Yuc.); as well as another 
Hub Port from the Pacific in Mexico. By doing this, the researcher covered the four 
pillars for the operation of the port. The pool of data is deemed sufficient, based on 
the fact that it includes eight out of sixteen FIPA in Mexico where the ISPS Code 
applies, representing a coverture of 50% of them and seven out of seven FIPAs 
situated in the Gulf of Mexico, where oil exploration and production activities take 
place, achieving a 100% coverage of them. One State-Owned Integrated Port 
Administration (Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche) where most of the oil activity is 
concentrated was also included in the study. Two informal interviews of top 
Directors from SEMAR were performed on key themes identified from issues 
prevalent in the analysis of the interviews to Presidents of the CUMAR and Federal 
FIPAs. From the total of persons invited to participate and representing Harbour 
Master offices at these nine cited ports, only one of them rejected the invitation. The 
same figures correspond to representatives from the Customs Maritime Units (one) 
and Directors from FIPAs (one) as well as the PFSO from that same port that due 
to extreme work volume had to decline the interview.  
The purpose of the study was described to the participants via an information cover-
sheet letter where the research objectives were explained, clarifying that their 
participation was voluntary, confidential and without any economic contribution, or 
gifts. The Research Ethics Committee of the World Maritime University approved 
the study. The total of interviewed participants was 57 persons, all involved in areas 
of maritime safety and security. The semi-structured interviews were carried out in 
the participant’s workplaces by the researcher and free from intervention with 
management and carried out during the visits to the installations for participant 
observation, which uncovered several aspects and deficiencies of the 
implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code in Mexico. 
4.5 Paper 5: Integrating the procedures of reporting port 
security incidents and the follow-up investigation to build 
a national maritime security policy: A case study in 
Mexico 
Paper 5 includes the first stage of the design, an analysis of data developed from the 
same semi-structured interviews with Harbour Masters, Directors of Customs 
Maritime Units; Port Administration Directors; PFSOs from ports and some 
terminals of hydrocarbons; Presidents of CUMARs (1st Commander of the Navy 
84 
Zone, Navy Sector or Navy Station) and Commandants of the UNAPROP, used for 
paper 4.  
It uses qualitative semi-structured interviews to allow new viewpoints to emerge 
freely, particularly about their opinion and perception concerning port security 
threats. This method is valuable to study opinions and fears of people when 
changing processes and systems, especially after the shift of maritime safety and 
security responsibility, as well as port state control from SCT to SEMAR.  
In a second stage of the research and after the findings of the 15 themes; “Action 
Research” was integrated into the methodology with the genuine interest of 
contributing to improve maritime security in the country. A three day ISPS Code 
implementation and compliance course was provided to Admirals from the 
CUMAR and Commanders from the UNAPROP from all ports on 17th, 18th and 
22nd November 2016.  
Based on the findings of the interviews and participant observation, the researchers 
developed a new and “transparent incident reporting tool”, as mentioned before, 
which was implemented at all ports in Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, by the 
National Maritime Authority of Mexico. The purpose of this was to test the 
instrument, and demonstrate in an actual case through “action research,” its 
contributions to improve incident reporting, incident investigation, PFSA and PFSP, 
as the ISPS Code requires. Measurements were carried out every quarter throughout 
the year 2017 and the incident-reporting instrument was adjusted accordingly when 
incidents without code were reported, adding new codes. As mentioned previously, 
due to its extent, it is annexed to this dissertation both, in English in Spanish. The 
Spanish version is the one implemented in México; but the English is also provided 
with the hope that other countries facing the same problematic might benefit from 
that instrument. 
4.6 Scope & delimitations 
The main scope of this research effort is to evaluate the level of implementation and 
compliance of the ISPS Code in Mexico, as well as identify the most relevant 
security threats at port facilities and port oil terminals and fixed and floating 
platforms in this nation State. To develop and implement the “transparent incident 
reporting tool” referred to above. It shall be highlighted that even if this instrument 
is developed tested and implemented at the different ports of Mexico were the ISPS 
Code applies, it can be applicable to other regions of the world facing similar 
security threats. 
85 
An important limitation to mention is that the research only considers ports 
(common areas) oil port facilities and marine oil platforms in Mexico, concerning 
the interviews. However the instrument for reporting of incidents was applied at all 
Mexican ports, including most type of port facilities.  
The study focuses mainly on port security and to a limited extent, maritime security, 
excluding other areas like safety, economics and marine environment, since these 
are topics of such importance that they deserve their own study.  
The doctoral dissertation is presented in the compilation format, compiling all the 
articles and manuscripts published by the candidate about the topic. This design was 
advised because through the research the referred tool and other recommendations 
following the published articles were implemented during the research period, and 
the security status is already improving, avoiding that the research loses its actuality 
and relevancy. 
4.7 Validity and reliability 
Validity has been described by Francfort-Nachmias & Nachmias (1996) as 
understanding the question “Am I measuring what I intend to measure?” Reliability, 
as Mejia (2007) explains, “It refers to the extent to which a measuring tool contains 
variable errors, that is, errors that appear inconsistently from observation, to 
observation during any single measurement attempt”. 
Qualitative methods and specifically; interviews, participant observation and action 
research are mainly used in this study.  Qualitative methods are used to describe the 
world of the human experience, emotions, perceptions and its interaction with 
groups of a specific type with defined tasks or responsibilities, among other aspects. 
Several researchers have criticised that qualitative methods are largely exposed to 
the subjective experience, disapproving its application in terms of validity and 
reliability. Both, qualitative and quantitative methods aim to reveal the truth about 
the investigated phenomena. As Bashir, Afzal, & Azeem (2008), established, the 
validity and norms applied to quantitative research do not completely apply to 
qualitative research. The referred authors wrote: 
“Validity in qualitative research means the extent to which the data is plausible, 
credible and trustworthy; and thus can be defended when challenged. Reliability and 
validity remain appropriate concepts for attaining rigor in qualitative research. 
Qualitative researchers have to salvage responsibility for reliability and validity by 
implementing verification strategies integral and self-correcting during the conduct 
of inquiry itself. This ensures the attainment of rigor using strategies inherent within 
each qualitative design, and moves the responsibility for incorporating and 
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maintaining reliability and validity from external reviewers’ judgments to the 
investigators themselves”. 
Even if interviews and participant observation do not score high in tests of validity 
and reliability, it does not necessarily mean that the methods applied are not 
acceptable. Stanton & MS (1998) argued that, “analysts should be aware of the 
potential power of the method before they use it, rather than proposing that they 
should not use it”. 
Mejia (2007) clarified that it does not mean that validity and reliability are not 
essential in qualitative methods, instead, he argues “different methods are 
appropriate in different stages of the design and one method scores differently from 
the other in terms of reliability and liability”. Kvale (1995) discusses validation of 
qualitative research relation to postmodern conceptions of knowledge and presented 
three different approaches to validity: 
“First, validity is treated as an expression of craftsmanship, with an emphasis on 
quality of research by checking, questioning, and theorizing on the nature of the 
phenomena investigated. Second, by going beyond correspondence criteria of 
validity, the emphasis on observation is extended to include conversation about the 
observations, with a communicative concept of validity. Third, by discarding a 
modern legitimation mania, justification of knowledge is replaced by application, 
with a pragmatic concept of validity. In conclusion, the validity of the validity 
question is questioned”. 
Action Research is a form of interactive inquiry process that balances problem 
solving, actions implemented in an interactive context with data-driven and 
collaborative analysis or research, allowing practitioners to evaluate their job and 
understand the underlying problem causes, enabling organizational change (Reason 
& Bradbury, 2001). It is about how the researcher identifies a particular subject and 
undertakes alternative methods of carrying out that particular job, reflects on what 
is happening and why, checks out any new understandings with others involved and 
in light of those reflections - tries new ways or methods to do their tasks that may 
or may not be more successful. If the trials show that the tested methods are better, 
then the individual or the group moves forward in that new direction. It requires 
constant evaluation, judgment and trial. Mcniff (2011) suggested that Action 
Research is meant to be a systematic process and recommended the use of this type 
of research when the emphasis of the study on the researcher’s intent is to take action 
for social improvement. 
McTaggar (1998) analysed validity in participatory action research, in terms of 
content and outcome. He said that for participatory action, researchers report on how 
things changed. Because of the shared work between the participants and the 
researcher the focus should be on the research itself as well as it’s reporting, 
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including the crucial questions of “how things were changed and how things were 
resisted”. He adds categorically that, “validity implies content. It requires thinking 
about how a social practice has changed”. He proposes that the following questions 
must be considered in the participatory research reporting: 
1. “How have things changed? 
2. What has not changed? 
3. What has been confirmed? 
4. What has been ignored? 
5. What has been made problematic”? 
Each of these questions is thoroughly answered in section 6 of this dissertation, 
which presents the discussion and conclusions. McTaggar, (1998) argued that the 
use of several methods is possible in action research to achieve validation. This is 
known as triangulation. This coincides with Hoepfl (1997), who also wrote that 
triangulation may enhance validity in qualitative methods. By referring to Alison, 
(2005), Mejia (2007), clarifies that triangulation is acceptable under the premises 
that “no single approach ever really solves, delineates, or validates a particular 
problem. Different methodologies, investigative approaches and other types of 
triangulation yield more complete data and result in more credible findings”. He 
explains that there are four types of triangulation: a) data triangulation; b) 
investigative triangulation; c) theory triangulation; and d) methods triangulation. 
Methods triangulation is defined by Alison (2005), as “the use of different methods 
to study a single research problem,” according to the referred by Mejia (2007).  
Methods triangulation was applied in this doctoral dissertation by using interviews 
(semi-structured using a questionnaire with open questions, which was approved by 
the Research Ethical Committee of this World Maritime University upon starting 
the study); heuristics (document analysis); observation (visits to eight ports of 
Mexico including Customs Maritime Units, port terminals, Navy Zones, Harbour 
Masters, oil platforms and observing patrolling of port navigation channels and the 
Continental Shelf with the Mexican Navy on board oceanic patrols. In addition the 
sea waters of Campeche and Tabasco, were most fixed and floating platforms are 
located, were flown by helicopter to explore the security at offshore facilities). 
Finally, it was also used action research for the implementation of the “transparent 
incident-reporting tool”. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Paper 1: Implementation and compliance of the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code in 
Mexico: A literature review and selected issues 
This paper provides a literature review of the state of the art on implementation and 
compliance of the ISPS Code for the case of Mexico. This investigation was initially 
oriented solely towards Mexico. Due to the absence of research within this subject 
for the referred country the review had to be done through subcategories with the 
conditional connection of Mexico and relevant issues were selected. The primary 
data confirmed the absence of research within this subject in Mexico. The secondary 
data, were other words related to the ISPS Code were used for the search, allowed 
for a wider geographical coverage and expanded on general bases the scope of 
analysis, since ten (10) different academic databases were exploited. The literature 
review from an author-centric approach is initially presented; then, it is used as the 
basis to further develop (and examine) the concept-centric approach, through eight 
selected categories. The careful screening of literature, constructed on specific 
concepts, allowed the identification of cross fertilization of such concepts in the 
respective fields. It is observed that the research efforts focused on the ISPS Code 
and the development of a PFSP have an integrated perspective, where the categories 
of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as maritime security management and the 
issue of port security have a strong interaction and dominant status. The results 
demonstrate the limited number of academic contributions in these areas from 
America Central and South America in relation to other parts of the globe, as well 
as the total absence of research efforts about the ISPS Code in Mexico. In the 
scientific contributions on the subject were Mexico is included; it is in reference to 
isolated cases of armed robbery, drugs organizations or proliferation of crime on 
general bases, but not regarding the ISPS Code itself. The absence of scientific 
research on this area for the specific country might also be related to the lack of a 
national maritime security policy and a poor maritime security culture as the authors 
have pointed out in other contributions. 
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5.2 Paper 2: Opening of offshore oil business in Mexico 
and associated framework to cope with potential security 
threats 
Paper 2 describes the situation of Mexican ports and the oil industry from a security 
perspective and discusses key elements of port and maritime security; addressing 
the necessity of the inclusion of port and maritime security and the protection of 
critical oil infrastructure located in the Continental Shelf in the national agenda 
which would provide for future research directions in the maritime security domain 
and contribute to the establishment of a national maritime security policy. It 
identifies the substantial security challenges that are facing maritime port and the 
oil industry in Mexico; and proves that the losses are not limited to economic 
factors, but also to loss of civilian life and the environment. It calls for attention of 
the subject of port and maritime security in the national agenda for the development 
of a national maritime security policy to provide the foundation for an effective and 
proactive port and maritime security programme. 
5.3 Paper 3: Enhancing maritime security in Mexico: 
Privatization, militarization, or a combination of both? 
Paper 3 examines three different options/solutions that Mexico implemented within 
its ports and offshore installations in order to improve the country’s maritime 
security framework, as well as ensuring compliance with the ISPS Code: 
privatisation, militarisation and finally, their combination. Results included 
inconsistencies within the data of the necessary security incident records; 
inadequate competence and training among the PSO/PFSO; use of different 
procedures among the ports under investigation for dealing with exactly the same 
security issues; some port terminals were operating even though the PFSP and 
respective SOC had expired in 2014, two year prior this questionnaire being sent. It 
also found a significant improvement of inter institutional communication and 
coordination at the visited port where the “militarisation model” was being tested 
and where the port administration and Harbour Master positions were given to 
personnel from the Navy. It was concluded that after twelve years of the ISPS Code 
implementation, Mexico does not comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code 
at an acceptable level; and the lack of a national maritime security policy has 
resulted in a poor (maritime) security culture, despite the severe (security) 
challenges that this nation is facing. To see the detailed list of incidents found see 
the appended paper. 
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5.4 Paper 4: Mexico's reorganisation of maritime security 
regime: A new Role for the navy and emphasis on energy 
related infrastructures  
Paper 4 presents a critical analysis of the latest maritime reform in which Mexico 
provides the legal framework to shift the National Maritime Authority from a civil 
institution (SCT) towards a military one (SEMAR). It also examines its extent of 
harmonisation with international law in respect of the ISPS Code implementation 
and compliance; and the level of acceptance of such changes, between the four 
pillars of representatives of authorities/institutions directly related to duties and 
operations, as Directors of Customs Maritime Units; Port Administrations Directors 
and PFSO; Commanders of the Navy and Harbour Masters. 
The results of the critical analysis of the maritime reform, highlights several 
contradictions and ambiguities of the new regime, since several duties and 
responsibilities are still “shared”. While the SEMAR is responsible for 
implementation and compliance with the ISPS Code, the SCT is holding the port 
authority role and is responsible for imposition of sanctions related to violations of 
the Code. In addition, a significant inconsistency is that the decree modifies Article 
7 of the “Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade” and establishes that the “National 
Maritime Authority” is exercised by the Federal Executive Power through SEMAR 
for the exercise of national sovereignty, deal with maritime safety and security 
issues, as well as exercise the Right of the State to be applied at the Mexican marine 
zones, while Article 9 B establishes that SCT will exercise its functions at the ports 
through the Offices of Services to the Merchant Marine. Additionally, the “Law of 
Ports”, Article 16, clearly established that the Port Authority is exercised by the 
Federal Executive Power through SCT, which in practice, would be exercised 
through the “Offices of Services to the Merchant Marine” established at all ports.  
In 2014, the Mexican government attempted the reorganisation of its maritime 
security regime. Several existing laws were revised and a new set of regulations was 
introduced including amendments to the “Law of Ports” and the regulation in 
relation to the establishment of the CUMAR, which is the organ responsible for the 
implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code in this nation. However, since 
this attempt, the Parliament has focused on port security and port installations. They 
overlooked including in the regulation the part related to maritime security and the 
requirements for ships, established in the ISPS Code, such as the Ship Security 
Officer (SSO), Ship Security Assessment (SSA), the Ship Security Plan (SSP) and 
the International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC). This part was not revised either 
in the major maritime reform of 2017. From April 21st 2014 to June 2017, when the 
last updates to this chapter were made, there was no institution appointed as 
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responsible for maritime security in respect of vessels conforming Mexico’s 
national legislation. 
It was established in Article 19 TER, paragraph II, of the Law of Ports, since the 
maritime security reform that took effect on the 21st of April 2014, that “the 
CUMAR shall apply all the dispositions and response measures within the 
framework of the Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 1974 Convention, comprising the ISPS 
Code and ensure the establishment of a series of functions and actions for each of 
the respective three security levels”. But, because of poor knowledge about the 
reform itself, the SEMAR did not exercise its authority and SCT through FIDENA 
directly revised and approved the PSA/PFSA and respective PSP/PFSP for the 
consequent issuance of SOCs, without taking into consideration the legal procedures 
regarding the CUMAR. After the last reform of 2016 the CUMAR kept this 
responsibility as established in Article 19 TER, of the Law of Ports, where there are 
clear specifications for each of the three maritime security levels. 
PSP/PFSP and SSP were not revised and approved by the organ responsible for such 
action. Thus, SOCs and ISSC were not issued in acordance to the juridical 
procedures and must be revised and renewed, following the procedures established 
by law. The paper also highlights the unnecessary “inter institutional character” of 
the “CUMAR”, once the control and management of Harbours Masters was 
transferred to SEMAR. 
Concerning the level of acceptance of this reform between those involved in port 
and maritime operations; the results show that from the interviewed subjects with 
functions of Harbour Masters, 75% expressed their approval of being transferred to 
the SEMAR and supported the law decree, while 25% strongly disapproved the 
transferral between the institutions. An important conclusion is that people 
interviewed were either very much in favour or very much against the change. 
87.5% of Directors of Customs Maritime Units and 75% of Directors of FIPAs 
supported the law decree; at the same time, 100% of Presidents of CUMAR held a 
positive view. Same figures correspond to Commandants from the UNAPROP 
(coast guard-navy unit), whereas 87.5% from PSO supported the transferral of 
Harbour Masters to SEMAR; and 80% from interviewed subjects functioning as 
PFSO from hydrocarbon terminals supported the transfer.   
As presented in Paper 4, twelve categories were identified that either prevent or 
promote the transferral of Harbour Masters from SCT to SEMAR:  
I) Poor performance of Harbour Masters from the SCT;  
II) Acute lack of human and material resources available for Harbour 
Masters to comply with their duties and responsibilities in a satisfactory 
manner;  
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III) High exposure to corruption on the part of Harbour Masters related to 
Mexican criminal organisations due to death threats against them or 
their families;  
IV) Fear losing their jobs on the part of Harbour Masters in a later stage of 
their productive life;  
V) Uncertainty on the part of Harbour Masters with respect to their salary 
levels, working rights and pension schemes;  
VI) Improvement of salary and working rights for Harbour Masters and 
their personnel with the transferral to SEMAR;  
VII) Already high participation of the Mexican Navy performing duties that 
correspond to Harbour Masters;  
VIII) Fear on the part of Directors of Port Administrations concerning lack 
of knowledge, stubbornness and unwillingness/inflexibility to negotiate 
on factors related to business issues with respect to authorities from the 
Mexican Navy;  
IX) (Trust in) Security improvement for offshore installations and vessels 
serving the oil market;  
X) Trust in a significant improvement of maritime safety and security on 
the part of Directors of Customs Maritime Units with the transferral of 
Harbour Master offices to the SEMAR;  
XI) Bigger and better capabilities (from SEMAR) to combat criminal 
organisations that are using port installations for the transport of drugs, 
weapons, money laundering and transport of stolen hydrocarbons, and 
finally;  
XII) Need of providing juridical support and attributions to the SEMAR to 
activities already performed by the Navy and which currently are 
outside their juridical attributions. 
5.5 Paper 5: Integrating the procedures of reporting port 
security incidents and the follow-up investigation to build 
a national maritime security policy: A case study in 
Mexico 
Paper 5 presents the findings of the study about the implementation and compliance 
of the ISPS Code in respect of report and investigation of port security incidents and 
the results of an action research study, where an analytical transparent incident-
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reporting tool developed by the researchers was implemented at all ports in Mexico 
where the ISPS Code applies, with the support of the National Maritime Authority. 
The aim is improving reporting of security incidents, allowing major insight in the 
problem areas to be integrated into PFSA, facilitating amendments to PFSP and 
enabling port/maritime security incident investigation. It is argued that by acquiring 
all relevant information of a particular event in this security incident-reporting tool; 
it would facilitate in learning from that particular security incident and use it not 
only for updating PSA/PFSA and respective PSP/PFSP, but also, to provide official 
security incidents investigators with all the necessary information, to investigate the 
event and instruct the implementation of measures that could prevent the re-
occurrence of such event. It is suggested that the use of this tool combined with 
statistics provides the fundament for a multilevel analysis of port security threats, 
identifying the problem areas and contributing to set up the strategies for the 
development of a national maritime security policy. 
On the basis of the interviews and observations to evaluate the implementation and 
compliance of the ISPS Code, in respect of report and investigation of port security 
incidents, fifteen themes were identified across the studied groups [CUMARs & 
UNAPROPs; Port Administration Directors; Customs Maritime Unit Directors; 
PSO/PFSO and Harbour Masters]; that affect port security either in a negative or 
positive way.  
It is important to emphasise that these findings were made on the basis of the visits 
to ports and interviews before the transferal of the National Maritime Authority from 
the SCT to SEMAR, which entered into force on 17th of June 2017. However, the 
CUMAR was responsible for implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code 
since 21st April, 2014. The themes (which are presented in paper 5), are the 
following: 
I) High discontent among Customs Maritime Units Directors concerning 
the rotation of customs authority agents between Customs Maritime 
Units, Airport Units and Cross-Border Units;  
II) High reluctance by Port Administration Directors and PSO to allow port 
security authorities from the CUMAR and the UNAPROP permanent 
interconnection to CCTV systems in real time;  
III) High reluctance by port terminals managers and PFSO to allow PSO 
and the UNAPROP permanent interconnection to CCTV systems in 
real time from port facilities (terminals) installations; 
IV) High reluctance by Customs Maritime Units Directors to allow port 
security authorities from the CUMAR and the UNAPROP permanent 
interconnection to CCTV systems in real time concerning customs 
warehouse and other vulnerable customs areas; 
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V) Separate IT and CCTV systems rooms between naval authorities and 
customs authorities; 
VI) High reluctance by port terminals managers and PFSO to share their 
PFSP with the representatives from port security authorities from the 
CUMAR (responsible for inspection and approval of PFSP) in order to 
inspect it, revise it and approve it and to develop the PSP for MARSEC 
(maritime security) level 3, responsibility of the CUMAR; 
VII) Poor development of maritime security exercises at level 3, most per-
formed without access to PFSP from port (terminals)  facilities 
[exercises to be conducted once every calendar year, with no more than 
18 months between them]; 
VIII) Lack of human and material resources at the UNAPROPs to cope with 
the ISPS Code duties; 
IX) Poor development of PSP. Port Security Officers only consider risks 
and threats related to common port areas, installations and roadways 
within the port, but not for each of the port facilities (terminals) located 
within the port, neither analyse the impact of security incidents of the 
terminals against each other and particularly, specific high risks 
terminals against other considered of less risks. 
X) Poor training of private security agents concerning port security risks 
and threats, as well as use of fire weapons. 
XI) Satisfactory level of cooperation between the Customs Maritime Units 
authorities and the UNAPROPs for inspection of goods and vessels at 
the customs warehouse with ZVB and other no intrusive security 
systems. The ZVB is a mobile screening system using X-Ray for 
screening of cargo and vehicles. It uses a backscatter technology to 
provide photo- images of suspected objects within the cargo such as 
explosives, currency, drugs, psychotropic materials, forbidden 
chemicals, and trade-fraud items;  
XII) With the exception of one port, none existence of official records of 
port and maritime security incidents (before the implementation of the 
“trans-parent incident reporting tool”); 
XIII) None existence of PFSP’s amendments officially requested by port 
security authorities following port security incidents; 
XIV) None existence of official reassessment of PSA/PFSA requested by port 
security authorities following port security incidents; 
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XV) None existence of official investigation of port security incidents 
(excluding judicial ones) made by port security authorities. 
Concerning implementation and results of the “transparent incident reporting tool”, 
the results show a significant improvement in reporting port security incident 
records, which increased from zero to 57 during the first year of this tool 
implementation. During the first quarter 2017, twenty port security incidents were 
reported. For the second quarter, same year, the figure was nine, which represented 
a decrease of 55.00 per cent, compared to the first quarter. During the third quarter, 
a total of seventeen port security incidents were recorded, which represents an 
increase of 88.88 per cent, compared to the previous quarter. For the fourth quarter, 
eleven port security incidents were reported. This represents a decrease of 35.29 per 
cent, compared to the previous period. In addition, 56% of the reported maritime 
incidents followed recommendations to be integrated into the PFSA and to be 
considered for improvement of PFSP. However, none of such recommendations 
have been integrated into PFSA yet. The need for further training and competence 
about the ISPS Code, as identified in paper 3 is confirmed with the implementation 
of this tool. On three occasions members of the UNAPROP reported pure safety 
incidents as security incidents, which were not included in the macro analysis. The 
figures about reported security incidents per quarter, is presented in illustration 7. 
 
Illustration 7 Graphic of port security incidents by quarter 
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As it can be observed in figure 8 below, the type of security incident that was 
reported most, is the code IFP-007, which stays for “confiscation of drugs, narcotics 
or psychotropic material”. The second place is shared by the classification codes 
IFP-006 (confiscation of weapons/firearms); IFP-009 (unauthorized access to 
restricted areas, including fishermen and stowaways); IFP-017 (vehicles abandoned 
in the port installations or its surroundings); IFP-019 (failures in control areas) and, 
the category “without code”. This type of incidents was assigned a code for the new 
quarter in relation to the period they were recorded. 
 
Illustration 8 Graphic of port security incidents by incident code 
In opposition to the significant improvement in respect of reporting security 
incidents, such progress was not reflected on consequent amendments to PSP/PFSP. 
However it does not necessarily mean that the recommendations for changes to 
PSA/PFSA and respective PSP/PFSP were ignored, but it must be taken into 
consideration that this type of process can take between six and twelve months; a 
period where they must be evaluated, tested, inspected and approved and they might 
be in a phase of this process. Anyhow the task has been problematic for members 
of the UNAPROP and representatives of the CUMAR since PSO/PFSO who have 
been very reluctant to deliver a copy of PSP/PFSP to the port security authorities 
from the CUMAR. 
Other important findings are related to the location where the incidents took place. 
From a total of 57 port security incidents reported by the UNAPROP for the year 
2017, 23 occurred within the Customs Maritime Unit Installations.  As it is observed 
in figure 9 below, which represents a 40.35 per cent of the total of security incidents 
at port facilities.  
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From these 23 security incidents, four were about failure of access control to 
restricted areas and the precise discovery of unauthorized persons found within the 
customs restricted areas; and one more about discovery of suspicious packages 
within the customs area, all the rest involved confiscation of drugs, narcotics, 
psychotropic material and fire weapons in containers at the customs area. In one of 
the events, it was reported 800 units of grenades and pistols including AK-47 Rifles. 
The rest of security incidents at the customs installations involved confiscation of 
cocaine and chemical materials for the production of synthetic drugs illegally 
transported in containers by ships. 
 
Illustration 9 Port security incidents by quarter and port area 
The findings related to serious deficiencies in the implementation and compliance 
of the ISPS Code in Mexico, within reporting of security incidents and its re-
evaluation to PFSA and respective amendments to PFSP; the poor exercise of its 
authority from the CUMARs and UNAPROPs (SEMAR) in respect of fulfilling its 
obligations and responsibilities with respect to port and maritime security; and the 
remarkable improvement in reporting security incidents after the implementation of 
the “transparent security-incident-reporting tool”, which enables port/maritime 
security incident investigation and can serve to identify the problem areas; 
contributing to setting up strategies for the development of a national maritime 
security policy are some of the most relevant contributions of this dissertation. 
Another important finding that should call for attention worldwide, is the fact that 
more than 40% of the reported security incidents occurred within the customs area, 
which even if it is within the port installations, is not required to conduct a security 
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risk assessments and develop the respective security plan. It has already occurred in 
the past (as reported by one of the participants in the interview) that heavily armed 
members of criminal organizations have penetrated the port and customs 
installations to recover confiscated quantities of cocaine and materials for 
production of methamphetamines. This is evidence, that the lack of a risk 
assessment and security plan for installations of the Customs Maritime Units put at 
risk the whole port and its port facilities. 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
6.1 Evaluating the need of expansion to apply the ISPS 
Code to passenger ferries of less than 500 GRT and its 
respective port facilities 
The annexed papers illustrate through different but connected topics, the rationing 
and purpose of the ISPS Code. They also highlight deficiencies and areas of 
opportunity for expansion of the application concerning this set of international 
security regulations to better secure oceans and port facilities. 
Certainly the main focus of the ISPS Code is on terrorism. A number of theoretical 
scenarios about terror attacks have been tested around the globe and security 
measures have been thereby implemented. However, the Code does not apply to 
vessels of less of 500 GRT, including leisure craft. Medium and large ferries 
transporting travellers between tourist destinations in a specific State also fall out of 
this international security legislation.  
Jones (2006) referred to a USCG study to point out that large ferries have been 
accounted with the highest risk assessment score from about 80 different maritime 
terrorist scenarios. The cited author writes:  
“Ferries come in all shapes and sizes, and serve a multitude of different ports and 
trades. The largest ferries are indeed targets for terrorist, and they are extremely 
susceptible to devices brought on board by passengers”. 
Because of the big number of people gathered in one specific place, public transport 
systems, including ferries, have been nominated as soft targets for terrorist 
organizations, appearing on the target list of different terrorist groups worldwide. 
Just a few months ago, on February 21st 2018, a terror attack against a large ferry 
with capacity for 300 passengers occurred in Mexico, when the craft arrived at the 
Cozumel port facility from Playa del Carmen, both close to Cancun, leaving 18 
persons seriously injured  (Sputnik, 2018), as previously discussed in section 2.2.3 
of this dissertation. Different media sources published that a national drug crime 
organization announced the attribution of the event and the political motive behind, 
demanding the dismissal of the city mayor. 
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Lately, to cut construction cost of ferries, several yards have replaced steel with 
aluminium. Therefore concerns are growing about the ferry industry as well, as 
Jones (2006) wrote: 
“The effect of a bomb of fire on such vessels can be catastrophic as aluminium is 
significantly weaker than steel when it undergoes heating and the effect of a terrorist 
attack could lead to the melting and destruction of an entire vessel extremely quickly. 
Aluminium melts at approximately 660 degrees C., whereas most commonly used 
steel melt at around 1370 degrees C, so the potential for an earlier degradation in the 
event of fire is obvious”. 
One solution to this problem, would be to expand the application of the ISPS Code 
regarding the requirement of the SSA, PFSA, SSP and PFSP as well as the hire of 
SSO and PFSO to medium and large ferries and port facilities serving this type of 
naval craft and services. Additionally, construction rules for passenger ferries at the 
State level should be revised to limit the use of aluminium, reducing the risk level 
of a potential catastrophe. 
Stricter security measures for the access of leisure craft and small fishery vessels, 
as well as high speed fibre boats used for fishery to port facilities should also be 
evaluated. During the participant observation phase of this study it was registered 
several small boats and high speed craft used for fishery within the navigation 
channels and in restricted seaways areas of the ports. It is important to recall that 
small boats are used for performing terror attacks against vessels and ports by 
deploying explosives, in most of the designed theoretical scenarios and tested 
worldwide in exercises for maritime security level 3, as the ISPS Code requires. 
As expressed by (Dunham, 2004), the U.S.S. Cole (on 12 October 2000) and the 
French tanker Limburg (on 6 October 2002) were attacked by small vessels, whereas 
it was with small and high speed boats that al-Qaeda planned to blow up the Israeli 
Cruise ships off Turkey, as Jones (2006), pointed out. 
 
Illustration 10 A very small ferry sailing in a restricted waterway in a maritime oil port facility, in Mexico 
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In a hypothetical scenario that this boat had carried explosives and performed a 
terror attack, the consequences would have been catastrophic, since the tanker 
vessels could have exploded in chain and the explosions would have reached the oil 
tanks onshore, and in addition to loss of life and property, the marine environment 
devastation could have reached as far as coastal waters of the United States. 
Stricter security measures are necessary to protect port facilities from small boats 
and leisure craft that might be used for terror attacks. The same risk factor also 
applies to marine oil platforms located in the Continental Shelf.  
However, measures must include solutions for affected citizens at port cities, as in 
the case illustrated in the figure above, where locals use small boats to cross from 
one side to the other without subject to any control, crossing the main navigation 
channels, putting at high risks oil terminals. 
6.2 The inherent role of the ISPS Code in keeping ports 
and vessels free of illegal traffic of drugs, weapons and 
unlawful items & the use of the developed transparent 
tool for reporting of security incidents and development 
of a national maritime security policy 
Several of the annexed papers discuss findings related to port security incidents 
connected to smuggling of drugs, psychotropic material and weapons. Although the 
IMO has left Contracting Governments to determine the extent to which the ISPS 
Code and particularly the maritime security measures shall apply to armed robbery, 
drug smuggling, stowaways, illegal migration and the security of dangerous goods, 
if the security measures established by the Code are strictly implemented at ship and 
port facilities, they would be sufficient to keep them free of illegal traffic of drugs, 
weapons and illegal items, considering access controls, control of unauthorised 
persons and security of the port perimeter area and waterways. 
If an illegal carriage of drugs, weapons or unlawful goods is found within a port 
facility, on the vessel or in a container, it implicitly means that there has already 
been a security breach of the measures established by the ISPS Code, either at that 
port, at one of the previous ports of departure reported by the vessel involved, or in 
less common cases, at the vessel itself during bunkering or catering stores 
operations, which in some illicit cases are performed outside the port facility and 
without the necessary authorities inspection. There are also registered cases in 
Mexico and several South American ports where swimmers and divers affix drugs 
packages to the bulbous bow of vessels.   
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In Cartagena Colombia, the Federal authorities arrested 14 persons involved in such 
operations for hiding the drug to be transported in the vessels hulls while they lay at 
the port for loading and unloading operations (RCN Noticias , 2015), similar, reports 
come from Puerto Bolívar, La Guajira, Colombia (Rodríguez, 2015), as well as the 
port of Santa Elena, in Ecuador, where the Navy found 5.53 tons of cocaine in an 
adapted compartment outside the hull of the vessel which were supposed to be 
transported to Europe  (La Prensa, 2017). Additionally, the same practice regarding 
packages adhered to the bulbous bow of the vessel have been reported in 
Panamanian ports, where the Federal authorities found 213 packages containing 
cocaine in this way (El Nuevo Diario, 2017). The same situation has been reported 
at Quetzal Port, in Guatemala, where suitcases with 281 packages containing 
cocaine were discovered adhered to the bulbous bow of a vessel by the Navy Police 
of that State (El Periodico, 2017). Mexico is not exempted of this threat. On January 
3rd this year (2018), the UNAPROP commissioned to Port of Lazaro Cardenas, in 
Mexico confiscated 300 kilos of cocaine that were also adhered to the bulbous bow 
of a vessel with Liberian Flag with the United States as destination (Casillas, 2018). 
The problem has also reached Peru, where the reported confiscations of drugs are 
not limited to merchant vessels, but even ships belonging to the Peruvian Navy, 
where Canadian authorities confiscated 28 kilos of cocaine (El Tiempo, 1996). 
Therefore, special measures must be implemented at ports and port facilities as well 
as with the vessels themselves regarding increased lighting around the hull and at 
docks and berths, giving special attention to small boats and high speed craft that 
could serve for hiding of swimmers/divers, sailing or waiting in the vicinity of ships.   
On the other hand, divers could also be used to affix bombs to vessel hulls for 
detonation at the next port of arrival, in another country. As Jones (2006) says: 
“Security must therefore begin at the point of loading. Any container to be shipped 
through a port must be loaded in an approved secure facility. These facilities should 
be secured against unauthorized entry and the loading process monitored by camera. 
In high risks areas, cargo and vehicle scanners must be employed and the images 
stored so that they can be crosschecked with images taken by inspectors at a trans-
shipment or arrival destination (…). It is vital to understand that all parties to the 
movement of cargo now have responsibilities and that if one sector does not apply 
itself rigorously to security then the entire effort can fail”. 
One solution for this increasing problem is strengthening underwater surveillance 
with remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVS) specially designed for harbour 
security, equipped with sonar, acoustic technologies and cameras as the UK’s 
Cerberus Yacht Sonar system, which is a diver detection system that provides 360-
degree sub-surface security protection using the Ocean Marine Systems (OMS) for 
retracting through-hull instrument hoist. “The hoist enables active sonar to be 
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deployed with the vessel in motion, resulting in continuous monitoring of sub-
surface activity around a vessel” (Jeffrey, 2017).  
On the other hand, the ISPS Code does not directly consider security measures for 
the aerial space of ports, including security threats that drones pose to the security 
of ports, port facilities and vessels. Lately the use of drones for smuggling of cocaine 
has increased. Ports and port facilities should consider this new technological threat. 
The use of drones deploying or intending to deploy explosives by terrorist 
organizations has been documented in previous events. The risk for a drone to 
deliver explosives, drugs, weapons and currency to port, port facilities and vessels 
needs to be included in the PSA/PFSA/SSA and respective PSP/PFSP/SSP. Though 
the ISPS Code establishes requirements for “preventing the introduction of 
unauthorised weapons, incendiary devices or explosive to ships” to vessels and port 
facilities, it does not directly address the security of the aerial space and the 
connected risk of drones. 
The IMO reports that they work in close cooperation with the World Customs 
Organization on matters related to prevention and suppression of drug smuggling 
on ships engaged in international maritime traffic and relevant authorities from 
member States worldwide. The Revised Guidelines for the Prevention and 
Suppression of the Smuggling of Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursor 
Chemicals on Ships engaged in International Maritime Traffic were adopted by 
IMO's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) through resolution MSC.228(82), on 7 
December 2006; and by Facilitation Committee (FAL) through resolution 
FAL.9(34), on 30 March 2007. 
The Organization adds that the aim is to enhance maritime security worldwide, with 
particular focus on developing countries through capacity-building activities, 
“which are conducted at national and regional levels, by the IMO sub-Division for 
Maritime Security and Facilitation (MSF) that operates under the auspices of the 
Maritime Safety Division (MSD), which in turn functions under the purview of 
MSC” (International Maritime Organization, 2018).  
Although, as the 228(82) Guidelines for the prevention of smuggling of drugs 
establishes, there are no shipping routes free of illegal traffic of drugs, psychotropic 
substances, precursor chemicals and weapons; countries located in the Latin-
American region are overrepresented in production and confiscation of drugs and 
precursor chemicals for production of synthetic substances, according to the World 
Drug Report of 2017 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017). All Centre 
and South American nations, excluding Chile, are considered as developing 
countries (varying from lower to upper middle income countries) by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Therefore, they 
should be prioritized for the IMO capacity-building programme on maritime 
security.  
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The findings of this research illustrate the significant number of port security 
incidents related to smuggling of drugs, precursor chemicals and weapons. This is 
highly relevant since confiscation of drugs; illicit substances and weapons were not 
considered as a port security incident at the different ports in Mexico before the 
implementation of the transparent reporting incident tool developed by the 
researcher. As documented in the appended papers 3 and 5 the selected ports 
reported that they have not registered a security incident since the ISPS Code 
implementation, back in 2004. Incidents records are the cornerstone for conducting 
PSA/PFSA and the respective development of PSP/PFSP.  
The transparent incident reporting tool developed by the researcher serves not only 
for reporting of security incidents but also for security incident investigation and 
protection of evidence material, as it includes the type of incident, code, description 
of the incident and / or protection failure, time, date and maritime terminal (place) 
of the security incident, support evidence’s documents, daily event’s report, extract 
of binnacle, diagrams, pictures, videos, audio recordings: yes no personal 
information (involved persons), description of damages, authorities involved, 
description of authorities response to the incident, recommendations to modify the 
PSP/PFSP, if the incident should warrant official investigation, if there are arrested 
persons and it is transparent since it is signed by the PFSO, the Director of the Port, 
the Chief Commander of the UNAPROP and the Chairman  (President) of the 
CUMAR. 
Together with the use of statistics by incident code and port/port facility at national 
level, this instrument provides the State with crucial information at a macro level to 
set up strategies for developing a National Maritime Security Policy by identifying 
threats and applying a risk-based approach to port and maritime security 
management, allowing the state to allocate material, economic and human resources 
as required at each port. 
Although this instrument was successfully implemented and tested at all ports where 
the ISPS Code applies in Mexico, with most type of port facilities, it can easily be 
adapted to other countries worldwide facing the same problems. It can also be 
modified to include other type of incidents not considered in the format by adding 
the type of security incident and allocating the respective incident code. 
Edgerton (2013), cited by Kusi (2015), said that when security strategies and 
measures are appropriately designed, functions as enablers, facilitating cost-
effective and reliable operations for all stakeholders.  
Bateman (2005), studied capacity building in respect of maritime security for the 
region Asia-Pacific, he said that many countries belonging to this region lack the 
capacity to provide adequate maritime security at a national level, under their 
national jurisdiction and to implement international security standards as required 
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by the ISPS Code. The author highlighted factors as lack of political and social will; 
lack of maritime security awareness; ineffective arrangements for maritime 
jurisdiction and enforcement, and differing interpretations of the Law of the Sea. He 
referred to the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, 1992) 
to define capacity building in the terms of maritime security: 
“Capacity-building encompasses the country's human, scientific, technological, 
organisational, institutional and resource capabilities. A fundamental goal of 
capacity-building is to enhance the ability to evaluate and address the crucial 
questions related to policy choices and modes of implementation among development 
options”. 
Currently Mexico shows several of the weaknesses revealed by Bateman (2005), 
and generally the lack of political and social will, as well as lack of maritime security 
awareness among the authorities of SEMAR and SCT to politically cooperate for 
the development of a National Maritime Security Policy.  
This also makes obvious the need for the development of a National Maritime 
Security Culture. The implementation of the “transparent incident reporting tool” 
can facilitate it by providing crucial information to set up the strategies related to 
policy choices. 
6.3 The need for expansion of the ISPS Code to offshore 
facilities in Mexico 
As discussed in section 2.3.2 of this dissertation, piratical acts against oil platforms 
and offshore facilities located in the Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Mexico have 
significantly increased during the last decade.  
The list of security incidents, vary from armed robbery on oilrigs, robbery of 
valuable equipment on “abandoned platforms” (empty of crew on board, but still 
under production and connected to other facilities with high production levels), 
including lifeboats and heliports, cabling and pipes to wells. Until now there has 
been no reports on loss of life in direct connection to violence during these unlawful 
acts (at the sea). However, the improper and rash disconnection of pipes and cables 
to wells might causes explosions resulting with the loss of life of perpetrators and 
an extensive marine disaster. 
Because of ambiguities to what constitutes piracy under international law, this 
criminal action cannot be counted as “piracy”. Under the UNCLOS definition, 
piracy events must occur in the high waters and outside the jurisdiction of any State, 
but it encompasses not only ships, but any “property” attacked by a ship for private 
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(economic) ends, whereas under the act established by the International Maritime 
Bureau, the location of the incident is irrelevant, as is the end (including terror and 
political motives), but it imposes the ship to ship rule, leaving oil rigs and offshore 
facilities outside this definition. 
Mejía (2007) discusses the fact that while “the definition of piracy in international 
law is quite precise and detailed, it has not been updated to take into account the 
development of the modern regime of maritime zones”. 
Although, in the hypothetical expansion of the term piracy under UNCLOS to 
include acts within territorial waters, it would only include the unlawful acts with 
violence or a threat of violence, leaving out robbery or plundering on board 
“abandoned” platforms, where the use of violence is unnecessary. 
On the other hand it is important to highlight that until now, all robbed and 
plundered platforms, were owned by PEMEX, the Mexican State oil company and 
with Mexican registration number, and therefore both, the nationality and the 
territorial principles of law applies.  
The relevant question would be about enforcement of jurisdiction, if oilrigs and oil 
marine platforms located in the Continental Shelf (of Mexico) in the Contiguous 
Zone or at the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), with a foreign State flag suffer 
armed robbery on board or are plundered. In that case they could also make the 
claim under the jurisdiction of their Flag State. Mexico amended its Constitution 
and Energy Law to open the oil business market to private companies for the 
exploitation of oil reservoirs from deep waters with the approval and 
implementation of the Constitutional Energy Reform, which became effective on 
December 21st 2013. On August 12th 2014 the new Hydrocarbons Law and the new 
Hydrocarbons Revenues Law became effective. These are part of a set of new laws 
and legal amendments to the energy reform (Cross & Patten, 2014).  
With the opening of the oil market, security threats against critical infrastructure as 
offshore installations may increase, including activities associated with terrorism, 
considering the establishment of oil companies that have already experienced terror 
acts in the past, such as the Norwegian Statoil. 
The security situation described above concerning offshore facilities needs to be 
improved. Part of this solution could be to expand the application of the ISPS Code 
instruments, declaring oilrigs and offshore facilities as port facilities, extending the 
requirements for the appointment of a PFSO, the development of a PFSA and the 
respective implementation of PFSP. By considering armed robbery into their PFSA 
and PFSP, offshore facilities would be better prepared for that type of events, 
improving their response to these type of incidents.  
As explained in paper 1 of this dissertation, in the hypothetical scenario of a large 
terrorist attack on oil terminals, or even a marine casualty as a result of a security 
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incident, it is necessary that the PFSP should include procedures and measures for 
response to this type of emergencies, including the environmental factor. An attack 
against this type of infrastructure would require extensive coordination not only at 
national level, but also international.  
Therefore the development of a plan for bi-national coordination with the 
neighbouring State, United States, putting aside sovereignty concerns and focusing 
on cooperation to avoid and manage (in this case) an extensive marine catastrophe 
is recommended. 
Another solution is as Menefee (2002), argues Governments worldwide could 
develop a law under their national legislation to sanction acts of piracy and maritime 
violence committed within territorial waters or at the coastal zone. In the model 
presented by this author offshore installations are also considered for sanctions of 
maritime violence. 
6.4 The enactment of the ISPS Code into Mexico’s 
national legislation, the 2016 maritime reform and 
possible solutions to juridical ambiguities 
The appended papers present several deficiencies concerning the implementation 
and compliance of the ISPS Code in Mexico. Errors in the enactment of the Code 
into national legislation are exacerbated by the lack of cooperation between SEMAR 
and SCT for the adequate operation of the CUMARs at all ports, which is the organ 
that holds the responsibility for the revision and approval of PSA/PFSA PSP/PFSP 
SSA and SSP, audits and annual inspection on compliance of security plans. 
One of the most serious deficiencies is the fact that due to the rather weak exercise 
of authority on the part of the representatives of the Navy at the CUMARs at all 
ports, and ignorance about their duties and responsibilities according to the Law of 
Ports and the CUMAR’s Regulation; the juridical procedures for the the revision 
and approval of PSA/PFSA PSP/PFSP and the issuance of respective SOCs to ports 
and port terminals were not followed. The void left by the CUMARs was in practice 
filled by FIDENA (through an agreement with SCT), which performed the revision, 
approval and inspections of security assessments and plans and send the respective 
notification of approval to SCT for issuance of issuance of the Statement(s) of 
Compliance and International Ship Security Certificates. Hence the current security 
plans and respective SOCs at all ports in Mexico must be revised and renewed, since 
they were not originally approved by the CUMAR, but by another institution 
violating the requirements established in the Law of Ports, articles 19; 19 BIS, and 
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19 TER; as well as the CUMAR`s regulation, as explained in paper 4 and section 
2.2.3 of this dissertation. 
Because of ambiguities and contradictions in several laws, the CUMAR has not 
been fully operating, inclusive after the last reform. This situation must be seen in 
light of the rather limited work of the National Parliament in respect of the 
inadequate enactment of Chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, 
(SOLAS Convention), containing the ISPS Code into national legislation in Mexico. 
This, together with the poor cooperation between SEMAR and SCT has resulted in 
the fact that the juridical procedures for the revision and approval of all PSA(s), 
PFSA(s), PSP(s), PFSP(s), and SSA(s), SSP(s) and and the issuance of respective 
Statement of Compliance (SOC) and International Ship Security Certificate(s), were 
not followed even after the last reform. The problem was regarding the revision and 
approval of those security evaluations and plans by the CUMAR, which was done 
by another institution that has not that attribution by law.  
The significant deficiencies of the new maritime regime, including the “inter 
institutional character” of the CUMAR [completely unnecessary after the transferal 
of Harbour Masters to SEMAR] are presented in paper 4 and section 2.2.3 of this 
dissertation.  
The magnitude of juridical weaknesses of the national legal framework, even after 
the last maritime reform, limit the exercise of authority of the “National Maritime 
Authority”, the CUMARs and UNAPROPs before national vessels, its masters and 
ship-owners; port administrations and port terminals to an obvious and outstanding 
degree. 
Port and maritime security in the terms of the ratified international treaties and 
instruments (ISPS Code), is established as one of several attributions of SEMAR, 
according to the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration, Article 30, 
subsection V, letter d. On the contrary, Article 36, subsection XVII of the same law, 
does not allocate this attribution to SCT, instead it establishes that SCT shall 
“participate” with SEMAR in the application of maritime safety and security 
measures.  
The endorsed duty to SCT is on a “participation” level and only regarding maritime 
and not port security, since this is not reflected in the article as it is in the case of 
SEMAR. It is important to highlight that the Organic Law of the Federal Public 
Administration is above the Law of Ports, since that law establishes the attributions 
of each of the different secretariats of the State. Thus, port and maritime security is 
a total responsibility of SEMAR and the “inter institutional character” of the 
CUMARs is unnecessary. 
A reasonable solution is that the President disregards the “inter institutional 
character” of the CUMAR established in the Law of Ports by a decree and gives full 
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attributions to SEMAR concerning port and maritime safety and security, leaving to 
SCT the responsibility for development of ports from an economic perspective, as 
it was intended with the 2016 reform and in harmonization with the established in 
the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration.  
 Article 24 of the last referred Federal Law gives the power to the President to 
determine the attributions of an institution/ministry when there is disagreement 
between two laws or between two institutions. This Article reads as follows: 
“In extraordinary cases or when exists doubts about the attributions of any of the 
Secretariats of the State related to a specific matter, the President of the Republic 
will resolve to which Secretariat corresponds its execution, through the Secretaría 
de Governación, SEGOB (Secretariat of Governance)”. Such solution must be 
published in the Official Diary of the Federation.  
This decree could also include the part of the ISPS Code related to vessels as the 
SSA, SSP and the designation of SSO, which was not included in the CUMAR’s 
Regulation in the sections dealing with the ISPS Code. Otherwise a revision to the 
CUMAR’s regulation is necessary. 
The implementation of a national program for recertification of compliance the ISPS 
Code instruments at Mexican ports and vessels flagging its Flag to which the Code 
applies to, would be necessary as soon as the character and constitution of the 
CUMAR is solved. This is crucial not only for the national interest of Mexico and 
port stakeholders since it might have international and economic consequences, but 
also for ship-owners and charterers. 
As previously discussed, ships must declare in the Advance Notice of Arrival the 
last 10 ports/port facilities where it has conducted loading and unloading operations. 
A ship that declares to have been at a port without a valid PSP/PFSP might be denied 
entrance to other ports in another country.  
Additionally, a ship that lays in a port that does not comply with the required 
international security standards might not be secure. If it is not secure, it might not 
be safe, either. There is an obligation for all ship-owners and charterers under 
marine insurance law, amongst others, to keep the vessel safe.  
Ship-owners and charterers might be unprotected regarding marine insurance 
coverage for Hull Insurance, Protection and Indemnity Insurance (P&I Insurance) 
and Loss of Hire Insurance, in the case of a casualty or time lost if the ship is 
detained because of confiscation of drugs or weapons, while laying in port facilities 
that do not hold a valid SOC and which have not implemented an approved security 
plan.  
Even the national interest of a State regarding protection of the marine environment 
might be vulnerable in the case of a marine disaster caused by a ship, to which 
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coverage for environmental liability under P&I insurance is denied, because of 
laying on a port without a revised and approved security plan and respective SOC 
by the correct institution and in accordance to procedures established by law. 
Finally, the five questions that McTaggar (1998) considers regarding validity for an 
action research study has been clearly answered through this section, specifying the 
changes that were made through the implementation of the “transparent incident 
reporting tool” and highlighting the improvement in reporting of security incidents, 
as well as the legal changes concerning the latest maritime reform. It also 
emphasizes what was not changed pointing out the unnecessary inter-institutional 
character of the CUMAR.  
It remarks that the allocation of the Port Authority to SSCT was confirmed in the 
analysis of the reform, as well as the poor level of compliance with the ISPS Code 
at the visited port facilities.  
The fact that amendments to PSP and PFSP that should have been conducted after 
security incidents were ignored, was also highlighted, as well as the lack of 
enactment of the part of maritime security regarding the SSO, SSA and SSP into the 
CUMAR’s Regulation.  
The fact that the proper operation of CUMARs at all ports is problematic because 
of its “inter-institutional character” as well as operational conflicts between 
SEMAR and SCT was properly documented. 
6.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
The transparent reporting-incident tool developed and tested through this study has 
been proven to be highly valuable for reporting of port and maritime security 
incidents, as discussed in Paper 5 and section 5.5 of this dissertation, where it is 
demonstrated a significant improvement in reporting security incidents, with the 
increase from absolutely nothing (zero) to 57 providing a strong indicator of 
success. Moreover, it joins three primary port/maritime security functions: a) 
reporting of port and maritime security incidents; b) classification and investigation 
of serious security incidents that require reassessments of the PSA/PFSA/SSA and 
amendments to the PSP/PFSP/SSP and finally; c) collection of evidence material 
related to the security incident. 
This instrument, combined with statistics, also provides nations with crucial 
information about threats and needs for the allocation of economic, material and 
human resources, absolutely necessary to set up the strategies for the development 
of a Maritime National Security Policy. Its flexibility and adaptability makes 
possible its implementation at any State of the world. Therefore it could be 
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considered as an important contribution to the maritime realm for improvement of 
maritime security. 
Additionally, a critical analysis of the implementation and compliance of the ISPS 
Code in Mexico, with special focus on port security both from a juridical and 
practical perspective, was conducted in this dissertation. The appended papers and 
different sections of this study illustrate the chaotic situation concerning port 
security, which prevail in the referred country. It clearly identifies several breaches 
concerning the compliance with this international set of security regulations, as well 
as potential risks, and security threats for port administrators, terminal operators, oil 
platforms, ship-owners, charterers and neighbouring countries. However, it also 
provides possible and practical solutions, identifying the necessary amendments and 
decrees to harmonise the national legal framework with international legislation as 
the revocation of the “inter institutional character of the CUMAR”, which is urgent 
to allow this organ operate and ensure compliance of the ISPS Code at all ports. 
Likewise it suggests investments to upgrade physical security at port facilities as the 
recommended acquisition of Cerberus Yacht Sonar systems for underwater 
surveillance to cope with threats connected to smuggling of drugs and psychotropic 
substances. 
The described situation is quite serious, but it is already under improvement. The 
SEMAR has taken several actions to upgrade port and maritime security under the 
opportunities given by the limited maritime regime that currently applies, whereas 
SCT has taken several actions to improve physical security of port facilities. The 
problem remains concerning the procedures followed for the approval of 
PSA/PFSA/SSA, PSP/PFSP/SSP, annual inspections, audits and respective 
certifications, since this was not made in accordance with the requirements 
established by law. Another issue is the limited cooperation between these 
institutions. Therefore, it is necessary the implementation of an intensive 
programme for revision and approval of PSA/PFSA/SSA, and PSP/PFSP/SSP with 
respective issuance of Statements of Compliance and International Ship Security 
Certificates, after the inter-institutional character of this organ is solved and 
according to the procedures established by law. Strengthening of cooperation 
between SEMAR and SCT is a prerequisite for success. 
The findings of this dissertation are highly valuable for the required amendments to 
the maritime regime in Mexico, whilst the instrument for reporting of security 
incidents and its related applicability for the development of a National Maritime 
Security Policy represents an important contribution not only for Mexico, but 
worldwide. 
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6.7 Further research 
a) The expansion of the application of the ISPS Code to oil platforms and 
offshore activities. It has been described in this dissertation how oilrigs and 
offshore facilities are also highly exposed to piratical acts and terrorism. 
The evaluation of the application of the ISPS Code instruments as PFSA 
and PFSP need to be further explored under a holistic approach where 
interest of the oil industry are represented in the balance between security 
and economic aspects. 
 
b)  The expansion of the application of the ISPS Code’s instruments to 
Customs Maritime Units. Findings in Paper 5 of this dissertation show that 
maritime customs installations are highly exposed to security threats. The 
lack of a security plan at these units might also put in risk the rest of the 
port area. The application of the PFSA and PFSP to Customs Maritime 
Units could be explored to standardize all facilities within the port area and 
synchronize port authority security efforts. 
 
c) The definition of piracy concerning both the location of the incident and the 
type of property, including oilrigs and platforms needs to be further 
evaluated. 
 
d) Specific strategies applicable worldwide for the development of a National 
Maritime Security Policy should be explored. It is true that the different 
parts of the world regions have different security risks, but there are some 
common factors that could be considered while building policies. 
 
e) Security Culture. The approach to security culture is different depending of 
the world region. Lessons from countries with a strong security culture 
could be evaluated for its adaptability to other regions through capacity 
building. 
 
f) The transparent reporting-incident tool developed and tested through action 
research in this study could also be combined with the revised harmonized 
reporting procedures  for reports required under SOLAS regulation I/21 and 
MARPOL, Articles 8 and 12, established in the MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.3. 
Another possibility is that the data acquired through this instrument could 
serve to revise and complement information obtained through MSC-
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MEPC.3/Circ.3 and its respective format concerning the part addressing 
information from casualties involving dangerous goods or marine pollutants 
in packaged form on board ships and in port areas. It is important to recall 
that whhile MEPC.3/Circ.3 focuses on very serious and serious marine 
casualties and incidents, from the accidental or human factor perspective 
(safety), the instrument developed in this study addresses incidents from a 
strict security perspective. In other words, those intentionally caused by any 
person with the aim of damaging the vessel, port facility or marine 
environment, as well as threats related to armed robbery, drug smuggling, 
stowaways and illegal migration.  
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     Format for reporting security incidents, 
English version.
Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, Adriana
Dalaklis, Dimitrios
PORT SECURITY PLAN / PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN 
FEDERAL INTEGRATED PORT ADMINISTRATION  
PORT NAME:_________________________________ 
SECURITY INCIDENT REGISTER 
 
FILE NR: 
 
                 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 
1
 
 
TYPE OF SECURITY INCIDENT  
 
ASIGNED CODE 
ATTACK TO THE PORT / PORT INSTALLATIONS IFP-001 
BOMB OR EXPLOSIVES WARNING / TERRORISM IFP-002 
PERSONNEL KIDNAPPING WITHIN THE PORT INSTALLATION IFP-003 
PERSONNEL KIDNAPPING OUTSIDE THE PORT INSTALLATION IFP-004 
ARMED ROBBERY IFP-005 
CONFISCATION OF WEAPONS/FIREARMS IFP-006 
CONFISCATION OF DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR PSYCHOTROPIC MATERIAL IFP-007 
CONFISCATION OF EXPLOSIVES IFP-008 
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO RESTRICTED AREAS (INCLUDING FISHERMEN AND 
STOWAWAYS) 
IFP-009 
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO PORT AUTHORITY AREA (CUSTOMS / PORT POLICE) IFP-010 
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF PSP/PFSP’S INFORMATION IFP-011 
LERNING TO KNOW SECURITY INCIDENTS BY THE MEDIA (NOT REGISTERED BEFORE) IFP-012 
TROUBLE/DAMAGE IN CCTV SYSTEMS IFP-013 
DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT AND PROTECTIVE MEANS THROUGH VANDALISM IFP-014 
SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES IN THE PORT INSTALLATION OR THEIR SURROUNDINGS IFP-015 
ACCESS POINTS PROVIDED WITH INADEQUATED PROTECTION MEANS IFP-016 
VEHICLES ABANDONED IN THE PORT INSTALLATIONS OR ITS SURROUNDINGS IFP-017 
INAPPROPRIATE USE OF ACCESS DOCUMENTS FOR VISITORS IFP-018 
FAILURES IN CONTROL AREAS IFP-019 
EXTORTION’S TELEPHONE CALLS  IFP-020 
WORKER’S STRIKE OR DEMONSTRATION WITH CLOSURE OF ACCESS AREAS IFP-021 
FAILURE IN THE TELEPHONE SYSTEMS IFP-022 
FAILURE IN THE WATER, ELECTRICITY OR SEWAGE SYSTEMS IFP-023 
UNAUTHORIZED DISSEMINATION OF CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL IFP-024 
UNAUTHORIZED DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON COMMERCIAL PROPERTY IFP-025 
UNAUTHORIZED DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION WHICH MAY DAMAGE PORT SECURITY IFP-026 
INADEQUATED USE OF ACCESS DOCUMENTS AS ACCESS CARDS IFP-027 
STOWAWAYS IFP-028 
LOCALIZATION OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS WITHIN THE PORT INSTALLATIONS IFP-029 
FAILURE TO PROTECT/HANDLE DANGEROUS GOODS IFP-030 
FAILURE TO USE ADEQUATE CLOTHING & ACCESS IDENTITY CARDS WITHIN THE PORT 
INSTALLATIONS 
IFP-031 
FAILURE ON THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE PORT INSTALLATION IFP-032 
INAPPROPRIATE USE OF PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT MEANT PROTECTION SYSTEMS IFP.033 
FAILURE TO FOLLOW REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES OF THE PORT INSTALLATION 
MEANT FOR PROTECTION 
IFP-034 
FAILURE ON RADIO AND TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IFP-035 
FAILURE IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND INFORMATIC NETWORKS IFP-036 
DETECTION OF ZONES THAT SERVE AS POINTS OF OBSERVATION FOR ILLICIT PURPOSES IFP-037 
RECOGNITION, WITHOUT DISCRIMINATORY CHARACTER, OF PERSONS WITH 
CHARACTERISTICS OR BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS THAT SUPPOSE A THREAT 
IFP.038 
NOT AUTHORIZED COMMERCIAL PRACTICES IN THE INTERFACE SHIP - PORT TERMINAL IFP-039 
LATE RESPONSE TO AN EMERGENCY OR CONTINGENCY PLANS IFP-040 
SECURITY INCIDENTS IN LOAD SPACES/WAREHOUSES AND STOWAGE DEVICES IFP-041 
DETECTION OF FAILURES IN THE EMERGENCY OR RESERVE EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE IFP-042 
INADEQUATED HANDLING OF THE CARRIAGE OR ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT OF SYSTEMS OF 
THE PORT INSTALLATION 
IFP-043 
FAILURE OF LOGISTICS OR DELIVERY AND RECEPTION OF PROTECTION 
EQUIPMENT/PROVISIONS TO THE PORT INSTALLATION 
IFP-044 
NON-AUTHORIZED INTRUSION TO EXTRICT RESTRICTED AREAS OF THE PORT 
INSTALLATIONS 
IFP-045 
PORT SECURITY PLAN / PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN 
FEDERAL INTEGRATED PORT ADMINISTRATION  
PORT NAME:_________________________________ 
SECURITY INCIDENT REGISTER 
 
FILE NR: 
 
                 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 
2
 
 
 
 
  
1 NAME OF INCIDENT AND / OR PROTECTION FAILURE: 
 
ASSIGNED CODE: 
 
 
2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT AND / OR PROTECTION FAILURE: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 TIME, DATE AND MARITIME TERMINAL (PLACE) OF THE SECURITY INCIDENT OR PROTECTION 
FAILURE: 
 
 
4 SUPPORT EVIDENCE’S DOCUMENTS: 
 
DAILY EVENT’S REPORT:                                                       YES               NO 
EXTRACT OF BINNACLE:                                                        YES               NO 
DIAGRAMS:                                                                               YES              NO 
PICTURES:                                                                                YES              NO 
VIDEOS:                                                                                     YES              NO 
AUDIO RECORDINGS:                                                              YES              NO 
PERSONAL INFORMATION (INVOLVED PERSONS):           YES               NO 
 
5 DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGES: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 NOTIFICATIONS: 
PSO / PFSO:                                                                                                   YES               NO 
NAVY UNIT FRO PORT PROTECTION (NAUPPRO) NR.:                            YES               NO 
MASTER OF HARBOUR:                                                                                YES               NO 
ANY OTHER INSTITUTION:                                                                           YES                NO   
NAME OF THE INSTITUTION:                                                                                  
 
7 EXACT PLACE WHERE THE SECURITY INCIDENT OR PROTECTION FAILURE HAPPENED: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PORT SECURITY PLAN / PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN 
FEDERAL INTEGRATED PORT ADMINISTRATION  
PORT NAME:_________________________________ 
SECURITY INCIDENT REGISTER 
 
FILE NR: 
 
                 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 
3
 
 
 
 
8 DESCRIPTION OF AUTHORITIES RESPONSE TO THE SECURITY INCIDENT OR PROTECTION FAILURE: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 TYPE OF INCIDENT OR PROTECTION FAILURE IF NOT INCLUDED IN THE CODE’S LIST: 
 
 
 
 
 
10 CROQUIS/ SKETCH OF THE SECURITY INCIDENT PLACE: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 PORT SECURITY PLAN / PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN:  
 
 
DID THE PSP/PFSP FUNCTION PROPERLY?                                                          YES                 NO 
ARE THERE RECOMMENDATIONS TO MODIFY THE PSP/PFSP?                        YES                  NO 
 
SPECIFY WHAT MODIFICATIONS ARE SUGGESTED TO DO : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PORT SECURITY PLAN / PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN 
FEDERAL INTEGRATED PORT ADMINISTRATION  
PORT NAME:_________________________________ 
SECURITY INCIDENT REGISTER 
 
FILE NR: 
 
                 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 
4
 
 
12 COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PSO / PFSO: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 WAY OF PARTICIPATION OF AUTHORITIES AND INSTITUTIONS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 SHALL THE SECURITY INCIDENT PASSES TO OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION OR BE FOLLOWED UP? 
 
NO 
 
YES 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
WHICH AUTHORITY SHALL BE IN CHARGE OF THE OFICIAL INVESTIGATION, IF NECESSARY? 
 
 
 
 
 
WHICH OTHER AUTHORITIES INTERVENED IN THE OFICIAL INVESTIGATION? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PORT SECURITY PLAN / PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN 
FEDERAL INTEGRATED PORT ADMINISTRATION  
PORT NAME:_________________________________ 
SECURITY INCIDENT REGISTER 
 
FILE NR: 
 
                 CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 
5
 
 
15 ARRESTED PERSONS AS A RESULT OF A SECURITY INCIDENT: 
 
 
ARE THERE ARRESTED PERSONS AS A RESULT OF THE SECURITY INCIDENT?          YES          
NO 
 
 
 
NAMES, LAST NAMES, GENDER, AGE AND OTHER PERSONAL INFORMATION OF ARRESTED 
PERSONS 
 
 
 
 
 
¿HAVE THEY BEEN INVOLVED IN PREVIOUS OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS?                     YES         
NO 
 
 
AUTHORITY, OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION NUMBER, ADDRESS OF THE AUTHORITY/COURT 
AND OTHER RELATED DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 GENERAL COMMENTS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ELABORATED BY 
PSO/PFSO 
 
 
 
 
REVISED BY 
GENERAL DIRECTOR OF PORT OR  
PORT FACILITY 
WITNESS OF THE ELABORATION 
UNAPROP COMMANDER 
 
 
 
V/O      B/O 
CUMAR / CHAIRMAN OF THE GROUP 
DATE REVISION BOOK & FILE NR: 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
 
     Format for reporting security incidents, 
Spanish version.
Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, Adriana
Dalaklis, Dimitrios
PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN PORTUARIA / PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA 
ADMINISTRACIÓN FEDERAL PORTUARIA INTEGRAL___________________________________ 
NOMBRE DEL PUERTO:______________________________________ 
INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN______________________ 
NÚMERO DE FOLIO:_________________________________________ 
 
                 DOCUMENTO CONFIDENCIAL 
1
 
 
TIPO DE INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO DE PROTECCIÓN CÓDIGO 
ASIGNADO 
ATAQUE A LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA IFP-001 
AVISO DE BOMBA O EXPLOSIVO IFP-002 
SECUESTRO DENTRO DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA IFP-003 
SECUESTRO FUERA DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA IFP-004 
ROBO A MANO ARMADA IFP-005 
LOCALIZACIÓN DE ARMA O ARMAS DE FUEGO IFP-006 
LOCALIZACIÓN DE ESTUPEFACIENTES O PSICOTRÓPICOS IFP-007 
LOCALIZACIÓN DE EXPLOSIVOS. IFP-008 
ACCESO NO AUTORIZADO A UNA ZONA RESTRINGIDA (INCLUYENDO PESCADORES Y 
POLIZONES). 
IFP-009 
ACCESO NO AUTORIZADO A LA AUTORIDAD PORTUARIA IFP-010 
DIVULGACIÓN NO AUTORIZADA DE UN PPIP IFP-011 
CONOCIMIENTO DE UN SUCESO POR LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN. IFP-012 
FALLO EN LOS SISTEMAS DE CCTV IFP-013 
DAÑO A LOS EQUIPOS Y MEDIOS DE PROTECCIÓN MEDIANTE VANDALISMO IFP-014 
PAQUETES SOSPECHOSOS EN LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA O SUS INMEDIACIONES IFP-015 
PUNTOS DE ACCESO PROVISTOS DE INADECUADOS MEDIOS DE PROTECCIÓN. IFP-016 
VEHÍCULOS ABANDONADOS EN LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA O SUS INMEDIACIONES IFP-017 
USO INADECUADO DE PASES. IFP-018 
FALLOS EN LOS PUNTOS DE CONTROL. IFP-019 
LLAMADA TELEFÓNICA DE EXTORSIÓN IFP-020 
HUELGA O MANIFESTACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES CON CIERRE DE ACCESOS. IFP-021 
FALLO EN LOS SISTEMAS DE TELEFONÍA. IFP-022 
FALLO EN LOS SERVICIOS DE AGUA, ELECTRICIDAD O DRENAJE. IFP-023 
DIFUSIÓN NO AUTORIZADA DE MATERIAL CONFIDENCIAL. IFP-024 
DIFUSIÓN NO AUTORIZADA DE INFORMACIÓN SOBRE PROPIEDAD COMERCIAL. IFP-025 
DIFUSIÓN NO AUTORIZADA DE INFORMACIÓN QUE PUEDA MENOSCABAR A LA 
PROTECCIÓN. 
IFP-026 
USO INDEBIDO DE DOCUMENTOS DE ACCESO. IFP-027 
POLIZONES IFP-028 
MIGRACIÓN ILEGAL IFP-029 
FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN DE MERCANCÍA PELIGROSA IFP-030 
FALLO EN EL USO DE VESTIMENTA ADECUADA DENTRO DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA IFP-031 
FALLO EN LA INTEGRIDAD ESTRUCTURAL DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA IFP-032 
USO INADECUADO DE EQUIPOS O SISTEMAS DE PROTECCIÓN DEL PERSONAL IFP.033 
FALLO EN LAS NORMAS Y PROCEDIMIENTOS DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA IFP-034 
FALLO EN LOS SISTEMAS RADIOELÉCTRICOS Y DE TELECOMUNICACIONES IFP-035 
FALLO EN LOS SISTEMAS Y REDES INFORMÁTICAS. IFP-036 
DETECCIÓN DE ZONAS QUE SIRVAN COMO PUNTOS DE OBSERVACIÓN CON FINES ILÍCITOS IFP-037 
RECONOCIMIENTO, SIN CARÁCTER DISCRIMINATORIO, DE PERSONAS CON 
CARACTERÍSTICAS O PAUTAS DE COMPORTAMIENTO QUE SUPONGAN UNA AMENAZA.  
IFP.038 
PRÁCTICAS COMERCIALES NO AUTORIZADAS EN LA INTERFAZ BUQUE - PUERTO IFP-039 
RESPUESTA TARDÍA ANTE UNA EMERGENCIA O PLANES PARA CONTINGENCIA IFP-040 
INCIDENTE EN LOS ESPACIOS DE CARGA Y DISPOSITIVOS DE ESTIBA IFP-041 
DETECCIÓN DE FALLOS EN EL EQUIPO DE EMERGENCIA O DE RESERVA DISPONIBLE IFP-042 
MANIPULACIÓN INDEBIDA DE LA CARGA, DEL EQUIPO O SISTEMAS ESENCIALES DE LA 
INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA 
IFP-043 
FALLO EN LAS ENTREGAS Y RECEPCIONES LOGÍSTICAS DE PROVISIONES A LA 
INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA. 
IFP-044 
INTRUSIÓN NO AUTORIZADA A ÁREAS RESTRINGIDAS DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA IFP-045 
 
 
PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN PORTUARIA / PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA 
ADMINISTRACIÓN FEDERAL PORTUARIA INTEGRAL___________________________________ 
NOMBRE DEL PUERTO:______________________________________ 
INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN______________________ 
NÚMERO DE FOLIO:_________________________________________ 
 
                 DOCUMENTO CONFIDENCIAL 
2
 
 
1 NOMBRE DEL INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÒN. 
 
 
CÓDIGO ASIGNADO. 
 
 
2 DESCRIPCIÒN DEL INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÒN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 HORA, FECHA Y TERMINAL MARÌTIMA (LUGAR) DEL INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA 
PROTECCIÒN. 
 
 
4 DOCUMENTACIÒN Y EVIDENCIA DE SOPORTE: 
 
REPORTE DE NOVEDADES:                    SI                NO 
EXTRACTO DE BITÀCORA:                      SI                NO 
DIAGRAMAS:                                             SI                NO 
FOTOGRAFÌAS:                                         SI                NO 
VIDEOS:                                                     SI                NO 
GRABACIONES DE AUDIO:                      SI                NO 
INFORMES PERSONALES:                      SI                NO 
 
5 DESCRIPCIÒN DE DAÑOS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 NOTIFICACIONES: 
 
OPIP:                                                          SI                NO 
UNAPROP-14:                                            SI                NO 
CAPITÀN DE PUERTO:                             SI                NO 
ALGUNA OTRA CORPORACIÒN:                  SI                NO                                                                                         . 
 
7 LUGAR EXACTO DEL INCIDENTE O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÒN: 
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ADMINISTRACIÓN FEDERAL PORTUARIA INTEGRAL___________________________________ 
NOMBRE DEL PUERTO:______________________________________ 
INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN______________________ 
NÚMERO DE FOLIO:_________________________________________ 
 
                 DOCUMENTO CONFIDENCIAL 
3
 
 
8 DESCRIPCIÒN DE LA RESPUESTA AL INCIDENTE O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 TIPO DE INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÒN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 CROQUIS DEL LUGAR DEL INCIDENTE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA. 
 
 
 
FUNCIONO CORRECTAMENTE EL PPIP.                                               SI                 NO 
HAY RECOMENDACIONES PARA MODIFICAR EL PPIP.                      SI                  NO 
 
ESPECIFICAR QUE MODIFICACIONES SE PROPONEN REALIZAR: 
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NOMBRE DEL PUERTO:______________________________________ 
INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN______________________ 
NÚMERO DE FOLIO:_________________________________________ 
 
                 DOCUMENTO CONFIDENCIAL 
4
 
 
12 COMENTARIOS Y RECOMENDACIONES DEL OPIP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 PARTICIPACIÓN DE AUTORIDADES: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 EL INCIDENTE PASA A INVESJTIGACIÓN OFICIAL O DE CONTINUIDAD: 
 
NO 
 
SI 
______________________________________________________________________________
___________ 
 
¿QUE AUTORIDAD ES LA ENGARGADA DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN? 
 
 
 
 
¿QUÉ OTRAS AUTORIDADES INTERVINIERON? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN PORTUARIA / PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA 
ADMINISTRACIÓN FEDERAL PORTUARIA INTEGRAL___________________________________ 
NOMBRE DEL PUERTO:______________________________________ 
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15 ¿HAY DETENIDOS?                  SI          NO 
 
NOMBRES, APELLIDOS, SEXO, EDAD Y OTROS GENERALES DE LOS DETENIDOS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¿HAY AVERIGUACIONES PREVIAS?            SI          NO 
 
 
AUTORIDAD, NUMERO DE AVERIGUACIÓN, DOMICILIO DE LA AUTORIDAD Y OTROS DATOS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
16 COMENTARIOS GENERALES: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ELABORÓ 
OPIP 
 
 
 
 
REVISÓ 
DIRECTOR GENERAL DE LA 
INSTALACIÓN 
CONSTAME 
COMANDANTE DE UNAPROP 
 
 
 
 
V/O      B/O 
PRESIDENTE DE CUMAR 
FECHA 
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PAPER 1
Implementation and compliance of the International
Ship and Port Facility Security Code in Mexico: A
literature review and selected issues
Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, Adriana
Dalaklis, Dimitrios
Published 2018 in TransNav, International Journal on 
Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, 
12(2). Pages 363-373. DOI: 10.12716/1001.12.02.18.
363 
1 INTRODUCTION 
After  the notorious  terror attack  in  the United States 
of  America  (U.S.)  on  September  11th,  2001,  the 
International  Maritime  Organization  (IMO) 
developed  a  set  of maritime  security  regulations  for 
managing the risk of maritime terrorism with the aim 
to  improve  maritime  and  port  security.  These 
provisions  were  established  in  Chapter  XI‐2  of  the 
Safety  of  Life  at  Sea  Convention  1974,  (SOLAS 
Convention),  containing  the  new  International  Ship 
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). Part A of 
this Code establishes the mandatory provisions, while 
the  non‐mandatory  (“recommended”)  part  B 
encompasses  guidelines  about  how  to  comply with 
the mandatory requirements of part A  (IMO, Official 
website, 2017). 
Implementation and Compliance of the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security Code in Mexico: A 
literature Review and Selected Issues 
A. Ávila‐Zúñiga‐Nordfjeld & D. Dalaklis 
World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden 
ABSTRACT: This paper provides a literature review of the state of the art on implementation and compliance of 
the  International Ship and Port Facility Security Code  (ISPS Code),  for  the case of Mexico. This  investigation 
was  initially  oriented  solely  towards Mexico,  but due  to  the  absence  of  research within  this  subject  for  the 
referred country  the review had  to be done  through subcategories with  the conditional connection of Mexico 
and relevant  issues were selected. The primary data confirmed  the absence of  research within  this subject  in 
Mexico. The secondary data, were other words related to the ISPS Code were used for the search, allowed for a 
wider geographical coverage and an expanded on general bases the scope of analysis, since ten (10) different 
academic  databases  were  exploited.  The  literature  review  from  an  author‐centric  approach  is  initially 
presented; then, it is used as the basis to further develop (and examine) the concept‐centric approach, through 
eight  selected  categories.  The  careful  screening  of  literature,  constructed  on  specific  concepts,  allowed  the 
identification  of  cross  fertilization  of  such  concepts  in  the  respective  fields.  It  is  observed  that  the  research 
efforts focused on the ISPS Code and the development of a Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) have an integrated 
perspective, where the categories of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as maritime security management 
and  the  issue  of  port  security  have  a  strong  interaction  and  dominant  status.  The  results  demonstrate  the 
limited number of academic contributions in these areas from America Central and South America in relation to 
other parts of the globe, as well as the total absence of research efforts about the ISPS Code  in Mexico. In the 
scientific  contributions  on  the  subject were Mexico  is  included;  it  is  in  reference  to  isolated  cases  of  armed 
robbery, drugs organizations or proliferation of crime on general bases, but not regarding the ISPS Code itself. 
The absence of  scientific  research on  this area  for  the  specific  country might also be  related  to  the  lack of a 
national maritime security policy and a poor maritime security culture as the authors have pointed out in other 
contributions. 
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The  IMO  establishes  that  the  ISPS  Code  is  “the 
comprehensive  set  of  measures  to  enhance  the 
security  of  ships  and  port  facilities,  developed  in 
response  to  the  perceived  threats  to  ships  and  port 
facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United 
States” (IMO, Official website, 2017). As explained by 
Nordfjeld & Dalaklis (2016), compliance with the ISPS 
Code and submission of related information to IMO is 
only mandatory  for Contracting Governments  to  the 
SOLAS 1974 Convention. They have also pointed out 
that  currently  “there  is  not  a  penalty‐mechanism  in 
place for states that don’t effectively comply with the 
ISPS Code”, since the overall concept is not to impose 
penalties, but  to rely on market  forces and economic 
factors to ensure compliance.   
The  development  of  Port  Facility  Security  Plans 
(PFSPs)  has  been  discussed  within  the  context  of 
maritime  security  management  systems  in  several 
research efforts after the approval of the ISPS Code by 
the  IMO;  it  has  been  viewed  as  the most  important 
instrument  to  cope  with  potential  security  risks  at 
ports  and  associated  infrastructure‐installations. 
Mexico  implemented  the  ISPS Code  in  2004  yet,  the 
development/establishment  of  PFSPs  has  not  been 
fully  effective,  especially  regarding  security  incident 
reporting  and  investigation.  Incident  record  keeping 
and  the  consequent  investigation  are  crucial  for  the 
performance  and  applicability  of  PFSPs,  since  these 
Plans must  be  amended  attending  the  causes  of  the 
investigated event. 
As  discussed  by  Webster  &  Watson  (2002),  an 
effective  literature  review  is a  crucial  foundation  for 
advancing  knowledge,  because  it  defines  the  key 
sources  for  a  topic under  research  and uncovers  the 
areas  where  (more)  research  is  necessary,  giving  a 
clear  contribution  to  science.  Additionally,  an 
effective  literature  review  must  follow  academic 
guidelines  to  rigorously  document  the  process  of 
literature search as discussed by Brocke, et al. (2009); 
the literature review in hands strictly follows a linear 
and simple approach that ensures academic integrity. 
The foundation of the methodology used is presented 
in  the  next  section;  subsequently,  the  results  are 
discussed, followed by the necessary conclusions.   
2 OBJECTIVES 
The objective of  this paper  is  to examine  the state of 
the art related to the implementation and compliance 
of  the  International  Ship  and  Port  Facility  Security 
Code  (ISPS Code) within  the context of port security 
in  Mexico,  based  on  a  cross‐disciplinary  approach 
among eight selected categories. 
3 METHODOLOGY 
Webster & Watson (2002, p. xiv) explained that a high 
quality  review must  cover  all  relevant  literature  on 
the  topic and should not be confined  to a  limited set 
of  journals. Therefore, a  thorough  search by  topic  in 
different  databases  across  all  relevant  journals  and 
across  all  disciplines  must  be  performed.  The 
contextual  boundary  is  within  the  scope  of  the 
development  of  the  PFSP  for  port  oil  terminals  in 
Mexico, under the framework of the opening of the oil 
industry  in  that  country;  the  respective  time‐based 
boundary covers all articles published in journals and 
conference  proceedings  until  the  indicated  dates  for 
search at  the databases given  in  table 1  that  follows. 
This table describes the considered databases for this 
literature review and the parameters for querying.   
The  literature  search  method  encompassed 
querying  ten  (10)  different  scientific  databases  as 
proposed  by Webster & Watson  (2002,  p.  xvi).  The 
first test was made back in June 2015, with the search 
queries for “ISPS Code Mexico”. This resulted in only 
one book  review about military  law. New  tests with 
other words were  tried. The key words used  for  the 
search  criteria,  excluding  the  Google  Scholar 
Database,  were  “offshore,  terrorism,  Mexico”. 
Furthermore,  since  probably  there  are  thousands  of 
articles  related  to  each  of  these  concepts,  testing 
different  combination  of  them  was  required.  Other 
combination of words were tested first, like “offshore, 
terrorism,  resilience”  and  “offshore,  terrorism, 
resilience, security management systems, ISPS Code”. 
It was discovered that these search enquiries covered 
a very  few  items. Additionally,  the  search “offshore, 
terrorism,  ISPS Code, Mexico” was  tried. At  the end 
of the successive test queries, the keywords “offshore, 
terrorism, Mexico” was tested. This one provided the 
largest number of  items;  it was  also noted  that with 
this search query several articles included in the other 
tests were  also  included  in  the  results  (largest  data 
sample).  It  is  important  to  recall  that  the  search  for 
“ISPS  Code  Mexico”  resulted  in  zero  items  and 
therefore,  the  words  “offshore,  terrorism,  Mexico” 
were used with reasoning  that  ISPS Code  focuses on 
terrorism and provides maritime security measures to 
counter  terrorism  both  at  ports  and  at  sea  and  the 
condition  that  we  were  searching  for  results  in 
Mexico. Other  type  of maritime  security  threats  like 
piracy; armed  robbery; stowaways;  illegal migration; 
and drug smuggling, are not directly covered by  the 
ISPS  Code,  since  it  leaves  up  to  the  discretion  of 
contracting  governments  to  SOLAS,  its  extension  of 
application to these type of subjects (IMO, 2012), and 
hence they were not considered for the search query.   
Since  the words  used  for  querying  the  different 
databases were  in English,  the  search  included  only 
academic  journal  articles  written  in  English. 
However,  for  the  Google  Scholar  Database  another 
combination of words in Spanish was used; “Mexico, 
terrorismo,  instalaciones  portuarias  petroleras,  plan 
de protección”11. The time boundary was specified to 
2004‐2015  (after  the  ISPFS  Code  was  introduced). 
Even  if  the words were  in  Spanish,  some  articles  in 
English  were  also  captured  by  this  search.  It  was 
decided to also use Google Scholar because several of 
the  leading scientific  journals  in Spanish are  indexed 
there.  The  considered  databases  for  this  literature 
review and the parameters for querying are all  listed 
in Table 1. 
 
 
                                                          
11 Mexico, terrorism, oil port installations, security plan. 
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Table 1. Databases and parameters for search enquiry __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Database        Words              Date of    Period      Nr. Articles  Relevant articles Relevant articles   
              of search            search    & Language  / Books      after title      after Abstract/ 
                                        of search                          Preface/ Contents __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(1) CRC‐net‐Base    Offshore terrorism      03.06.2015  Non specified   190        40           21 
              Mexico (OTM) 
(2) ProQuest         (OTM)            05.06.2015  Non specified   28         15           1012 
(3) Science‐Direct      (OTM)            06.06.2015              279        36           5 
(4) Academic Search  (OTM)            06.06.2015  Non specified   1          0            0 
Complete WMU  
(5) Ingenta‐Connect  (OTM)            06.06.2015  Non specified   0          0            0 
Database 
(6) Springer        (OTM)            06.06.2015 Non specified    1          1            0 
(7) Emerald Insight   (OTM)            21.08.2015  Non specified   82         12           6 
(8) IEEEXplore Digital (OTM)            21.08.2015  Non specified   134        21           3 
Library   
(9) Wiley Online     (OTM)            21.08.2015  Non specified   614        35           17 
Library 
(10) Google Scholar Mexico terrorismo inst.  22.08.2015  2004‐2015      472        34           11   
              Port. petroleras plan   
              de seguridad13 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
TOTAL                                              1801       194          73 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                          
12  In addition to two counted and repeated in CRC‐net database. 
13 Mexico, terrorismo, instalaciones portuarias petroleras, plan de protección. 
On  2nd of March,  2018  and with  an  effort  to  re‐
evaluate the state of the art and update the results, a 
new  test with  the search query “ISPS Code, Mexico” 
was conducted. This time it was made only in EBSCO 
since  this  scientific  search  instrument  covers  all  the 
databases above, the results showed only one item. To 
ensure  that  it was  the  right  search  query  and  avoid 
human  bias;  the  words  “ISPS  Code”  but  in 
combination with several other countries were further 
tested. These results are provided in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Number  of  research  contributions  by  the 
combination of ISPS Code and the country _______________________________________________ 
ISPS CODE + COUNTRY _______________________________________________ 
COUNTRY        NR. OF CONTRIBUTIONS / 
ARTICLES _______________________________________________ 
United States                  29,107 
Europe                      15,276 
United Kingdom              27,442 
Greece                      12,809 
Turkey                      12,721 
Sweden                     13,447 
Norway                     12,915 
Canada                      4 
Mexico                      1 
Brazil                      13,015 
Argentina                    12,641 
Chile                       12,645 
Peru                        12,529 
Panama                     12,648 _______________________________________________ 
 
Based on this outcome, the results from the search 
of 2015 were used. However,  it was discovered  later 
that  the  contributions  were  not  directly  related  to 
Mexico  concerning  the  ISPS  Code,  but  rather 
connecting the country to isolated crime cases or drug 
organizations. 
4 RESULTS 
As  shown  in  Table  1,  the  search  from  June  2015 
resulted into 1,801 articles/books, which was reduced 
to  only  194  after  examining  the  titles;  these  were 
further  reduced  to 75 after consideration of abstracts 
or preface summary, as well as introduction and table 
of contents  in  the case of books. Those  that were not 
included  in  the  next  stage  were  clearly  related  to 
concepts  that  had  a  better  fit  with  a  different 
discipline ‐or a different context‐ and did not comply 
with  the  specific  combination.  The  literature  review 
from an author‐centric approach is presented in Table 
III which follows next. In accordance with the type of 
contributions  from  the  results,  eight  categories were 
selected  to  further  study  the  topic  and  used  for 
developing the literature review. These categories are 
the following: 
 Concept  1=  Terrorism  (at  sea  or  maritime 
terrorism). 
 Concept 2= Counterterrorism 
 Concept 3= Port Facility Security Plan 
 Concept  4=  International  Ship  and  Port  Facility 
Security Code 
 Concept 5= Maritime Security   
 Concept 6= Safety 
 Concept 7= Oil Spill & Environmental Protection 
 Concept  8=  Resilience  plan  –In  the  sense  of 
prevention  &  response  &  to  emergencies 
(preventive and reactive measures to emergencies) 
As  it  can be observed  in  table  III  that  follows,  in 
various  research  efforts  (mostly  books),  the  focus 
includes  the analysis of different concepts  in relation 
to  the  eight  categories  selected  above. A  significant 
number  of  books  focused  on  port  and  maritime 
security,  addressing  the  ISPS  Code  and  PFSP. 
However,  it  is  noteworthy  that  safety  issues,  as  a 
result  of  security  incidents  were  also  addressed  in 
these  books.  Within  this  category,  the  issue  most 
commonly identified was marine pollution caused by 
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oil  spill  associated  with  security  incidents.  The 
complete  list  of  the  references  related  to  these 
research items is presented in Appendix I. 
Table 3. Author‐centric literature review __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Author                                Type   Methods                        1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
114  (Schulz, 2011)15                          CH    Book                            x  x      x  x    x 
1 (Pilewsk & Pilewski, 2012)                 CH    Book                                         x 
1 (Norman, 2012)                        CH    Book                           x          x    x 
1 (Bolz, Dudonis, & Schulz, 2012)              CH    Book                           x          x     
1 (Hesterman, 2013) Pages 295‐300            CH    Book                           x              x 
1 (Doro‐on, 2014)                        CH    Book                           x               
1 (Perdikaris, 2014)                        CH    Book                           x  x      x      x 
1 (Kenneth, 2009)16                        Book   Book                           x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
1 (T. & Tweedy, 2014)                      Book   Book                                     x     
1 (Espin‐Digon, Burns‐Herbert, & Bateman, 2008)17 Book   Book                           x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
1 (Badiru & Racz, 2013)                    Book   Book                                         x 
1 (Rogers, 2007)                          Book   Book                           x               
1 (Neumann, 2013)                        Book   Book                                   x     
1 (Pinkowski, 2008)                       Book                                               x 
1 (Mythen, 2014)                         CH    Book                           x  x             
1 (Lutchman, Maharaj, & Waddah, 2012)        Book   Book                                     x    x 
1 (Bahr, 2014)                           Book   Book                                     x     
1 (Park, 2013)                           Book   Book                                       x   
1 (Theodore & Dupont, 2012)                Book   Book                                     x    x 
1 (Spurgin, 2009)                         Book   Book                                     x     
2 (Cullen & Berube, 2012)                  Book   Book                           x  x      x       
2 (Klein, Rothwell, & Mossop, 2009)            Book   Book                           x  x      x       
2 (Tuerk, 2012)                          Book   Book                           x               
2 (Weintrit & Neumann, 2013)                Book   Book                           x               
2 (Bragdon, 2008)                        Book   Book                           x        x  x     
2 (Tanaka, 2012)                          Book   Book                           x  x          x  x 
2 (Martínez Gutiérrez, 2009)                 Book   Book                                       x   
2 (Weintrit & Adam, 2009)                  Book   Book                           x  x      x  x  x  x 
2 (Tan, 2005)                            Book   Book                                       x   
2 (Ringbom, 2007)                        Book   Book                                     x     
3 (Papa, July)                            Article  Comparative Approach/ Doc. Analysis    x        x       
3 (Safford, Ulrich, & Hamilton, 2012)           Article  Empirical. Tele‐phone Surveys                     x   
                                          & Interviews 
3 (Jaradat & Keating, 2014)18                 Article  Literature review and conceptual                x       
                                          analysis of “critical infrastructure” 
3 (Lichterman, 1999)                      Article  Reflective analysis                  x              x 
3 (Piètre‐Cambacédès & Bouissou, 2013)19        Article  Literature Review Cross conceptual              x  x     
                                          analysis 
7 (Phillips, 2008)                         CH    Terror Attack Identification & Analysis   x  x             
7 (Aronica, Mukhtyar, & Coon, 2001)          Article  Analysis of case law.                x               
7 (Mugarura, 2014)                        Article  Qualitative. Secondary Data Analysis.    x               
                                          Doc. Analysis 
7 (Goede, 2013)20                         Article  Qualitative. Exploratory comparative    x               
                                          case analysis 
7 (Haynes, 2000)                         Article  Qualitative Comparative case analysis    x               
7 (Hoti & McAleer, 2005)                   CH    Apply Risk Assessment model to        x        x       
                                          evaluate security of 120 countries 
8 (Singha, Bellerby, & Trieschmann, 2012)        Article  Sensitivity analysis of oil spill.                      x   
8 (Middleton, Glosec Ltd., Day, & Lallie, 2012)    Article  Use Nmap and Nessus to test network             x       
                                          vulnerabilities in offshore In 7 countries. 
8 (Crook, 2010)                          Article  Magazine article                               x   
9 (Giroux, 2010)                          Article  Risk Analysis on Natural and                  x       
                                          Human‐caused Threats 
9 (Ibrahim & Allen, 2012)                   Article  Qualitative, interpretative methodology          x      x 
                                          with Activity Theory as a conceptual   
                                          framework 
9 (Gregory, 2011)                        Article  Qualitative literature review with a       x        x       
                                          comparative approach for three borderlands 
9 (Fabiano, 2012)                         CH    Analysis on International Threats       x        x       
9 (Haimes & Yacob, 2011)                  Article  Multidimensional Risk Analysis        x               
                                          on Terrorism 
                                                          
14 Number corresponding to database 
15  Pages: 4, 164,307, 311, 323. 
16 Repeated in ProQuest 
17 Repeated and fully available at ProQuest 
18 Critical oil infrastructure. 
19  Safety and security in several disciplines 
20 Organized Crime. 
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9 (Brown, Coté, Lynn‐Jones, & Miller, 2010)      Book   Book                           x  x            x 
9 (Vlcek, 2013)                          Article  Procedure Analysis                 x  x             
9 (Crenshaw, 2010)                        Book   Book                           x  x             
9 (Zabyelina, 2013)                        Article   Book                                   x       
9 (Stoney & Scanlon, 2014)                  Article  Reflective / exploratory analysis          x              x 
9 (Weinberg, 2008)                        Book   Book                           x        x      x 
9 (Burgherr & Hirschberg, 2009)              Book   Book.                          x  x      x  x  x  x 
9 (Lewis, 2006)                          CH    Book                           x  x      x      x 
9 (Woodward & Pitbaldo, 2010)              Book   Book                                     x  x  x 
9 (Bekefi & Epstein, 2011)                  Article  Descriptive / Narrative of best practice &          x       
                                          suggest a risk assessment method to   
                                          integrate risk into the financial analysis 
9 (Speight, 2011)                         Book   Book (Describe all the process of                 x  x     
                                          petroleum production and respective   
                                          problems and security challenges) 
9 (Vaggelas & Ng, 2012)                    CH    CH in a book                          x  x  x      x 
10 (Maldonado, 2009)                      Article  Essay                              x  x  x  x     
10 (Garcia, Monosalva, Rezende, & Sgut, 2004)    Book   Multi‐methodology for different stage    x  x  x  x  x       
                                          analysis. ISPS Code Implementation   
                                          in South America from CEPAL 
10 (Enríquez, 2007)                        Article  Analysis of the SUA convention        x        x      x 
10 (Sgut, 2006)                          Book   Book                                   x       
10 (Preciado, 2009)                        Article  Reflective Analysis of the Security        x  x      x       
                                          and Prosperity Partnership of North 
                                          America (SPPNA) 
10 (Arias, 20014)                         Thesis  Case study                               x       
10 (Zamora, 2008)                        Doc. Thesis  Conceptual Analysis                    x       
10 (Castán, 2008)                         Article  Essay Historical analysis of literature            x       
10 (Elizalde, 2012)                        Doc. Thesis  Analysis of documents, concepts    x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
                                          and literature 
10 (Taylor, 2009)                         Book   Book                           x        x       
10 (Ferreirós, 2011)                        Article  Reflective Analysis                  x        x       __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 4. Concept Matrix __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Concept Matrix __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Concept                               Articles included in the analysis  Books included in the analysis Total __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Terrorism (at sea or maritime terrorism)               14                     27               41 
2. Counterterrorism                              2                      15               17 
3. Port Facility Security Plan                         2                      4                6 
4. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code          2                      4                6 
5. Maritime Security                                16                     19               35 
6. Safety                                      1                      17               18 
7. Oil Spill & Environmental Protection                 4                      9                13 
8. Resilience plan                                5                      20               25 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 5. Geographic dimension of selected literature __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Book/Article __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Kenneth (2009). This book is mainly about maritime security in the US, however the author also analyses several maritime 
security incidents in other countries and devoted some chapters to the study of maritime security worldwide from a 
historical perspective, written in English.  North‐America: United States, Mexico. Central and South America: Brazil, Peru, 
Ecuador, Chile. Europe: United Kingdom, Greek, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Mediterranean Sea, Greece, 
France, Turkey. Asia: Indonesia, Malacca Strait, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, the Red Sea and 
Arabian Sea, Suez Canal, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, India, Japan. Africa: Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt, Eritrea, Namibia, 
Senegal, Liberia, Guinea, Angola, Sierra Leone, South Africa  
Espin‐Digon, Burns‐Herbert, & Bateman (2008). Editors of a book that encompasses several scientific articles related to 
maritime security & implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code from 31 authors. Note: It does not necessarily means 
that each of the countries listed are related to a specific study, but often security incidents at some countries are referred to 
in the study of another one, written in English.  North‐America: United States, Canada & Mexico, (This last one was briefly 
commented in an article addressing drug trafficking). Central and South America: Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia & the 
Caribbean Sea. Europe: England, Germany, France & Italy, Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Mediterranean 
Sea, Asia: North Indian Sea, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Arabian Gulf and Malacca Strait Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Myanmar, Bangladesh, Thailand Japan, China, South Korea, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Laos, 
Vietnam, Kuwait, Yemen, Iraq, East Timor, Suez Canal. Africa: Somalia, Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria & Algeria. Oceania: 
Australia & New Zealand  
Vaggelas & N (2012). Article with a comparative study about the implementation of the ISPS Code between the Piraeus and 
Hong Kong ports. North‐America: United States. Europe: Piraeus, Greece. European Union’s implementation of IMO 
instruments. Asia: Hong Kong, China  
Maldonado (2009). This is an article on operative safety and security related to foreign trade in Mexico, written in Spanish. 
North‐America: Mexico, United States.  
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(Garcia, Monosalva, Rezende, & Sgut, 2004) This is an article from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEPAL; in Spanish), with a Multi‐methodology for different stage analysis about Implementation of the ISPS 
Code in South America, written in Spanish. North‐America: Mexico. Central and South America: All South American 
States and the Caribbean.  
Elizalde (2012). Doctoral thesis about the maritime security and its normativity. North‐America: Mexico, United States, 
Central and South America: IMO & UN instruments applied in the Caribbean Region. International Agreements from the 
Organization of American States against maritime drug traffic Europe: IMO & UN instruments applied in the European 
Union, Spain Africa: Somalia __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In order  to make  the conversion  from  the author‐
centric  approach  towards  the  category‐centric 
approach and synthesize the relevant  literature, table 
4  that  follows  is providing a  summary of a category 
matrix  in  relation  to  the  number  of  articles  and/or 
books that were identified during the search.   
Then, the  items that  included  in their analysis the 
categories  three,  four and  five “Port Facility Security 
Plan;  International  Ship  and  Port  Facility  Security 
Code  and; Maritime  Security” were  further  studied 
under  a  geographical  dimension,  including  five 
subcategories  that  covered North‐America,    Central 
and  South  America,  Europe,  Asia  and  Africa.  The 
complete  details  of  this  analysis  are  illustrated  in 
Table 5. 
5 DISCUSSION 
The  original  purpose  of  this  review,  which  was  to 
examine  the  state  of  the  art  of  implementation  and 
compliance  of  the  ISPS  Code  in México,  had  to  be 
adjusted since there was only one article that met the 
search  criteria;  and which  actually  falls  outside  the 
framework  of  this  literature  review,  as  it  is  about 
military law. The results about this objective are clear: 
the  state  of  the  art  concerning  implementation  and 
compliance of ISPS Code in Mexico is quite poor. The 
topic really need to be researched and, in general, it is 
observed that research within the maritime domain in 
Mexico  is  limited.  Even  when  it  was  used  some 
subcategories  to  get  a  wider  number  of  research 
items, it is discovered that those academic efforts that 
mention Mexico, they do it in a connection to isolated 
cases  of drug  organization, proliferation  of  crime  or 
smuggling  of  drugs  and weapons,  but  not  in  direct 
connection to compliance of the ISPS Code in Mexico. 
Yet,  the research contributions were deeper explored 
and divided  into geographical areas to examine their 
allusions  to  the  country  in  the  analysis  and  studied 
according to eight selected categories, it make it more 
evident the lack of research in the maritime real in the 
referred nation.  In a previous study Nordfjeld‐Avila‐
Zúñiga & Dalaklis (2018) have already addressed “the 
necessity  of  the  inclusion  of maritime  security  and 
protection  of  critical  oil  infrastructure  offshore  [of 
Mexico]  in  the  national  agenda  that would  provide 
for future research directions in the maritime security 
domain  and  contribute  to  the  establishment  of  a 
national maritime security policy”. 
Therefore, at this stage of the study the scope gets 
another  dimension,  since  even  the  search  queries 
were conditioned to the word of Mexico, the research 
items  that  have  brought  connections  to  this  country 
were  for  isolated  cases,  and  the  contributions  that 
were found are mainly addressed to other parts of the 
world. Thus,  the discussion  shifts  focus  to  the  eight 
selected  categories;  based  on  the  contributions  on 
general bases, rather than the country. 
Even  though  the  concept  of  “terrorism”  has  been 
discussed by several authors in the past, there is not a 
sole definition. Tuerk (2012) pointed out that there  is 
not an authoritative definition of this term, but that all 
definitions  have  several  features  in  common:  “first, 
there  must  be  actual  or  threatened  violence;  second  a 
political  motive  is  necessary;  finally,  the  acts  must  be 
directed at and intended to influence a targeted audience”. 
To emphasize  this,  the author cites  to note 393,  from 
Power, Maritime Terrorism: “A new Challenge” and 
further explains  that  the overall  side of  the  common 
aspect is arguably that an act is not terrorism unless it 
has  a  deliberate  political  motive.  Kenneth  (2009), 
coincides with Tuerk  that  there are many definitions 
of terrorism and says that it is simply “the use of force 
or violence against people and places  to  intimidate and/or 
coerce  a  government,  its  citizens,  or  any  segment  thereof 
for  political  or  social  goals”.  The  author  expands  his 
explanation by arguing that terrorists try to coerce the 
adversary to obtain a goal without having to face the 
risk  of  a  direct  confrontation,  fighting  an 
asymmetrical war, which  is  an  strategy used  by  the 
weaker  side  in  the  conflict  to  compensate  for  the 
strengths of the enemy. 
Espin‐Digon,  Burns‐Herbert,  &  Bateman  (2008), 
have  similar views  to  the  above mentioned  authors. 
They further discuss maritime terrorism21, by arguing 
that  despite  the  hysteria  surrounding,  acts  of 
maritime terrorism are by no means frequent, because 
maritime  terrorism  requires  a  certain  degree  of 
familiarity with the sea. These researchers also noted 
that “terrorists would also need a kind of maritime domain 
awareness (MDA) to even think about including maritime 
attacks into their modus operandi –and the availability of a 
special  set  of  knowledge  and  skills”.  Even  so,  they 
correctly pointed out  that acts of maritime  terrorism 
targeting ships, ports and oil terminals occur and that 
therefore  it  is  necessary  to  be  prepared  with 
appropriate countermeasures. Kenneth (2009) defines 
“counterterrorism”  in  his  glossary,  as  “offensive 
strategies, tactics and plans used by government agencies, 
military  forces,  law  enforcement  agencies,  and  private 
sector organizations  to mitigate  the  threat of  terrorism by 
reducing  the  chances  that  individuals  or  groups  can 
successfully wage  campaigns  of  terror  in  pursuit  of  their 
organizational  goals”.  Finally,  in  the  context  of 
maritime  terrorism  and maritime  security, discussed 
by  Klein,  Rothwell,  &  Mossop,  (2009), 
counterterrorism may be understood  as  the  capacity 
of  a  state  to  respond  to  sudden  and  unanticipated 
threats. 
                                                          
21  Terrorism at sea or terror actions against vessels, port and off‐
shore installations. 
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Counterterrorism capacity  is one of  the objectives 
of  any  PFSP, which    is  an  instrument  embodied  in 
the  ISPS  Code  to  ensure  the  application  of  security 
measures deliberated  to protect  the port  facility  and 
its  serving  vessels,  their  cargoes,  and  persons  on 
board  at  the  respective  security  levels. According  to 
Kenneth (2009), a port facility is required to “plan and 
effect security at the levels identified in the risk assessment 
process  and  as  established  by  the  governmental  entities 
with statutory responsibilities for port security oversight”. 
This  author  also  emphasized  the  need  of 
standardizing the terms used in the plan since a term 
like  security,  for  instance,  may  have  a  different 
meaning  for  different  people  in  different 
environments. For  the purposes of developing a port 
facility  security  plan,  he  correctly  identified  that  a 
working understanding of the security should include 
a set of measures aimed to: 
 “Neutralizing  vulnerabilities  for  criminal  activity 
within the port, 
 Identifying and responding to safety issues, 
 Minimizing the threat of terrorism, 
 Reducing  opportunities  for  internal  criminal 
conspiracies, 
 Disrupting  links  between  corruption,  terrorism 
and organized crime, 
 Sharing intelligence and investigative information, 
with appropriate law enforcement agencies, 
 Promoting opportunities  for  the  exchange of best 
practices in port security”. 
Kenneth  (2009) criticised  that very often  the PFSP 
exists  only  in  paper,  but  it  is  rarely  tested  for 
effectiveness  and  emphasized  that  “the  key  to 
successful port  security management  in  terms of  the 
PFSP  is  to  understand  it  as  a  living  document”. 
Vaggelas  &  Ng  (2012),  noted  that  based  on  the 
requirements  of  the  PFSA  (Port  Facility  Security 
Assessment),  a  PFSP  has  to  be  developed  for  each 
facility which has provisions for addressing changing 
security levels for every security operation and that a 
PFSP may cover more than one facility only provided 
that the operator,  location, operation, equipment and 
design of those facilities are very similar to each other. 
As mentioned before, the PFSP is a requirement of the 
International  Ship  and  Port  Facility  Security  Code 
(ISPS  Code), which  came  into  force  on  July  1st.  of 
2004 and  it  is  a part of  the  amendments  to  the  1974 
Convention  for  the  Safety  of  Life  at  Sea  (SOLAS). 
Kenneth (2009) defined the ISPS Code in his glossary, 
as  the  “comprehensive  set  of  measures  implemented  in 
2004  to  enhance  the  security  of  ships  and  port  facilities, 
developed  and  agreed  to  by  member  countries  of  the 
International Maritime  Organization  in  response  to  the 
perceived  threats  to  ships  and  port  facilities  after  the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States”. 
Vaggelas  &  Ng  (2012)  simplify  that  the  Code  has 
mainly two major components; part A that illustrates 
the  minimum  mandatory  requirements  that  ships 
(represented by their firms) and ports (represented by 
the contracting government) must  follow; while Part 
B  provides  more  detailed,  but  not  compulsory, 
guidelines  for  the  implementation  of  security 
assessments and plans. 
For  Espin‐Digon,  Burns‐Herbert,  &  Bateman 
(2008), the ISPS Code is a security regime formulated 
under  the  auspices  of  the  IMO  to  strengthen  the 
maritime security in general, and prevent and supress 
acts  of  terrorism  against  the maritime  realm.  These 
authors  clarify  that passenger  ships,  including high‐
speed  passenger  craft,  cargo  ships  of  500  gross 
tonnage  and  above, Mobile  Offshore  Drilling  Units 
(MODUs) and all port facilities serving ships engaged 
in  international voyages are required to comply with 
the  ISPS  Code,  according  to  the  established  in  the 
SOLAS  Chapter  XI‐2.  They  also  correctly  identified 
that  the  ISPS  aim  is  to  provide  a  standardized 
consistent  framework  for  evaluating  risk,  enabling 
governments  to  offset  according  to  changes  in 
different  threat  levels  affecting  the  vulnerability  of 
vessels, port and offshore facilities. 
Furthermore,  in an article written by  J. Urbansky, 
W. Morgas  and M. Miesikowsky  (2009)  included  in 
the  book  edited  by  Weintrit  A.  (2009),  the  authors 
stated  that maritime  security  “is  the  security  from  the 
terrorism,  piracy  and  similar  threats,  as well  as  effective 
interdiction  of  all  the  illicit  activities  on  sea,  such  as 
pollution of the marine environment; illegal exploitation of 
sea  resources;  illegal  immigration;  smuggling  the  drugs, 
persons, weapons  and  other matters  that  can  be  used  for 
terrorist  activities”.  All  the  above  also  explain  why 
concepts number 1 and 5 are the ones most commonly 
presented  in  the  research  items, since  interest on  the 
issue  of  terrorism  and  the  respective  maritime 
security  framework  is  high.  On  the  other  hand, 
concepts 3 and 4 are rather low in representation. This 
translates into the fact that implementation issues and 
related practicalities are clearly lagging behind.     
On  a  different  direction,  but  in  similarity  to  the 
term  of  maritime  security,  there  is  not  a  sole  and 
universal  definition  for  the  concept  of  maritime 
safety,  although  concepts  such  as  protection  of  life 
and property  at  sea,  risk  assessment  and prevention 
of  hazards  are  standing  out.  Piètre‐Cambacédès  & 
Bouissou  (2013,  p.111‐112),  analysed  the  similarities 
and differences between the two domains, safety and 
security. The authors pointed out  that while security 
is  connected  to  risks  originated  or  exacerbated  by  a 
malicious  action,  independently  from  the  nature  of 
the  related  consequence,  the  concept  of  safety  is 
linked  to  accidental  actions  i.e. without  a malicious 
intention,  but  with  potential  impact  to  the  related 
environment. They further clarify that  in the security 
discipline  it  is  common  the  use  of  the  term  threat, 
while  in  the  safety discipline  the  tendency  is  to  use 
the  term  hazard,  even  though  they  are  used  to 
describe  identical  concepts  in  several  standards. An 
example provided by  these authors  is  the use of  the 
term incident, as an event with minor consequences in 
safety, while it means an infringement or breach with 
regards to security.   
On this context, Kenneth (2009 p.223‐224) cited the 
U.S. Department  of  Labor  2001  par.2,  to  emphasize 
that:  “The  core  function  of  any  work  place  safety  and 
health program  is  to  ‘find  and  fix’ hazards  that  endanger 
employees  and  to  implement  systems,  procedures  and 
processes  that  prevent  hazards  from  recurring  or  being 
introduced  into  the work  place. This  element  of  a worker 
protection  program  has  the  most  immediate  and  direct 
effect on  injury and  illness prevention”. The author also 
noted  that  port  facilities  present  some  unique  and 
extraordinary  challenges  with  respect  to  safety 
management  because  of  the  variation  of  operations 
and  its  interaction with  the vessels,  cargo  and  land‐
based people, as well as conveyances. 
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The issue of marine oil pollution is also considered 
a part of maritime safety and maritime security and it 
is  included  in  the  standards  of  training  and 
certification  as  an  important  part  of  oil  spill 
prevention. It is addressed as a possible consequence 
of security incidents. Oil spill has also been addressed 
several  times  within  maritime  security  regarding 
possible terror scenarios. Espin‐Digon, Burns‐Herbert, 
&  Bateman  (2008  p.57),  argue  that  one  of  the 
considered  terror  scenarios  in  United  States  is  the 
floating  bomb  scenario,  “that  is,  a  hijacked  liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) or liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker 
driven into a major port and exploded there, with the intent 
of  disrupting  seaborne  global  trade”.  The  authors  also 
refer  to  the “momentum weapon” scenario, which  is 
about a large ship such as an ultra‐large crude carrier 
or  a  chemical  tanker,  where  the  terrorists  would 
attempt to drive the vessel into the harbour at a high 
speed  to  ram  either  other  ships  with  vulnerable 
cargoes or oil terminals and similar and then detonate 
the  ship.  The  last  cited  authors  clarify  that  even  if 
such  scenarios  as  the  called  “momentum  weapon” 
has been developed, for the port of Singapore, where 
the largest of Southeast Asia’s oil refineries is located, 
all of them belong to the realm of fiction. However, it 
is necessary to be prepared to respond to large terror 
attacks  at  port  and  offshore  installations  and  to 
mitigate  eventual  oil  spills,  protecting  the  marine 
environment.  It  is  therefore  no  coincidence  that 
concepts number 6 and 7 are represented in 18 and 13 
occurrences respectively. The fact that there is a rather 
close correlation in these two numbers is attributed to 
the  fact  that  oil  pollution  is  widely  considered 
nowadays as the main safety risk. 
Regarding  resilience’s  plans,  also  known  as 
emergency management plans, Kenneth  (2009)  refers 
to  the National Response  Framework  from  the U.S., 
and affirms that this document defines the principles, 
roles, and structures that frame how the United States 
will  respond  collectively  in  terms  of  a  “national 
response  doctrine”  of  coordination,  specific 
authorities,  and  best  practices.    By  citing  to  U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security  (2008),  the author 
points  out  that  the  National  Response  Framework 
establishes  five  key  principles  that  reflect  the 
overarching  approach  to  incident  and  emergency 
response,  which  are:  first,  engaged  partnerships; 
second, a tiered response; third, scalable, flexible, and 
adaptable  operational  capabilities;  fourth,  unity  of 
effort  through unified command; and  fifth, readiness 
to act. He further explains that when developing port 
specific  emergency  operations  and  response  policies 
and  procedures;  port  security  managers  must  take 
into  consideration  that each  facility plan would be a 
component  of  the  larger  national  plan  and  stresses 
that  “planning  for  emergency  must  be  managed 
collaboratively  with  those  port  users  and  government 
agencies that have interests and concerns in the stability of 
the  port  environment”.  He  further  added  that  it  is 
imperative  to  have  a  coordinated  response  to  port 
incidents  (including  hazardous  materials  incidents) 
and  emergencies;  additionally,  to  ensure  that  these 
events will  be managed  competently  and  in  concert 
with national security priorities. As a result, the total 
number  of  occurrences  for  concept  7  is  convincing, 
since potential safety risks must be addressed via the 
“right” resilience plans.   
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The  results  about  the  state  of  the  art  concerning 
implementation  and  compliance  of  ISPS  Code  in 
Mexico are clearly poor. The subject should be further 
studied and,  in general,  it  is observed  that academic 
contributions within  the maritime domain  in Mexico 
are quite limited. The lack of research in the maritime 
realm  in the referred nation might have a connection 
to the constricted attention of the issue in the national 
agenda, which  then  again,  is  possibly  related  to  the 
absence  of  a  national  maritime  security  policy  in 
Mexico. 
Concerning the wider domain of maritime security 
at  ports  and  offshore  installations  encompasses 
directly or indirectly all the concepts included of table 
IV. However, even if they are considered as different 
concepts,  they cannot be seen as  isolated, because  in 
one way or another  they are  interdependent of  each 
other. Furthermore, safety and security  issues can be 
highly  interdependent  and  also  influencing  one  the 
other at the same time. In a similar direction, the same 
interdependency  could  be  argued  between  oil  spill 
and  environmental  protection;  on  the  positive  side, 
resilience’s plans (also called emergency management 
plans) can provide the necessary mitigation toolbox. 
Likewise,  the  concepts  of  terrorism  and 
counterterrorism are (directly or indirectly) related to 
both  the  maritime  safety  and  security  domains, 
because of  the  severe  consequences  that are  resulted 
from  a  successful  attack  as  well  as  the  need  the 
necessary  detailed  preparation  to  avoid  these 
“unpleasant  events”.  In  any  case,  these  are  various 
important  concepts  addressed  via  the  International 
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (the ISPS Code), 
which  establishes  guidelines  and  recommendations 
for the development of the Port Facility Security Plan 
(PFSP). In the long run, the ISPS is a toolbox that sets 
out processes  and procedures  to  cope with  the  risks 
within the maritime security domain.   
As  it  can  be  seen  in  the  concept  matrix,  the 
category of  “terrorism  at  sea or maritime  terrorism” 
was  the most  studied  according  to  findings  of  this 
literature  review, with  41  different  articles  or  books 
examining  this  topic;  the  topic  of maritime  security 
followed with 35 instances.    The fact that “terrorism” 
and  “maritime  security”  were  most  commonly 
presented in the research items could be attributed to 
the recent terror attack threats worldwide, a situation 
that  has  brought  global  interest  on  the  issue  of 
terrorism at sea and  the respective maritime security 
framework  for  managing  the  risk  of  maritime 
terrorism and improve maritime and port security. 
As already highlighted,  the most  important set of 
regulations addressing that subject is the Chapter XI‐2 
of  the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974  (SOLAS 
Convention), encompassing the ISPS Code; this Code 
requires  the  establishment of PFSPs  at port  facilities 
with specific characteristics. It is also noteworthy that 
studies  approaching  the  categories  concerning  the 
ISPS  code  and  PFSPs  were  the  lowest  represented, 
with only  six  instances. This  can  be  interpreted  into 
the notion that ISPS Code implementation issues and 
related  practicalities  are  still  worldwide  lagging 
behind in terms of investigation and examination.     
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As  it  has  been  demonstrated  in  this  literature 
review, research efforts focused on the ISPS Code and 
the  development  of  a  Port  Facility  Security  Plan 
(PFSP)  have  an  integrated  perspective,  where  the 
concepts of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as 
maritime security management and  the  issue of port 
security  have  a  strong  interaction  and  dominant 
status.  Additionally,  the  safety  issue  is  quite  often 
addressed,  with  oil  spill  and  environmental 
protection  being  included  in  the  consequences  of 
security incidents. Closing with a positive note, after a 
total  of  fourteen  (14)  years  after  the  approval  and 
implementation  of  the  ISPS  Code,  there  have  been 
identified quite a few different approaches to security 
risk assessment methodologies as  it  can be observed 
through  the  currents  literature  review. On  the  other 
hand, more emphasis on the implementation issues of 
the ISPS Code is evidently needed to ensure that apart 
from  theory,  field  results  are  resulting  into  an 
acceptable security risk level. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Mexico  amended  its Constitution  and  energy  law  to 
open the oil industry to the private sector. This was a 
priority for the actual government because since 2008 
the  government  of  the  United  States  of  America 
started to lease blocks close to the border  line, where 
the  bi‐national  oil  reservoirs  from  the  “Perdido  Folt 
Belt” are located and in consideration to the USA Rule 
of Capture; pursuant to, “the owner of an area of land 
acquires  title  to  the  minerals  produced  from  wells 
drilled  thereon, even  if  it  is proved  that part of such 
minerals  migrated  from  adjoining  lands.  This  is 
known in the oil industry as the straw effect.” (Avila, 
2008).   
On August 12th 2014 the new Hydrocarbons Law 
and  the  new  Hydrocarbons  Revenues  Law  became 
effective. These are part of a set of new laws and legal 
amendments to  implement the Constitutional Energy 
Reform that became effective on December 21st 2013. 
After  75  years  of monopoly  in  the  oil  industry;  the 
Opening of Offshore Oil Business in Mexico and 
Associated Framework to Cope with Potential Maritime 
Security Threats 
A. Ávila‐Zúñiga‐Nordfjeld & D. Dalaklis 
World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden 
ABSTRACT: After  75  years  of  State  oil monopoly, Mexico  performed  the  first  business  oil  round  in  2015 
involving  the private  sector.    This auction‐round offered 14 oil exploration  fields  located on  the  continental 
shelf  to  private  companies.  The  development  and  exploitation  of  these  hydrocarbon  fields  faces  significant 
challenges  regarding  security.  The  economic  loss  for  theft  of  hydrocarbons  through  illegal  connections  to 
pipelines  is  estimated  to  973 million,  125  thousand U.S. dollar, only  for  the year of  2014. While productive 
research  has  been  made,  it  has  mainly  focused  on  transportation  systems  and  basically,  pipelines.  The 
development  and  establishment  of  policies  prioritizing maritime  security  and  protection  of  critical  offshore 
infrastructure against theft of hydrocarbons, drugs organizations and terror attacks needs to be included in the 
national agenda to improve maritime security and mitigate potential security threats at sea, including damage 
to the marine environment. This could increase the trust of investors and stakeholders and would contribute to 
the faster development of new exploration and production fields. While the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS Code) is the cornerstone for the construction of the port’s security program and establishes 
the  requirements of  the Port Facility  Security Plan  (PFSP),  including  oil port  facilities,  it has not  been  fully 
implemented  in several  important Mexican ports. It  is concluded that some  important ports  lack many of the 
core  security  processes,  procedures  and  controls  that  should  be  included  in  any  PFSP.  This  article  briefly 
reviews  the situation of  the oil  industry  from a security perspective and discusses key elements of maritime 
security;  addressing  the  necessity  of  the  inclusion  of  maritime  security  and  protection  of  critical  oil 
infrastructure offshore in the national agenda that would provide for future research directions in the maritime 
security domain and contribute to the establishment of a national maritime security policy. 
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country  performed  the  first  oil  business  round  and 
offered  14  oil  exploration  fields  located  on  the 
continental shelf  to private companies. Whereas,  this 
first round was not as successful as it was expected by 
the  Mexican  Government  and  only  two  bids  were 
received by  international companies  for a  total of 14 
blocks;  in  the  round one  second  tender  the National 
Hydrocarbons  Commission  of  Mexico  (CNH) 
awarded three of five shallow‐water blocks (Comisión 
Nacional de Hidrocarburos, 2015).   
Diverse  factors  may  affect  the  interest  of 
international  investors  in  the  oil  industry  in Mexico 
when  participating  in  the  oil  fields  blocks  auctions, 
like  the  low  international  oil  prices  during  the  last 
two  years  or  the  fact  that  the  first  offer  was  of 
exploration  fields  while  the  second  one  was  of 
production fields, which gives more security over the 
investment.   
However,  another  factor  that  may  affect  the 
interest of  international oil companies  is  the  security 
of  the  oil  installations  both  onshore  and  offshore. A 
total  of  4  thousand,  298  illegal  connections  to 
pipelines  have  been  discovered  by  Pemex  and 
authorities  during  the  period  of  January  1st.  to 
October 27th 2015.   
Even  though  the  security  challenges  in  the  oil 
industry  are  by  now  more  evident  ashore,  it  is 
necessary to include maritime security in the national 
agenda as well.   
The  development  and  establishment  of  policies 
that enhance maritime security and  the protection of 
offshore  installations  would  increase  the  trust  of 
international investors in the national oil industry. 
Maritime  security  is  a  topic  that  has  been 
discussed  for  several  decades  at  the  International 
Maritime  Organization,  yet  some  significant  issues 
remain  in  discussion  and  unsolved.  The  focus  of 
extensive  research  regarding  maritime  security  has 
been  on  piracy  at  sea,  while  terrorism  at  offshore 
installations, port maritime security and protection of 
critical infrastructure has not got the same attention.   
The  International  Ship  and  Port  Facility  Security 
Code (ISPS Code) was implemented in Mexico since it 
entered  into  force on 1st. of  July, 2004,  following  the 
requirements  and  recommendations  of  the 
International  Maritime  Organization.  Nonetheless, 
some of the most important ports of Mexico have not 
fully  implemented  the  ISPS  Code  yet.  A  set  of 
information that according to the requirements of the 
ISPS Code all the port and port facilities are obligated 
to keep  in  logs was missing when  such  information 
was  requested  to  the  port  authorities  through  the 
National  Institute  of  Access  to  Public  Information, 
which  reveals  a  difference  between  the  formal 
statements of the port regarding the security program 
purpose  and  the  actual  implementation  of  the  ISPS 
Code. This puts in evidence the urgency of the review 
of national policies and national legislation in order to 
enhance maritime security both, at the port and at sea.   
2 METHODOLOGY 
For the purposes of this study the authors have used 
the method of document review to analyse the actual 
situation  of  the  oil  industry  in  Mexico  from  the 
security  perspective.  The  data  was  gathered  from 
different  sources  that  included  official  information 
from  Petroleos Mexicanos  (Pemex),  the Mexican  oil 
agency  and  different  authorities  published  on  their 
webpages. In addition some relevant information was 
requested  to  Pemex  and  other  different  institutions 
through  the  National  Institute  of  Transparency, 
Access  to  the  Information and Protection of Personal 
Data (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la 
Información  y  Protección  de  Datos  Personales  in 
Spanish,  and  represented  with  the  acronym  INAI). 
Once  the  documents  relevant  for  this  topic  were 
gathered,  they  were  further  selected  and  classified 
according  to  their  relevance  to  analyse  what  the 
security  challenges of  the oil  industry  in Mexico  are 
from a strict security perspective.   
3 OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this paper is to review the situation of 
the oil industry in Mexico from a security perspective 
and  discuss  key  elements  of  port  and  maritime 
security; addressing  the necessity of  the  inclusion of 
port  and  maritime  security  and  the  protection  of 
critical  oil  infrastructure  located  in  the  Continental 
Shelf in the national agenda, which would provide for 
future  research  directions  in  the  maritime  security 
domain  and  contribute  to  the  establishment  of  a 
national maritime security policy. 
4 RESULTS & GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The  security  of  the  oil  industry  in Mexico  has  been 
seriously affected during the last years, which has left 
significant not only loss of civilian life, but also huge 
economic  losses  to  Pemex,  the Mexican  government 
and the Mexican society as a hole. 
The  results  of  this  document  analysis  show  that 
there is an inconsistency between the requirements of 
the ISPS Code and its actual  implementation at some 
of  the most  important ports with oil  facilities. These 
factors  need  to  be  improved  to  enhance  maritime 
security and to avoid serious security deficiencies that 
could result in loss of life, oil spill and environmental 
damage. Other  important  security  challenges  for  the 
oil  industry,  like  the  increasing  tendency  of  theft  of 
hydrocarbons were also found. 
On  September  19th  2014,  the  general  director  of 
Petróleos Mexicanos  (Pemex), Emilio Lozoya Austin, 
presented  the problematic  and  challenges  of Pemex, 
before  the  Commission  of  Energy  of  the  LXII 
Legislature‐group  of  the  National  Congress 
(Parliament).  In  this  presentation,  the  mentioned 
director of Pemex  said  that  “In  the year  2014, up  to 
August,  it  is  estimated  that  the  volume  of  crude  oil 
subtracted  trough  illegal  connections  to  pipelines 
amounted to 7.5 million barrels, which equivalent cost 
is  15  thousand,  300  million  pesos.  That  is  what  is 
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stolen to the Mexican Government, at least up to this 
presentation”. 
The  textual wording  in Spanish of  the director of 
Pemex is as follows: “En el año 2014, al cierre del mes 
de  agosto  se  estima  que  el  volumen de  combustible 
sustraído  ilícitamente  a  través  de  las  tomas 
clandestinas  ascendió  a  7.5 millones de  barriles,  con 
un costo equivalente a 15 mil 300 millones de pesos. 
Eso  es  lo que  le  roban  al Estado mexicano o, por  lo 
menos, a la presentación del informe”. 
According to the figures published by the National 
Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics the 
annual  average  of  oil  prices  for  2014  is  86.5  USA 
Dollars per barrel, whereas  the average  for 2015 and 
up  to  September  that  year,  the  oil  price  average  is 
46.6, as figures illustrated in table I.   
Table 1.  Oil  Price  Indices  per  Barrel  (Mexico),  2014‐2015. 
Source: Elaborated with data from the National Institute for 
Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI); price indices 
series. _______________________________________________ 
Period      Price Oil Barrel    Annual Average _______________________________________________ 
2014/01        90.65           86.5 
2014/02        93.09 
2014/03        93.48 
2014/04        95.68 
2014/05        96.79 
2014/06        98.79 
2014/07        94.65 
2014/08        90.8 
2014/09        85.82 
2014/10        75.23 
2014/11        71.39 
2014/12        52.36 
2015/01        41.7            46.6 
2015/02        47.26 
2015/03        47.36 
2015/04        50.69 
2015/05        54.06 
2015/06        53.87 
2015/07        46.56 
2015/08        39.87 
2015/09        38.82 _______________________________________________ 
 
Therefore  the  estimated  number  of  stolen  barrels 
from January to August, 2014 amounts  to 7.5 million 
barrels; the economic loss amounts to 648 million, 750 
thousand US dollars. 
With  this  information  the  total  economic  loss 
caused  by  theft  of  hydrocarbons  for  2014  may  be 
estimated;  considering  that  7.5 million  barrels  from 
January  to  August  gives  a monthly  average  of  937 
thousand  500  barrels; multiplying  this  figure  for  12 
months,  it  gives  a  total  of  11 million,  250  thousand 
barrels, which can be multiplied by the average price 
of crude oil barrel for the year 2014; which is 86.5 US 
Dollars. Therefore the total economic  loss  for  theft of 
hydrocarbons  for  the  year  2014,  for Mexico,  can  be 
estimated to 973 million, 125 thousand U.S. dollars.   
The  total  number  of  illegal  connections  to 
pipelines  discovered  by  Pemex  and  relevant 
authorities  for  2014 was  3  thousand  635, while  this 
figure  increased to 4 thousand 298  for 2015 and only 
up  to  October  26th.  This  figure  means  that  the 
number  of  illegal  connections  to  pipelines  increased 
with 18.24 per cent  from 2014  to 2015, which  can be 
observed in table 2. 
Table 2. Nr. of Illegal Connections Discovered by Pemex or 
Authorities,  2000‐2015.  Source:  SISI12857200255215,  from 
INAI _______________________________________________ 
Year          Nr. of Illegal connections discovered _______________________________________________ 
2000                      155 
2001                      132 
2002                      159 
2003                      152 
2004                      102 
2005                      132 
2006                      213 
2007                      324 
2008                      392 
2009                      462 
2010                      691 
2011                      1361 
2012                      1635 
2013                      2613 
2014                      3635 
2015                      4298 _______________________________________________ 
 
If  this  figure  is  applied  to  the  loss  of  barrels  for 
2014; in this case 11 million, 250 thousand barrels, the 
increase would  amount  to  2 million  52  thousand oil 
barrels, giving a  total of 13 million 302  thousand oil 
barrels  for  the year 2015.  If  the estimated amount of 
loss  of  barrels  for  2015,  in  this  case  13 million,  302 
thousand barrels is multiplied by the average price of 
crude  oil  barrel  for  the  year  2015  (In  this  case  the 
average was  calculated with  figures  from  the period 
January‐September, as presented  in table 1); which  is 
46.5 US Dollars, the estimated economic loss for 2015 
amounts  to  618  million  543  thousand  U.S  Dollar; 
under  the  condition  that  the  production  remain 
unchanged  and  the  average  loss  of  barrels  per 
incident remains the same from 2014 to 2015. 
The  fact  that  the  estimated  economic  loss  caused 
by  theft  of  hydrocarbons  from  2015  is  less  than  the 
estimated loss for the year 2014, even considering that 
the  number  of  incidents  of  illegal  connections  to 
pipelines was larger in 2015 than in the previous year; 
is because the dramatic fall of the oil prices in 2015. 
It was requested to Pemex to provide  information 
about  how  many  clandestine  connections  where 
found  to pipelines, warehouse  tankers, oil  terminals, 
refineries  and  other  oil  installations,  but  this 
classification  had  not  been  registered  in  the  files. 
However, the discovery of such illegal connections to 
Pemex  installations  to  steal  hydrocarbons  have 
resulted in 14 thousand 547 legal claims, only for the 
period 2006 to 2015, (Pemex unidad de enlace a travez 
del  INAI  2015,  SISI  12857200255215)  from  which  a 
total  of  324  persons  have  become  sentenced with  a 
guilty verdict, as observed in table 3. 
According  to  the  same document  from  the  INAI, 
clandestine  connections  to  pipelines  and  other  oil 
installations  have  led  to  explosions,  which  have 
caused the dead of two civilian and serious injuries to 
other  four  persons  in  2014,  while  in  2015  an 
individual lost his life by the same cause.   
The  consequences  of  illegal  connections  to 
hydrocarbon’s  pipelines  have  also  caused  severe 
damages  to  the environment polluting diverse  rivers 
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and valleys because of oil spill. During  the period of 
2006  to  2015  a  total  of  571  legal  claims  for  oil  spill 
pollution have been presented as illustrated in table 4. 
Table 3.  Nr.  of  Persons  Convicted  for  Theft  of 
Hydrocarbons, 2006‐2015. Source: SISI12857200255215 _______________________________________________ 
Year            Nr. of Persons Convicted 
        Guilty Verdict  Acquittal Verdict (No Guilty) _______________________________________________ 
2006          19             13 
2007          36             16 
2008          55             35 
2009          30             19 
2010          34             31 
2011          35             52 
2012          68             69 
2013          35             46 
2014          12             12 
2015          0              5 _______________________________________________ 
Total         324            298 _______________________________________________ 
Table 4.  Legal  Claims  for  Oil  Spill  Pollution,  2006‐2015. 
Source: SISI12857200255215 _______________________________________________ 
Year        Nr. of Legal Claims for Oil Spill Pollution _______________________________________________ 
2006                      130 
2007                      101 
2008                      65 
2009                      52 
2010                      24 
2011                      46 
2012                      46 
2013                      35 
2014                      54 
2015                      18 _______________________________________________ 
Total                     571 _______________________________________________ 
 
To  connect  illegal  pipelines  to  Pemex’s 
installations  network  requires  a  high  degree  of 
expertise. Several employees and ex‐employees  from 
the  Mexican  oil  agency  have  been  investigated  for 
participating  in  these  crimes  against  the  nation. 
Information  from  another  document  also  from  the 
INAI, with register number SISI1857200171515 (2015), 
establishes that a total of 136 employees  from Pemex 
had  been  investigated  in  relation  to  theft  of 
hydrocarbons, as illustrated in table 5. 
Table 5. Nr.  of  Employees  and  Ex‐employees  investigated 
for  theft  of  hydrocarbons,  2006‐2015.  Source: 
SISI1857200171515 _______________________________________________ 
Nr. of Employees and Ex‐employees involved and 
investigated in theft of hydrocarbons 2006‐2015 _______________________________________________ 
Year      Nr. of Employees      Nr. of Ex‐employees   
        investigated for theft   investigated for theft   
        of hydrocarbons     of hydrocarbons _______________________________________________ 
2006          10               0 
2007          7                3 
2008          19               0 
2009          10               0 
2010          14               2 
2011          5                2 
2012          11               2 
2013          15               1 
2014          33               1 
2015          12               1 
TOTAL        136              12 _______________________________________________ 
 
There are other  important aspects of security  that 
reflect  the  urgency  of  implementing  measures  to 
improve security within the oil agency. From 2006 to 
2015 several employees were arrested and put under 
investigation for other type of law‐breaking including 
possession  of  cocaine,  cannabis,  falsification  of 
company’s  card,  terror  attempts  and  murder,  as 
illustrated in table 6. 
Table 6.  Pemexʹs  employees  investigated  for  other  crimes, 
2006‐2015. Source: SISI1857200171515 _______________________________________________ 
Pemex’s employees investigated for other crimes   
(2006‐2015) _______________________________________________ 
Crime                          Nr. of employees _______________________________________________ 
Possession of Cocaine                      9 
Possession of Cannabis                    25 
Falsification of company’s card              1 
Possession/bearing of fire weapons            7 
Violence with weapons                    8 
Explosion Threat                        1 
Theft of production material, ferric material,      115 
working tools, machinery, cable, pipes, car   
parts, cooper and cranes among other Pemex’s   
property items. 
Murder                                1 
Kidnapping                            2 
Fraud for selling working positions            4 
Improper (unmoral) Behaviour at work         2 
Psychotropic medicine drugs                  1 
Stealing other employees properties            4 
Falsification of fuel tickets                  1 
Car accident                            1 
Fraud                                1 
Attack/assault & Violence                  2 
Being member of the “Z” narcotic organization    1 
Alcohol at work                          3 _______________________________________________ 
TOTAL                                189 _______________________________________________ 
 
Pemex also  function as  the operator of several oil 
terminals.  The  crimes made  by  some  employees  of 
Pemex  like  falsification  of  the  company  card  put 
unacceptable  risk  to  the  company  and measures  to 
stop  these  actions  are  essential  regarding  security, 
since this type of actions could be required for terror 
attacks in a terror scenario. On the other hand, crimes 
like  possession  of  weapons  and  drugs  can  lead  to 
serious  accidents  putting  in  risk  the  safety  of  the 
personnel;  the  installations  and  the  marine 
environment  because  of  oil  spill  pollution.  It  is 
important  to  mention  that  even  though  maritime 
security  and  maritime  safety  are  two  different 
concepts, they are directly connected. 
Piètre‐Cambacédès  &  Bouissou,  (2013)  analyses 
the  similarities  and  differences  between  the  two 
domains, safety and security. The authors wrote  that 
while  security  is  connected  to  risks  originated  or 
exacerbated  by  a  malicious  action,  independently 
from  the  nature  of  the  related  consequence;  the 
concept  of  safety  is  linked  to  accidental  actions  i.e. 
without  a  malicious  intention,  but  with  potential 
impact  to  the  related  environment  (p.111).  They 
further  clarify  that  in  the  security  discipline  it  is 
common to use the term “threat”, while  in the safety 
discipline  the  tendency  is  to use  the  term  “hazard”, 
even  though  they  are  used  to  describe  identical 
concepts  in  several  standards. An  example given by 
the cited authors is the use of the term incident, as an 
event  with  minor  consequences  in  safety,  while  it 
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means  an  infringement  or  breach  with  regards  to 
security (p.112). 
Klein,  Rothwell,  & Mossop,  (2009  p.  242),  states 
that  one  of  the  main  characteristics  of  maritime 
security  is  that  there are  two different dimensions  in 
terms  of  response  to  external  threats  faced  by  a 
coastal  state.  The  author  establishes  that  the  first 
dimensions is the fact that exists a core set of threats, 
values  and  responses, which  any  state will  bring  to 
bear in seeking to secure its maritime security; which 
is  reflected  in  the national  and  international outlook 
of  a  state,  its  geographical  location  and  maritime 
domain,  as  well  as  its  bilateral  and  regional 
relationships. These are factors that even  if  they may 
slightly vary over time, they will remain fairly stable. 
The  authors  explained  that  the  second  dimension  is 
the “evolving and emerging threats to maritime security”. 
They further clarified that some of those threats could 
periodic  or  temporary,  while  others  may  suddenly 
arise  with  little  or  no  warning  at  all.    Therefore, 
planning  and  organizing maritime  security  requires 
not  only  ongoing  attention  to  the  core  values  of  a 
state, but also the capacity to respond to sudden and 
totally unexpected threats with diverse scenarios from 
oil  spills  to  terror  or  nuclear  attacks,  as  well  as 
transnational  crime  against  the  port  or  offshore 
installations (Klein, Rothwell, & Mossop, 2009 p. 242‐
243). 
By citing to Ng and Gujar (2008), Vaggelas & Ng, 
(2012 p.674) established that port security includes all 
security  and  counter‐terrorism  activities  within  the 
port’s  domain,  including  the  protection  of  port 
facilities and  the  security of  the activities during  the 
interaction of the ship with the port. 
In  an  article written  by  J. Urbansky, W. Morgas 
and  M.  Miesikowsky  (2009)  presented  in  the  book 
edited by A. Weintrit (2009 p.3), the authors wrote the 
following about maritime security: “is the security from 
the terrorism, piracy and similar threats, as well as effective 
interdiction  of  all  the  illicit  activities  on  sea,  such  as 
pollution of the marine environment; illegal exploitation of 
sea  resources;  illegal  immigration;  smuggling  the  drugs, 
persons, weapons  and  other matters  that  can  be  used  for 
terrorist activities”.   
Maritime  security  regulative  framework 
encompasses  several  international  conventions  like 
SOLAS  1974  and  respective  protocols  up  to  date, 
MARPOL  73/78  with  respective  protocols,  and  the 
SUA convention  from 1998 and 2005 with  respective 
protocols,  among  others. The  International  Ship  and 
Port  Facility  Security  Code  (ISPS  Code)  came  into 
force  on  July  1st  of  2004  and  it  is  a  part  of  the 
amendments to the 1974 Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea  (SOLAS). The amendments  to  the SOLAS 
Convention  included  a  new  chapter  XI‐2,  about 
special  measures  to  enhance  maritime  security. 
Kenneth  (2009)  defines  the  ISPS  Code  as  the 
comprehensive set of measures  implemented  in 2004 
to  enhance  the  security  of  ships  and  port  facilities, 
developed and agreed to by member countries of the 
International  Maritime  Organization  in  response  to 
the perceived  threats  to ships and port  facilities after 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United 
States. 
Vaggelas & Ng  (2012 p.677‐678)  simplify  that  the 
Code has mainly two major components, whereas the 
first  part  illustrates  the  minimum  mandatory 
requirements that ships and ports represented by the 
contracting government must follow, the second part, 
which  is  not  compulsory,  provides  guidelines  and 
recommendations  for  the  implementation of  security 
assessments and plans with more detail. The authors 
clarify that even if certainly the ISPS Code includes a 
standardized guidance on maritime security for both, 
ships  and  ports,  it  focuses mainly  on  how  terrorist 
attacks can be deterred and mitigated, while detailed 
procedures on how  to deal with  the consequences of 
such  security  events,  like  crisis  management  or 
recovery are not addressed. Resilience plans or plans 
for crisis management are instruments that should be 
considered  as  a  part  of  any  security  program.  By 
citing Sarathy  (2006) Zhang, Payam, & Ekwall  (2011) 
expressed  that  a  system  of  this  type  should  be  “a 
robust,  resilient,  and  flexible  that  will  require  extensive 
coordination  both  at  national  and  international  levels”. 
Robustness  and  resilience  are  different  features.  By 
citing  to  Husdal  (2008),  Zhang,  Payam,  &  Ekwall 
(2011) wrote  that whereas  resilience  is  the  ability  to 
survive, robustness is the ability to rapidly recuperate 
the stability.   
A  security  plan must  rapidly  respond  to  events 
that  threat  security  from  a  proactive  perspective 
rather  than  a  reactive. However,  it  should  include  a 
resilience  plan  to  reduce  consequences  of  a  terror 
event in a properly reactive way. 
Espin‐Digon,  Burns‐Herbert,  &  Bateman  (2008 
p.4), says  that passenger ships,  including high‐speed 
passenger craft, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and 
above, Mobile Offshore Drilling Units  (MODUs) and 
all  port  facilities  serving  ships  engaged  in 
international voyages are required to comply with the 
ISPS Code, according to the established in the SOLAS 
Chapter XI‐2. 
The  Port  Facility  Security  Plan  (PFSP)  is  a  legal 
instrument embodied  in  the  ISPS Code  to ensure  the 
application  of  security measures  to  protect  the  port 
facility  and  its  serving  vessels,  their  cargoes,  and 
persons  on  board  at  the  respective  security  levels. 
Kenneth  (2009  p.99),  said  that  a  port  facility  is 
required  to  plan  and  effect  security  at  the  levels 
identified  in  the  risk  assessment  process  and  as 
established  by  the  governmental  entities  with 
statutory  responsibilities  for  port  security  oversight. 
The author adds that the development of a PFSP shall 
include measures  aimed  to neutralize vulnerabilities 
for  criminal  activities  within  the  port;  identify  and 
respond  to  safety  matters;  minimize  the  threat  of 
terrorism;  reduce  opportunities  of  internal  criminal 
conspiracies;  disrupt  the  connection  between 
corruption,  terrorism  and  organized  crime;  share 
intelligent  and  investigative  information,  with  the 
respective and correct law enforcement agencies; and 
promote  opportunities  for  the  interchange  of  best 
practices in port security (p.100)    .   
Vaggelas & Ng  (2012), clarified  that based on  the 
requirements  of  the  PFSA  (Port  Facility  Security 
Assessment), a PFSP must be developed for each port 
facility which has authorization for changes according 
to  the  different  security  levels  for  every  security 
operation and highlight that a PFSP may be extended 
to  more  than  one  facility  only  provided  that  the 
178 
operator,  location,  operation,  equipment  and  design 
of those facilities are very similar to each other. 
Requirements  of  the  port  facility  security  plan 
establish a number of security records that must kept 
updated as a part of the specific security plan.   
Some of  the  information  required  to keep  in  logs 
was  requested  to  some  important  ports  of  Mexico 
through  the  INAI.  This  included  the  number  of  oil 
spills by vessels under operations at the port; number 
of  accidents  at  the  port/port  facilities,  number  of 
fatalities  that  resulted  in  loss  of  life  at  the  port 
installations;  number  of  dead  and  seriously  injured 
persons  in  accidents  at work  at  the port; number  of 
employees  arrested  by  committing  crimes  related  to 
their working duties or against the interest of the port 
and the type of crime. However, the answer was that 
the port agency does not have such information and it 
was  suggested  to  further  require  it  to  the  terminal 
operator.  Since  the  terminal  is  directly  connected  to 
the operation of the port, the port shall also keep this 
type  of  information.  This  reflects  deficiencies  in  the 
implementation  of  the  Port  Facility  Security  Plan  at 
the specific ports.   
The  ISPS  establishes  that  the  port  and  port 
facilities  should  keep  security  records  including 
security  threats  and  incidents;  oil  spills,  changes  in 
the  security  levels  and  internal  audits  and  reviews, 
among others. When the appointed authorities, in this 
case  the Ministry of Communications and Transport, 
discover  deficiencies  in  the  implementation  of  the 
PFSP  their  approach  should  be  at  a  first  stage  to 
advice  the  port  or  port  facility  in  correcting  the 
deficiency;  the  second  stage  is  the persuasion of  the 
port  or  port  facility  on  the  need  to  correct  the 
deficiency; the third stage is the formal notification of 
the requirement to correct the deficiency; the next step 
is  the  commencement  of  proceedings  to  impose 
sanctions  for  the  failure  to  correct  the  deficiency; 
while  the  last  step  is  the  imposition of  sanctions  for 
failing  to  correct  the  deficiency,  according  to  the 
provisions established in the ISPS code (International 
Maritime Organization,  IMO 2012).In  case of  serious 
security deficiencies that put  in risk the ability of the 
port or port facility to continue to operate at security 
levels 1 to 3 the authority is able to suspend or restrict 
specified  activities  at  a  port  or  port  facility  and 
cumulative  security  failings  at  a port or port  facility 
could  lead  to  the  suspension  or  withdrawal  of  the 
approved  Port  Facility  Security  Plan  and  the 
respective statement of compliance (IMO, 2012). 
Furthermore,  once  the  statement  of  compliance 
and approval of  the PFSP have been withdrawn,  the 
national authorities can demand completion of a  full 
Port  Facility  Security  Assessment  (PFSA)  and  a 
revised  PFSP  before  reinstating  the  approval  and 
statement of compliance (IMO 2012). Kenneth (2009 p. 
116) criticises  that very often  the PFSP exists only  in 
paper  but  rarely  is  tested  for  its  effectiveness.  The 
author emphasizes that the key to achieve a successful 
port security management  in  terms of  the PFSP  is  to 
understand it as a living document. He adds that the 
PFSP  should not be written as a one‐time effort, but 
should really be a working document addressing  the 
security  threats  twenty‐four hours a day, seven days 
at the week, the whole year.   
To  avoid  that  port  and  port  facilities  stop  the 
compliance of the PFSP, the government through  the 
Designated Authority shall perform PFSP inspections. 
The  frequency  of  inspections  may  be  programmed 
and  announced  in  advance  could  be  totally without 
warning. Inspections may be performed in connection 
with the initial, intermediate and renewal verification 
of  the  port  facility’s  Statement  of  Compliance, 
investigating  a  security  incident  or  concerning  the 
assessments  of  the  port  facility  with  the  Maritime 
Security  Measures  (IMO,  2012).  The  Government 
through  the  Designated  Authority  has  the 
responsibility  to  ensure  the  compliance  of  the 
provisions  of  the  ISPS  Code,  as  well  as  other 
requirements  established  in  International 
Conventions  from  which  Mexico  is  signatory  to 
enhance maritime security. 
5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Maritime  security  is  an  area  directly  connected  to 
several  issues  that  vary  from  immigration  at  sea,  to 
smuggling of drugs, weapons; theft of hydrocarbons; 
terrorism  and  piracy.  All  of  these  are  areas  have 
research  potential within  the  context  of  the  case  of 
Mexico.  However,  the  compliance  of  international 
conventions  and  national  legislation  should  be 
reviewed  to ensure  that  the  international obligations 
of Mexico are properly reflected in national law.   
Another  area  is  the  examination  of  the 
implementation of the ISPS Code in the Mexican ports 
and port  facilities,  including  case  studies  from  ro‐ro 
terminals, container terminals, chemical terminals and 
oil terminals. It is also suggested to study the case of 
Pemex  concerning  security  and  safety  systems  to 
improve  security  within  the  organization  and  to 
reduce the theft of hydrocarbons. Research about  the 
penalties  for  theft  of  hydrocarbons  from  a  holistic 
perspective,  including  the  social  and  environmental 
aspect is also suggested. 
6 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
According to the results of this document review, the 
conclusion  is  that  the  oil  industry  in  Mexico  faces 
substantial  security  challenges.  The  losses  are  not 
limited to economic factors, but also to loss of civilian 
life and the marine environment.   
Even  though  the oil companies as private entities 
are  responsible  for  implementing  effective  security 
systems within their own property and responsibility 
areas;  national  authorities must  cooperate  to  ensure 
the  operation  of  these  business  activities  and  to 
improve the security of vulnerable  infrastructure  like 
pipeline  networks,  offshore  installations  and  port 
facilities. 
Maritime and port security is an issue that should 
be  included  in  the  national  agenda  for  the 
development  of  analytical  instruments  that  should 
provide the fundaments for an effective and proactive 
maritime security program and the establishment of a 
national maritime security policy. 
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Résumé : La présente analyse examine trois options / solutions différentes que le
Mexique a mis en œuvre dans ses ports et ses installations offshore afin d’améliorer
le cadre de sécurité maritime du pays et d’assurer le respect du Code international de
la sécurité des navires et des installations portuaires (ISPS), privatisation, militarisation
et enfin leur combinaison. Les conclusions d’un travail de recherche en cours incluent
des incohérences dans les données des dossiers d’incidents de sécurité nécessaires
ou même leur absence totale. Les compétences et la formation inadéquates des
agents de la sûreté de l’installation portuaire (PFSO) se distinguent également. Une
autre question importante était l’utilisation de procédures différentes parmi les ports
faisant l’objet d’une enquête pour traiter exactement les mêmes problèmes de sécurité.
La conclusion claire est que, après douze ans de mise en œuvre du Code ISPS, le
Mexique, qui dirige la Commission portuaire interaméricaine de l’Organisation des
États américains (OEA), ne respecte pas les exigences du Code ISPS à un niveau
acceptable. L’absence d’une politique nationale de sécurité maritime a entraîné une
culture appauvrie de la sécurité maritime, malgré les graves problèmes de sécurité
auxquels ce pays est confronté. Il est également vrai que le pays discute actuellement
de la réorganisation de son appareil de sécurité maritime, avec des résultats positifs.
Des outils et recommandations pour améliorer le cadre opérationnel de la sécurité
maritime mexicaine sont donc envisagés, ainsi que les domaines potentiels de
recherches futures.
1) p1501@wmu.se
2) dd@wmu.se
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Abstract: The current analysis examines three different solutions that Mexico
implemented within its ports and offshore installations in order to improve the country’s
maritime security framework, as well as ensuring compliance with the International
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code): privatisation, militarisation and,
finally, their combination. The findings of an on-going research effort include
inconsistencies within the data of the necessary security incident records, or even
their total absence. Inadequate competence and training among the Port Facility
Security Officers (PFSO) also stands out. Another important issue was the use of
different procedures among the ports under investigation for dealing with exactly the
same security incidents. The clear conclusion is that after twelve years of the ISPS
Code implementation, Mexico, which is leading the Interamerican Port’s Commission
of the Organisation of American States (OAS), does not comply with the requirements
of the ISPS Code at an acceptable level; the lack of a national maritime security
policy has resulted in a poor (maritime) security culture, despite the severe (security)
challenges that this nation is facing. It is also true that the country under discussion is
currently reorganising its maritime security apparatus, with some positive results;
tools and recommendations for enhancing the Mexican maritime security operating
framework are therefore provided, along with areas of potential future research.
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Introduction
After the tragic events of September 11th, 2001, the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) developed a set of maritime security regulations for managing the risk of maritime
terrorism, as well as improving security status at sea and the various port locations
around the globe. These provisions were established in the new Chapter XI-2 of the
Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, (SOLAS Convention), comprising the new
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).
The IMO defines the ISPS Code as "the comprehensive set of measures to enhance
the security of ships and port facilities, developed in response to the perceived threats
to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States".
Compliance with the ISPS Code and submission of related information to the IMO is
not mandatory for all IMO member states, but only for those Contracting Governments
to the SOLAS 1974 Convention.  However, there is no penalty mechanism in place
for states that fail to effectively comply with the ISPS Code. The overall concept is not
to impose penalties, but to rely on market forces and economic factors to ensure
compliance (official website IMO, SOLAS 1974). However, after 12 years of
implementation of the ISPS, market forces and economic factors had not been powerful
enough to result in full compliance in Mexico, where serious deficiencies were detected
by an on-going research effort.
The SOLAS 1974, Chapter XI-2 establishes special measures to enhance maritime
security, while Regulation XI-2/3 of this chapter addresses the ISPS Code. Whereas
part A of the Code establishes the mandatory provisions, the not mandatory
("recommended") part B encompasses guidelines about how to comply with the
mandatory requirements of part A. This set of regulations only applies to passenger
ships, including high speed passenger vessels; cargo vessels of 500 gross tonnage
and over; Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) in transit and at ports (but not fixed
and floating platforms and MODUs on the oil field); and all type of port facilities serving
vessels offered for international voyages.  In any case, the extent to which the guidelines
apply on ships will depend on the type of the ship, its cargo and number of passengers,
as well as its sailing routes and the features of the port or port facilities visited by that
specific ship. Regarding the application of guidelines to port facilities, it will depend on
the type of carriages and vessels visiting that particular facility and its "ordinary" trading
routes.
In Mexico there are 16 Federal Integrated Port Administrations (FIPA)3 where the
ISPS Code applies; they are operating under concessions given by the Ministry of
Communications and Transport (and called thereafter MCT4) and are the following:
3) Administración Integral Portuaria, in Spanish, also known as APIs.
4) Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes in Spanish, and represented with the abbreviation SCT.
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Altamira, Tampico, Tuxpan, Veracruz, Coatzacoalcos, Dos Bocas, Progreso,
Ensenada, Guaymas, Topolobampo, Mazatlán, Puerto Vallarta, Manzanillo, Lázaro
Cárdenas, Salina Cruz and Puerto Madero, (SCT, 2016). The principal requirements
of the ISPS Code for ports and port facilities cover the development and implementation
of the Port Security Plan (PSP) and Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) respectively,
as well as the designation of the Port Security Officer (PSO) and Port Facility Security
Officer (PFSO). Other provisions cover control of compliance with maritime security
measures and registration of security incidents.
According to the mandatory Part A of the ISPS Code, contracting governments have
to appoint the Designated Authority to carry out certain maritime security duties/
responsibilities established in the Code. This Designated Authority holds the
responsibility of ensuring compliance with the maritime security measures at all ports
(where the ISPS Code apply) through the Port Security Assessment (PSA) and Port
Facility Security Assessment (PFSA). The revision, approval and control of compliance
of the Port Security Plan (PSP) and Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), which shall be
based upon the PSA and the PFSA, are also included. In Mexico the Designated
Authority is the MCT through the General Direction of Merchant Marine (GDMM).5
A very important function within the ISPS code is the setting of security levels, which
is performed by governments through the Designated Authority. It focuses on the
alert for the perceived risk of terrorist attacks, but governments may include other
type of threats in their risk evaluation like pirate-type attacks against vessels and oil
platforms, or even the possibility of kidnapping port(s) and terminal(s) personnel.
These security levels apply both to ships sailing within the respective territorial sea,
as well as into port facilities. The Designated Authority can decide on the
implementation of different security levels for different ports, port facilities and different
areas of their territorial waters. It is necessary to point out that the change of security
levels must be clearly communicated to the associated port(s), port facilities and
vessels transiting or attempting to transit those areas (IMO, 2012).
As established by IMO, there are three different security levels, where Security Level
1 is considered normal and requires the minimum appropriate protective security
measures at all times. Its priority is the normal conduct of commercial operations and
facilitation of trade. Security Level 2 requires additional protective security measures
for the specific period of time that the risk of a security incident is heightened. Its
priority is the allowance of continued commercial operations, but with increased security
measures and its consequent restrictions. Security Level 3 requires specific protective
security measures which shall last only for a limited period of time when risk for a
security incident is probable or imminent, even when it is not possible to identify the
5) Dirección General de Marina Mercante, in Spanish.
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target. It encompasses the strictest security measures and its priority is the security of
the port, port facilities, vessels and society that may be affected by a security incident
and can result even in the suspension of commercial operations.
The control of security response under Level 3 is transferred to the Government or
other organisations responsible for dealing with significant incidents (IMO, 2012).  In
Mexico it is the President of the Unified Centre for Port and Maritime Security6 (hereafter
UCMAR), who is responsible for port security and coordinates all operations under
Level 3. As established by Regulation of the UCMAR published on the Official Diary
of the Federation7 on 21 April, 2014, provision 6: "a UCMAR shall be established at all
the 16 ports (FIPAs) designed to receive vessels of over 500 gross tonnage"; known
as "Puertos de Altura", in Spanish. Additionally, provision 8 of this regulation establishes
that it shall be the Commander the Navy Military Zone of each jurisdiction where an
UCMAR is established who shall be the President of that respective UCMAR.
According to the Law of Ports Article 19 SECOND, the UCMAR is a group of
interinstitutional coordination between the Ministry of Marine (hereafter MMAR8) and
the MCT for the application of maritime security measures; effective prevention and/
or dealing with security incidents is the aim. Article 19 THIRD, paragraph II of this law
puts forward that the UCMAR shall apply all the terms and response measures within
the framework of the Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 1974 Convention, comprising the
ISPS Code and ensures the establishment of a series of functions and actions for
each of the respective three security levels. Also, paragraph III states that the UCMAR
shall function as the coordinator for all actions of the three different levels of government
(municipal, regional and federal) in relation to maritime security.
The key instruments and concepts related to maritime security are addressed in the
ISPS Code, with the aim to ensure security at ports and within an acceptable risk
level. Some of these key instruments are the PSA and PFSA,which encompass the
evaluation of security risks of the port or port facility. This risk evaluation must be
done to develop the PSP or PFSP in the case of terminals, which then must be
approved by the Designated Authority. The PSP is designed to ensure the compliance
of measures and procedures aimed to protect the port, persons, cargo, port equipment
and machinery and the vessels serving or buying services to that port from threats,
security risks, and security incidents. The PFSP has the same objectives as the PSP,
but limited to the terminal. The PSO and PFSO are the bodies responsible for ensuring
that the risk evaluation (PSA/PFSA) is carried out according to the principles and
guidelines of the ISPS Code, submitted and approved; to establish the respective
6) Centro Unificado para la Protección Maritíma y Portuaria  and represented with the abbreviation
«CUMAR» in Spanish.
7) Diario Oficial de la Federación, in Spanish.
8) Secretaría de Marina, represented with the abbreviation «SEMAR» in Spanish.
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PSP/PFSP based on its PSA/PFSA and get it approved as well. Once approved, the
PSO/PFSO is also responsible for implementing and maintaining (or even improving
via formalised procedures) the plan at all times.
Once the Designated Authority performs the necessary inspections to verify the
development, implementation and compliance of the PSP/PFSP, it may issue the
Statement of Compliance (SOC) for a specific period, which shall not exceed five
years, the maximum period of validity. After the SOC is issued, the PSO/PFSO is
also responsible for ensuring compliance with the necessary training, exercises and
practices; coordinating the inspections in scene in cooperation with the respective
authorities; performance of internal security audits and liaison with the Designated
Authority’s representatives for external audits. PSO/PFSO must attend security
incidents and keep incident security records updated. Security incidents themselves
must be considered in the evaluation of risk and integrated into the security plan to
achieve a constant reduction of risks and the continuous improvement of port (and
maritime) security.
In the case of Mexico, even if the GDMM of the MCT is the Designated Authority
responsible for the revision, approval and control of compliance of the PSP(s) and
PFSP(s), the UCMAR is co-responsible according to its Regulation, Article 7, paragraph
II, which states that: "[UCMAR] shall participate in the evaluation of risks of maritime
and port security, previous to the elaboration of the security plans and it shall propose
the necessary modifications and updating to those plans". Paragraph III of this article
also adds that, once the plan has been approved, the UCMAR shall participate in the
verification and control of the compliance of such plans to ensure their effective
implementation.
In recent years, Mexico experienced a period of extreme violence, where "extortion
payments"9 were demanded of owners and operators of port terminals, in order not to
kill them personally or damage their installations, as denounced by the Federal Deputy
from the Deputy Chamber of the Federal Congress, LXII Legislature, Germán Pacheco
Díaz, before Parliament, Chamber of Deputies on 5 November 2013.  This led to the
reorganisation of maritime security in the country, amendments to several laws and
the approval of new regulations since 2014, including the Law of Ports, the regulation
in relation to the UCMAR, and the Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade, among
others. Additionally, the creation of the military navy unit for port security (hereafter
NAUPPRO10) was decided.
9) «Cobro de Piso» in Spanish.
10) Unidad Naval de Protección Portuaria, represented with the acronym UNAPROP in Spanish.
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Research Methodology
The research methodology includes the use of an extended questionnaire with 71
open questions concerning maritime security, sent to eight ports of Mexico; Altamira
and Tampico (Tamps.), Tuxpan, Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos (Ver.), Dos Bocas (Tab.),
Progresso (Yuc.) and Madero (Chiapas), through the National Institute of
Transparency, Access to Information and Protection of Personal Data (called National
Institute of Access to Information (NIAI)11 hereafter). A questionnaire of 70 similar
questions (but specifically addressed to oil maritime terminals) was also sent to "Pemex
Exploración y Producción" through the NIAI to acquire information for the following
terminals: Dos Bocas (Tabasco), Terminal Maritima de Pemex Puerto Isla del Carmen
(Camp.), Arbol Grande (Tamps.), and Cobos (Ver.); as well as the following terminals
from "Pemex Transformación Industrial": Madero (Tamps.), Tuxpan (Ver.), Pajaritos
(Ver.), Guaymas (Son.), Salina Cruz (Oax.), Veracruz (Ver.), Lerma (Camp.), Progreso
(Yuc.), Acapulco (Gro.), Lázaro Cárdenas (Mich.), Manzanillo (Col.), Mazatlan (Sin.),
Topolobampo (Sin.), La Paz (B.C.S.) and Rosarito (B.C.).
An inquiry into the establishment of the NAUPPRO at the different ports of Mexico
was sent to the MMAR, while another request for information about the total number
of persons employed at private security companies that have got the courses 18.2
and 18.3 as required in the ISPS Code was sent to the FETNAMM12, also through the
NIAI. The NIAI was created to comply with the provisions of the General Law of
Transparency promulgated in 2012. This law establishes that information from public
institutions operating with money from national resources shall be open to public
scrutiny with exceptions related to national security. The information delivered through
the NIAI is official and publicly available.
These actions were combined with a six-day visit by the researcher to one of Mexico’s
three largest ports with oil terminals conducted in April 2016, where she conducted
interviews and "participant observation." The questionnaire that was sent to the other
ports through the NIAI was also answered by respondents at that specific port. Several
employees, the PSO and PFSO(s), the Director of the port, the Master of the harbour
(referred to as Regional Captainship of the Port in Mexico), the Director of the Port
Customs Unit and the Commandant of the maritime police (NAUPPRO) were
interviewed. In doing this, the researcher covered the four pillars for the operation of
the port. The pool of data is deemed sufficient, based on the fact that nine out of
sixteen ports where the ISPS Code applies (representing a coverage of 56% of them
11) Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales in
Spanish, and represented with the acronym INAI.
12) «Fideicomiso de Formación y Capacitación para el Personal de la Marina Mercante Nacional», and
represented with the acronym FIDENA in Spanish, which may be translated to «Fund of Education and
Training of the National Merchant Marines», and called FETNAMM thereafter.
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and seven out of seven FIPAs situated in the Gulf of Mexico, where oil exploration
and production activities take place, covering 100% of them) were included in the
study; 100% of Pemex’s terminals are also included, creating valid representation for
the case of Mexico (see figure 1).
Figure 1 Federal Integrated Ports Administrations (FIPA) in Mexico.
(Ministry of Communications and Transport, 2016).
The results from the questionnaire were further analysed through "document analysis"
with an exploratory approach, to confirm or reject the inexistence of security incidents
at the selected ports and oil terminals in national newspapers and media sources,
using Google to have a wider coverage within the period of 2004-2015. Data was
classified using codes and categories for the overall analysis to present the results
and its respective discussion.
Results & Findings
According the results of the questionnaire, six ports and the maritime terminals from
both "Pemex Exploración y Producción" and "Pemex Transformación Industrial" have
had no security incidents at all in the course of 2010-2015. Furthermore, they officially
replied that until now, there has never been any security incident; the seventh port
reported that "at least five security incidents of low-impact were registered during the
period 2010-2015", while the port of Tuxpan wrote that "they have the antecedent of
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five maritime incidents, highlighting that it is the duty of the GDMM to classify them as
low, middle or high impact". "Only one" low-impact security incident was registered at
the visited port during the same period, following the questionnaire, but the field-
findings from the interviews and participant observation at this port proved the existence
of at least three security incidents classified as with high impact.
To each of the specific questions about security incidents concerning armed attacks
for robbery at the port/port facility; confiscation and smuggling of weapons and drugs
or other dangerous restricted substances in the cargo; cargo theft at the port/ port
facility; theft of material and other items or machinery  on the part of employees,
property of the port/ port facility; personnel working under the effects of drugs and
psychotropic substances; situations of vandalism and sabotage; and kidnapping of
port/terminal personnel, with the exception of one port, where a weapon was
confiscated, the respondents from the other eight ports and Pemex terminals replied
that there has never been any security incident of that nature. This significantly differs
from the findings of the document analysis through Google, as summarised in tables
1 and 2 respectively.
Table 1 Security Incidents at the Elected Ports
Security incident (Ports)
Confiscation of 11,720 kilos of
cocaine in a container and arrest
of seven persons that were "pro-
tecting" it. This confiscation of
cocaine was the biggest of the
Mexican history up to that date.
An oceanic patrol ship, confis-
cated 2,479 kilos of cocaine
from the fishing boat "Chara-
musca", which was navigating in
the proximity to Port Madero in
Chiapas.
Confiscation of 32 tons of mo-
nomethyl-amine, in a ship co-
ming from China.
Confiscation of 900,928 litres of
stolen hydrocarbons, transpor-
ted in the vessel "Havnor", with
flag from San Vicente.
Confiscation of 395,343 litres of
stolen hydrocarbons from the
vessel "Capitán Kenny", with US
flag, and arrest of nine persons
with Honduran nationality and
the vessel, about 172 kilometres
Port
Tampico
Madero
Veracruz
Coatzacoalcos
Dos Bocas
Date
7th October, 2007
27th April, 2010
30th April, 2012
May, 2012.
25th July, 2012
Reference
JCM, 2007.
SEMAR, 2010.
Univision Noticias,
2012.
Derecho, 2016 citing
Sinembargo.mx
Diario Libre, 2012
and Fierro, 2012.
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from Port of Dos Bocas, Tabas-
co.
Confiscation of 2,360 litre of di-
lute cocaine in a container sent
from Argentina.
Armed attack against a naval
vessel resulted into one officer
dead and another seriously in-
jured.
Confiscation of 169 kg. of cocai-
ne in a container downloaded
from the ship "Monte Oliva" with
German flag.
Confiscation of 15,800 litters of
dilute cocaine, from a container
unloaded from the ship "Monte
Verde" coming from Panama.
Confiscation of the fishing ves-
sel "Tuxpan" with 1,800 litres of
stolen hydrocarbons. The com-
bustibles had been stolen some
days before to another vessel,
property of Pemex, which had
sailed off from the Port of Dos
Bocas, Paraiso, in the Southern
state of Tabasco.
Arrest of the fishing vessel ca-
lled Vikingo II with register num-
ber 28040150232 from Tampi-
co Tamaulipas, carrying 12 tons
of stolen hydrocarbons.
A kidnaped Pemex’s worker
was rescued and liberated by
the police.
Extortion Payment was given in
order to ensure the life of direc-
tors, employees, terminal ope-
rators and Pemex’s contractors
towards crime ring organizatio-
ns.
Increase in confiscation of we-
apons, drugs and stolen hydro-
carbons at marine ports with the
establishment and activation of
UNAPROP(s) and higher parti-
cipation of the SEMAR in the ad-
ministration of ports.
Progreso
Altamira
Altamira
Veracruz
Frontera
Coatzacoalcos
Altamira
Several Ports and
oil terminals.
Several ports
28th April, 2014
11th November,
2014
21st. September
2015
1st of March, 2016
1st of March, 2016
2nd March, 2016
29 th July, 2016
Several events
with reference to
period 2010-2013
Several events
with reference to
period 2010-2013
Ángel, 2014.
Milenio.com, 2014;
Narco Violencia,
2014 and Huerta,
2014.
Letra Roja, El Co-
lor de la Informa-
ción, 2015.
Salinas, 2016.
Ortíz, 2016.
Veracruzanos.info,
2016 and Imagen
del Golfo, 2016.
Zona de Guerra sin
Censura, 2016.
Cámara de Diputa-
dos del H. Congre-
so de la Unión, LXII
Leg., 2013.
Cámara de Diputa-
dos del H. Congre-
so de la Unión, LXII
Leg., 2013 and
Gaviña 2016.
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Table 2 Security Incidents at Oil Terminals
129% Rise in confiscation of
methamphetamines from 2008
to 2012 in Mexico.
National level Several events
with reference to
period 2008-2012
United Nations
Office on Drugs
and Crime, 2013,
cited by Montalvo,
2014.
Security incident (Pemex
terminals, Offshore Tabasco)
Plundering and dismantling
equipment from the (new) pla-
tform Yaxche Bravo, including
theft of very costly materials.
Plundering of the platform Kab-
A
Plundering of the platform Kix-2
where the offenders took even all
the navigation lightening signs.
Plundering of the platform Si-
nan-SO
Plundering of the platform Yax-
che Bravo again, stealing the
whole heliport. The outcome of
this official investigation GPDM-
SCO-D8-190-2010, has not
been published yet.
Kidnapping of 45 employees of
Pemex during the year 2013.
Kidnapping of several directors
and leaders of the worker’s
union as well as owners of com-
panies giving services to Pemex
in different cases (reportage)
Pemex confirms the kidnapping
of 16 employees during the pe-
riod 2007-2010
Gasoline is stolen inside Pemex
Terminal
Yaxche Bravo
Kab-A
Kix-2
Sinan-SO
Yaxche Bravo
Pemex (National
level).
Several States
Several States
Tuxpan
Date
15th September,
2008
11th October, 2008
14th October, 2008.
8th March, 2009
4th May, 2010
2013
2010-2013
2007-2013
22nd August, 2016
Reference
Pérez, 2010.
Pérez, 2010.
Pérez, 2010.
Pérez, 2010.
Pérez, 2010.
24 Horas, El Diario
Sin Límites, 2013.
Pérez,
Voltairenet.org,
2010.
El Economista,
2013.
(Martínez, 2016)
Regarding ships or small boats without the required authorisations to infringe into
restricted areas of navigation, the reply from the Port of Tampico was that "the Port
Security Plan does not consider any restricted area of navigation and therefore there
are not any register about security incidents of such situation". Altamira, Coatzacoalcos,
Dos Bocas, Port Progreso and the visited port admitted to having had such situations,
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while ports of Tuxpan, Veracruz and Madero as well as all the terminals from Pemex
answered that they have not had such situations.
During the field visit of the researcher to the port of interest and travelling towards the
open sea on board an oceanic patrol vessel, a small group of boats similar to those
commonly used by smugglers was observed; the boats were located just a few meters
besides the main sea passage towards the container terminal. Also, this event was
noticed while a large container vessel was approaching the port facility: nothing was
done to send them away and prevent a dangerous situation. The officials’ reply was
that: "they are just fishing; we have taken them off many times before, but they always
come back". Additionally, it was noted that the average time for inspecting persons
and vehicles in the access/exit control zones was just 45 seconds, a very short period
of time and an indicator of low-quality inspections.
It is also interesting to consider that a small glass containing cannabis was personally
noticed at the office of the PFSO from one of the terminals; he said that a few years
back, they caught a person from a construction company working inside the port, with
about 300 grams of cannabis: "it was like 300 grams and that is not for personal use,
but for trade". The person was forced to resign, but because of time-consuming
paperwork related to an official investigation, the case was not brought to court and
the PFSO just kept the cannabis in a small glass container with alcohol to cure muscular
damage.  In an interview to another employee, it was revealed that the Pemex’s oil
terminal in the specific port was operating without a formally appointed PFSO since
early October 2015 (almost six months before the time of the visit), when the person
holding that position had retired.
With personnel from the Navy mastering the harbour since November 2013 and the
creation of the NAUPPRO, the status of maritime security improved substantially at
the visited port in practical terms. Other measures to improve maritime security were
also implemented, such as the use of two different private security companies: one
for the operation of the video vigilance system, and the other for control and vigilance
of access and exit zones, to avoid security incidents at the control zones being erased
from the video records. Security measures were reflected in an increase of confiscation
of drugs and dangerous substances, though this improvement in performance was
not reflected in incident security records (mismanagement practices prevailed). Last
but not least, terminal operators, directors and employees gradually recovered the
feeling of safety when the extortion payments from crime-ring organisations
disappeared.
Other findings from the questionnaires, as well as other information acquired from the
MMAR and the FETNAMM, through the NIAI include the following:
• Different proceduesand allocated periods across the country for keeping and
maintaining security incident records.
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• Inexistence of security incident registers at certain ports and Pemex terminals.
• Failure to classify risks and threats at ports and oil terminals.
• Poor performance of PFSA for the 15 oil terminals of "Pemex Transformación
Industrial." PFSA are the fundament of the PFSP, which have not been amended
since its original approval in June 2004, despite the incidents reported by the
media and a double recertification.
• Wide use of private security companies to perform specific security duties at
the ports, whereas Pemex has its own security employees with support from
the Navy.
• Misunderstanding of responsibilities and duties on the part of the PSO(s),
PFSO(s).
• Lack of awareness of the duty for registering items’ confiscation in incident
security logs.
• Establishment and activation of 14 NAUPPROs from September 2014 to August
2015, with an average of 43 elements per unit at fourteen ports, including
Altamira Tampico, Tuxpan, Veracruz, Coatzacoalcos, Ciudad del Carmen and
Progreso.
• PSO limited training to various elements of the NAUPPRO during the period
2014-2015.
• Arrangement of 369 courses for "personnel of the port/port facility with specific
security duties" (18.2 ISPS Code) and 93 courses for "security knowledge that
must have the port/port facility personnel" (18.2) by the FETNAMM (established
by the Designated Authority); where the total number of participants hired by
private security companies amounted to 4,573 and 1,274 respectively, during
the period 2010-2015.
• Deficiencies reported from Designated Authority’s audits to some ports covered
improving maintenance of security equipment, providing more security training,
construction of walls along the port area and reinforcing surveillance and lighting
equipment.
• The certificate of compliance with the ISPS and approval of PFSP of two Pemex
terminals (Terminal Marítima Árbol Grande and Terminal Marítima de Cobos)
were originally issued in 2006 and have not been recertified, but they are under
normal operations.
• The certificate of compliance with the ISPS and approval of PFSP for the port
of Tuxpan expired in 2014, but is under normal operations during "the
recertification process".
• Inadequate performance of Designated Authority’s audits and inspections, since
they audited these ports and terminals every year during the period 2010-2015
without reporting serious deficiencies; lack of security incidents records and
inadequacy in the classification of security risks.
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• Testing of the "militarisation" model at the visited port, where the port
administration and the Regional Captainship of the Harbour were given to
personnel from the Navy.
• Improvement of interinstitutional communication and coordination at the visited
port.
General Discussion
The situation illustrated in tables 1 and 2 forced the authorities to initiate the
reorganisation of maritime security mechanisms in 2013, including justice reforms to
provide juridical support to those changes. In addition to traffic of drugs and weapons,
theft of hydrocarbons is affecting the economy of Mexico as well as the overall maritime
security status. The assessment for theft of hydrocarbons amounted to 11,250,000
barrels, with an estimated economic loss of 973,125,000.00 U.S. dollars, only for
2014 (Nordfjeld & Dalaklis, 2016). Before the NAUPPRO was created in 2014, port
security was mainly provided by private security companies, which increased the
vulnerability and risk of port installations. Given its political significance related to
national security, maritime and port security should be the responsibility of the
government and international organisations, covering strategic installations, including
offshore platforms. However, the level of security challenges in Mexico relating to a
combination of terrorism13, organised crime, marine piracy and poor performance on
the part of the Designated Authority, showed that the government was not able to
meet its responsibilities and provide satisfactory physical protection to port and oil
installations, forcing port administrations to rely on private security companies.
As expressed by Kerr (2010), private security companies can provide a security
package quicker than governments because they have less bureaucracy and can
operate with a lower profile than most government forces. On the other hand, they
are limited by the regulatory framework, concerning the use of firearms and are more
exposed to corruption and dispersion of sensitive information as a result of constant
personnel rotations, which increases the risk of uncertified employees and poor training
standards. Ports included in this research outsourced the "specific security duties"
service to private security companies for covering vigilance access control zones,
guarding of vigilance towers and inspections of cars and baggage at the access/exit
control zones. Terminals have their own security management. On the other hand,
Pemex choose to have its own security force for its terminals, with extra support from
the Navy when necessary; this resulted into avoiding external worker rotation and the
risk of spreading sensitive information concerning security routines.
13) Theft of hydrocarbons and plundering of oil and offshore installations is considered terrorism, following
the new Federal Law to Prevent and Sanction Crimes Committed Concerning Hydrocarbons.
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Excepting Dos Bocas, and other ports not included in the study where the respective
naval unit has not yet been activated, the Navy and the NAUPPRO have taken over
the security of strategic installations, including offshore and port facilities. The
agreement for the creation of 19 NAUPPROs, which function as maritime police,
including duties of vigilance, inspection and control within the port and ocean port
roadways, was published on 31 Mars 2014. These units are additional to the elements
from private security companies and are responsible for special security duties to
detect trafficking of drugs, weapons and other restricted substances during the
uploading and downloading operations from vessels as well as the presence of
unauthorised persons. This implies a combination of the initially established security
management, "privatisation of security services" and definitely some "militarisation".
As expressed by Germán Pacheco Díaz, representative from the national congress
(2013), confiscation of drugs and restricted substances in cargo increased in the port
of Altamira with the establishment of this maritime police. However, the kidnapping of
port personnel and extortion payments to crime ring organisations remained. There
are several benefits in the combination of military forces and private security companies,
including the economic aspect. Regarding cooperation, private firms need to integrate
their operations with relevant stakeholders (such as naval, coastguard, customs and
police forces) to reduce the chances of "blue on white" incidents, maximise the
opportunities to receive support, and ensure the standards of skills and professional
knowledge of its work force (Kerr, 2010). When outsourcing port and maritime security
to private security companies, it is still the responsibility and duty of the Designated
Authority to conduct periodic and random audits and inspections at the ports to examine
the compliance of the PFSP as well as security service providers, to ensure that they
have the required certification and security training.
To apply a proper response to maritime security incidents, it is crucial to ensure a
regional solution that includes the cooperation of international forces in a specific
geographical area if necessary, particularly when the consequences of a maritime
security incident will go beyond maritime boundaries, as is the case of oil spill pollution
caused by safety and security incidents. As Cordner (2011) points out, major security
incidents are likely to have severe environmental consequences that will transcend
national boundaries; this highlights the need for government, industry and regional
consultative entities to adopt a strategic risk management approach. There is simple
explanation why: "No single Agency or jurisdiction currently maintains the capability,
capacity or resources necessary to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from
an armed takeover of an offshore facility. Rather, collaboration with regional partners
at the local, state and federal levels ensures that an effective and safe response
capability is maintained" (Applegate & Hill, 2014). But, challenges related to a regional
solution implies that while strategic plans exist to identify frameworks and guidelines
for command and control, they do not operationalise response architecture to
implement and sustain coordinated training programmes and integrate planning and
resource coordination efforts (Applegate & Hill, 2014).
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The government is testing the militarisation model at the visited port where, in addition
to private security companies and the NAUPPRO, the Director and the Master of the
harbour are Rear Admirals from the Navy, while the President of the UCMAR is the
1st commander and Rear Admiral from that naval zone. The only civil authority in this
equation is the Director of the maritime customs unit, who said that the coordination
between the authorities and the port has improved substantially since the arrival of
the Navy. The respondent added: "At the beginning we didn’t know how it was going
to function, if trade would be affected, if it would be closed, but here at this port, the
external factor of security improved the trade operations and (…) the coordination is
very good; we have systematic security meetings, where all the organisations involved
participate." The original scepticism towards a military discipline on the part of port
employees was transformed into a feeling of safety and satisfaction with the military
leadership. As a result, the shipping companies recovered the trust to transport their
carriages through Mexican ports, as expressed by Francisco Orozco Mendoza,
Chairman of the Mexican Association of Shipping Agents,14 Mundo Portuario (2014).
The director of the port emphasised that the main risk at the port today is related to
hurricanes and stormy weather.
Additionally, during the interview with the Master of the harbour at the visited port, he
pointed out that: "why am I working here, even I belong to the Navy? Yes, I am
working in another Ministry. Well, in 2013 the insecurity situation at this province
continued, especially at the Port. Therefore, the President ordered the MMAR that
Naval Officers should be brought in to support and control the port administration and
the captainship of the harbour, because the status of security was at a clearly
unacceptable level. Criminals even exporting illegally extracted minerals. There was
not a security plan for level 3 which should be implemented by the Navy, because in
order to create a plan for level 3, there should be measures established for level 1
and level 2 in advance, but that was not achieved." It is true that Mexico signed the
protocols for the ISPS Code, but the MCT did not perform an effective job and many
points towards this direction were already mentioned. As a result, the law changed
and the UCMAR(s) were established and now the MMAR is a co-responsible entity to
address security level 1, level 2 and level 3 and more elaborated plans are now in
place.
Ports and port terminals must have their own PSO and PFSO, as established in the
ISPS Code. But, in the case of Mexico they were not fulfilling the requirements
concerning security incident registers, which should have been created by them
concerning the numerous security incidents that were identified, including confiscation
of drugs, weapons and hydrocarbons made by the Navy. More importantly, this failure
took place despite the fact that these events are classified as high security risks
14) Asociación Mexicana de Agentes Navieros, represented with the acronym Amanac, in Spanish.
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involving confiscation and transportation to official warehouses for future destruction.
Kidnapping of port personnel and terminal operators strongly affects port operations
and should be handled as security incidents, even when they happen outside the
port.  Statistics and analysis of maritime security incidents illustrate past actions and
shall be open to public scrutiny, ensuring that the government implements barriers to
avoid that such events happen again; on the contrary, procedures for how to deal
with such incidents in the future are included in the PFSP and must be confidential.
Handling of confiscation of drugs and other restricted items is clearly the duty of the
NAUPPRO and customs’ authorities, but it is the duty of the PSO/PFSO to register
them accordingly in the respective security incident logs and consider them during
the risk evaluation and if needed to amend accordingly the PFSP. The analysis of the
root causes of security incidents is the cornerstone of the PFSA, which is the base of
the PFSP, but if a new security threat is identified, adjustments are necessary.
Therefore it is crucial to keep security incident records updated. Furthermore, all the
above-mentioned deficiencies were not detected during the Designated Authority’s
audits and inspections and no matter that they went through a second filter, the MMAR,
which performed the final revision of the PFSA and PFSP and should require
amendments (when necessary) upon their approval. Additionally, authorities of the
Tampico Port did not establish a restricted navigation area according to their answer
in the questionnaire. A restricted navigation area for the port roadways and within the
port proximity area should be established, not only to mitigate security risks, but also
for maritime accident prevention.
It is necessary to highlight that it is recommended for the process of recertification of
port and terminals to start at least a year before the expiration date of the Declaration
of Compliance with the ISPS Code, to avoid that port and terminals continue operating
without the required certifications, which could give grounds for suspension of port
and terminal operations. Finally, as Kerr (2010) argues, the responsibility for assuring
maritime security lies firmly with governments, but private security companies can
attend a niche market in support of these official bodies.
Conclusions
Maritime security incidents in Mexico are numerous and involve extraordinary and
complex threats such as the plundering of oil platforms, kidnapping and extortion of
port personnel and terminal operators and even pirate-type attacks. The government’s
security strategy of combining justice reforms and providing more power to the Navy
through the formulation of maritime police (NAUPPROs) and UCMARs, as well as
including community engagement and the participation of different organisations from
the three levels of government is functioning and has improved the overall situation.
Mechanisms in place are gradually recovering control of an unacceptable situation,
particularly in ports where the military model is being tested. However, this strategy
must be followed along with ensuring compliance of the ISPS Code, with the issue of
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record keeping standing out. It is true that the lack of a national maritime security
policy has resulted in constant breaches of the ISPS Code provisions and different
security procedures at the ports under examination. After twelve years of ISPS
implementation, Mexico still does not comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code
at an acceptable level, although some improvement is recorded because of the recent
security reforms. One pressing need is to introduce a quality system that ensures the
proper registration of security incidents: updating these incident records will help in
the future improvement of the maritime security framework and the creation of a
sustained security culture focused not only on incident prevention, but also on response
to and recovery of a major security incident, including resilience plans.
In any case, in order to avoid duality and misunderstanding of security duties due to
the recent involvement of the military and the difference in culture, it is recommended
to set up a clear division of duties and responsibilities; the establishment of a "no-
blame culture" must be considered to ensure the proper registration and thorough
analysis of all respective security incidents. It is also recommended to re-evaluate the
PFSPs of the ports and all Pemex terminals by considering threats that were not
included in the initial creation of those documents; it is also necessary to consider the
establishment of a restricted navigation area at the Tampico Port. Last but not least,
it is essential to standardise the notion that the process of re-certification shall start in
due time (maybe at least a year) before the period of validity of SOC expires to avoid
suspension of port and terminal operations. Finally, an extensive study covering the
satisfaction level in locations where the militarisation model is already in place (and
how this affects trade operations and maritime security) should be performed before
its further implementation throughout the country.
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Mexico’s Reorganisation of Maritime
Security Regime: A New Role for the Navy
and Emphasis on Energy Related
Infrastructures
Adriana Avila-Zuñiga Nordfjeld and Dimitrios Dalaklis
1 Introduction
Previous research efforts have already pointed out that the current state of imple-
mentation and level of compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS Code) in Mexico is rather poor (Nordfjeld and Dalaklis 2016).
This chapter will also investigate in a similar direction. It will first provide a
summary of the latest reform to Mexico’s national legislation dealing with various
important issues of the maritime domain. Then, it will identify the contradictions in
the relevant laws, in relation to effective implementation of national legislation and
international instruments, with special focus on the ISPS Code. Subsequently, it will
study the acceptance of the transferral of the National Maritime Authority from a
civil institution (MCT) towards a military one (MMAR) within the four different
authorities directly related to the maritime industry’s operations/activities. Finally,
findings in relation to field research activities in main Mexican ports and especially
important energy hubs are presented, followed by the associated conclusions and
recommendations with the aim to improve their security status.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) communicates via its web site
the information that thirty-five (35) different countries located in the American
Continent have signed and ratified the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974; Mexico is included in the aforementioned group. The
SOLAS 1974 Convention includes Chapter XI-2 concerning special measures to
enhance maritime security, and especially Regulation XI-2/3 that enshrines the
International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code). Apart from the
ISPS Code, the SOLAS 1974 Convention is used to “operationalize” a very influ-
ential safety instrument for shipping operations: the International Management Code
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for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International Safety
Management (ISM) Code). Furthermore, in its Chapter XI-1, there are special
measures to enhance maritime safety that provide the basis for carrying out inspec-
tions of foreign ships in national ports under Port State Control (PSC); the latter can
also be described as an exercise of the right of protection of the coastal State, as
established in Article 25 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). In the case of Mexico, there is a confusing situation after the country’s
last major legal maritime reform, where it was established that the National Maritime
Authority shall be executed by the Ministry of Marina (MMAR), and it transferred
all Master of Harbours to MMAR; however, the Port Authority remained with the
Ministry of Communications and Transport (MCT).
Implementation and compliance with the ISPS Code is a topic studied extensively
in the United States and Canada. The US has, indeed, been a pioneer in port security.
Already in 1997, 7 years before the ISPS Code entered into force, the US Depart-
ment of Transportation launched the “Port Security National Planning Guide”,
which was “intended to be used by port directors and officers of port security
departments in fulfilling their responsibilities toward the development of an effective
port security program” (US Department of Transportation 1997). The guide included
requirements of a “Security Survey and Risk Assessment” and the development and
implementation of a “Security Plan”. Kenneth (2009) pointed out that “the evolution
of organized security processes in the maritime sector can be understood as a
product of increasing governmental and commercial concerns about the criminal
exploitation of seaports, [. . .] and the rising threat of global terrorism”. In the case
of Canada, the ISPS Code has been implemented since it entered into force in July
2004. Rudner (2009) included maritime ports as part of the “Critical National
Infrastructure” that must be protected from terrorism and provided emphasis on
ports serving the energy sector. The author highlighted the need for “a national
strategy/plan for the protection of Canada’s critical national infrastructure against
exogenous risks and threats”.
Mexico, similarly to Canada, is one of the largest producers of oil and gas and has
a significant number of critical infrastructures, including numerous maritime ports
linked to the energy sector. Mexico’s State owned company (Pemex) reported that,
as of 1st January 2014, the proven reserves of Mexico’s crude oil were calculated to
be 9812 million barrels (MMb), whereas the proven reserves of natural gas were
calculated to be 16,549 billion cubic feet (Pemex, Petroleos Mexicanos 2014). This
report also mentioned that the biggest volume of proven reserves of crude oil,
equivalent to 70%, are located in marine oil fields and only 30% of them are located
in terrestrial fields. At the same time, 56% of the proven reserves of natural gas are
located in terrestrial fields, with the remaining 44% in marine fields. It must also be
highlighted that most of the Mexican ports are directly or indirectly serving the oil
energy market for developed marine oil fields.
96 A. A.-Z. Nordfjeld and D. Dalaklis
dd@wmu.se
2 Mexico’s Maritime Reform
To better understand the latest developments in Mexico in relation to the maritime
domain, it is important to consider that a few decades ago, the MMAR held the
control of ports and the merchant marine; but in 1977 the ex-President José López
Portillo reformed the “Law of Public Federal Administration” transferring to the
MCT all the activities related to the development of merchant marine, as well as the
construction of port infrastructure and the respective administration/operation. How-
ever, the MCT and particularly the Harbour Masters (also called Port Captains in
Mexico) were never equipped in a satisfactory manner to deliver the functions of
maritime safety and security, such as port state control and inspection of vessels.
Almost 40 years later, all these functions are (again) reallocated to the authorities of
MMAR, with the latest maritime legal reform.
For a rather prolonged period, drug cartels in Mexico were conducting a wide
array of illegal activities that resulted in extremely high levels of violence. Consid-
ering these implications, as well as less unforeseen crimes such as the theft of
hydrocarbons and demands of “extortion payments” to owners and operators of
port terminals (Nordfjeld and Dalaklis 2016), the Mexican government attempted
the reorganization of its maritime security regime. Not only is efficient use of energy
resources important, but “losing” tremendous quantities of oil due to theft is totally
unacceptable and must be addressed via the right types of policies. Several existing
laws were revised; a new set of regulations was introduced in 2014 that included
amendments to the “Law of Ports”, the regulation in relation to the establishment of
the “Unified Centre for Port and Maritime Security” (called “UCMAR” thereafter),
and the “Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade”, among others. However, the
Parliament focused on port security and port installations; it did not include in the
regulation the part related to maritime security and the requirements for ships,
established in the ISPS Code, such as the Ship Security Officer (SSO), Ship Security
Assessment (SSA), the Ship Security Plan (SSP) and the International Ship Security
Certificate (ISSC). From April 21st 2014 to June 2017, when the last updates to this
chapter were made, there was no institution appointed responsible for maritime
security conforming Mexico’s national legislation. Additionally, the creation of
the “Military Navy Unit for Port Security/Protection” (“Unidad Naval de Protección
Portuaria” and represented with the acronym UNAPROP, in Spanish, called
NAUPPRO thereafter) was decided, covering only the part of the ISPS Code related
to protection of ports and port installations.
Concerning maritime security, as already mentioned, an important legal instru-
ment is Chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, (SOLAS
Convention) which relates to the ISPS Code. This Code is defined by the IMO as
“the comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port
facilities, developed in response to the perceived threats to ships and port facilities
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States” (International Maritime
Organization 2012). Whereas part A of the Code establishes the mandatory pro-
visions, the non-mandatory (“recommended”) part B provides guidelines about how
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to comply with the mandatory requirements of part A. After numerous years of ISPS
Code implementation, Mexico does not yet comply with its requirements at an
acceptable level, although some improvement is lately recorded, mainly because
of the 2014 security reforms (Nordfjeld and Dalaklis 2016).
As highlighted previously, the mandatory Part A of the ISPS Code introduced the
obligation for contracting governments to appoint a Designated Authority to carry
out certain maritime security duties/responsibilities established in the Code. This
Designated Authority holds the responsibility for setting maritime security levels
and ensuring compliance with the maritime security measures at all ports (where the
ISPS Code applies) through the Port Security Assessment (PSA) and Port Facility
Security Assessment (PFSA). The revision, approval and control of compliance of
the Port Security Plan (PSP) and Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), which shall be
based upon the PSA and the PFSA, is also included in the respective responsibilities.
The development of PSP/PFSP is also related to the activities of the Port Security
Officer (PSO) and Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO).
As established by IMO, there are three different security levels: Security Level
1 (normal) requires the minimum protective security measures at all times; Security
Level 2, which requires additional protective security measures for the specific
period of time that the risk of a security incident is heightened; and Security Level
3, which requires specific protective security measures and may result in the
suspension of commercial operations. Security response under Level 3 is transferred
to the Government or other organizations responsible for dealing with significant
incidents (International Maritime Organization 2012). In Mexico, it is the “Unified
Centre for Port and Maritime Security” (UCMAR) that is responsible for coordina-
tion and execution of all security operations under Level 3 and it is the Commander
of the Navy Military Zone of each jurisdiction where an UCMAR is established who
shall be appointed as the Chairman of that respective UCMAR, as established in
provision 8 of Regulation of the UCMAR published on the Official Diary of the
Federation, on 21st of April, 2014. This provision also includes the notion that the
Harbour Master shall be nominated as the Vice-Chairman of the UCMAR, and, in
addition, three employees of each of these institutions shall be selected as advisers. A
UCMAR shall be established at each of the 16 Federal Integral Port Administration
(s) (FIPAs) designed to receive vessels of over 500 gross tonnage, or which receive
vessels sailing international trading routes, according to Provision 6 of the referred
regulation.
According to the “Law of Ports” Article 19 SECOND, the UCMAR is a group of
inter-institutional coordination between the MMAR and the MCT for the application
of and compliance with the ISPS Code. This part was not amended with the Decree.
However, since MMAR obtained control of both Master of Harbours and the
UCMAR itself, the “inter-institutional character” of this group should be
re-evaluated, keeping in mind that MCT will maintain control of the “Fideicomiso
de Formación y Capacitación para el Personal de la Marina Mercante Nacional”
(represented with the acronym “FIDENA” in Spanish, which may be translated to
“Fond of Education and Training of the National Merchant Marine”, and called
FETNAMM thereafter). This is the authorized institution for giving the IMO’s
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model courses 18.1, 18.2 and 18.3 concerning the ISPS Code, and the only autho-
rized foundation so far, for performing Port Security Assessments (PSA) and Port
Facility Security Assessments (PFSA).
Article 19 THIRD, paragraph II of this law highlights that “the UCMAR shall
apply all the dispositions and response measures within the framework of the
Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 1974 Convention, comprising the ISPS Code and ensure
the establishment of a series of functions and actions for each of the respective three
security levels”. This is part of the maritime security reforms that took effect on the
21st of April 2014. However, because of lack of knowledge about the reform itself,
the MMAR did not fully exercise its authority and the Harbour Master was errone-
ously recognized as the authority (for the ISPS Code) by the PFSOs and port
agencies. The UCMAR is responsible for the revision of PSA/PFSA, which covers
the security risks evaluation for ports or port facilities, which shall be the base for
developing the PSP/PFSP, submitted and approved by the Designated Authority.
The responsible person for developing the PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP is the Port
Security Officer (PSO) or Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO), including compli-
ance with all requirements established in the ISPS Code and reflected in the
PSP/PFSP as training, exercises, practices, inspections audits and modifications
via formalised procedures to the plan.
In another research of Nordfjeld and Dalaklis (2017), it was rightly pointed out
that the PSO/PFSO must attend security incidents and keep incident security records
updated, which must be considered in the risk evaluation and integrated into the
security plan to achieve a constant reduction of risks and continuous improvement of
port and maritime security. UCMAR shall verify, among other aspects, that security
incidents are properly recorded in the security incidents register; even with MCT
supervising the port authority, the UCMAR is responsible for control of compliance
with the ISPS Code and co-responsible for the revision and approval of PSA/PFSA
and PSP/PFSP, according to its Regulation, Article 7, paragraph II, which states that:
“[UCMAR] shall participate in the evaluation of risks of maritime and port security,
previous to the elaboration of the security plans and it shall propose the necessary
modifications and updating to those plans”. Paragraph III of this article, mentions
that once the plan has been approved, the UCMAR shall participate in the verifica-
tion and control of compliance with plans, ensuring their effective implementation.
Findings of the above mentioned study included inconsistencies within the data of
the necessary security incident records, or even their total absence. Neither the
MMAR nor the MCT has effectively addressed the issue of security incident record
keeping.
The UCMAR is currently performing the responsibilities of a Port Security
Committee, a committee recommended by the ISPS Code to coordinate security
procedures and measures. Under the UCMAR, there is also the Port Security
Assessor Committee, which is normally integrated by the UCMAR and customs-
immigration authorities operating at the port; the management of the port operator
and port terminals is also included. Additionally, municipal and regional Govern-
ments with associated interests in that jurisdiction are part of the committee. How-
ever, it is important to consider the need to balance the openness of an advisory
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committee with the need to protect the confidentiality of sensitive security informa-
tion (International Maritime Organization 2012).
In 2016, the President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, presented a law initiative
to amend and improve diverse provisions of the “Law of Public Administration”,
“Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade” and the “Law of Ports”. The aim was to
transfer the control, inspection, vigilance and other activities related to the merchant
marine and the maritime industry, including Harbour Masters from a civil authority
(MCT) to a military one (MMAR). However, a significant exclusion was port
development and administration apparatus, including the port authority, which was
previously exercised through Harbour Masters. This law initiative was approved by
the National Congress without any change and published as a Decree on the Official
Diary of the Federation (ODF) on the 19th of December 2016.
This legal document establishes the new attributions of the Ministry of Marine,
which entered into force on the 17th of June, 2017. Every authorized port shall have
a Master of Harbour, which will be administrated by MMAR with a delimited
maritime territorial jurisdiction, which, according to Article 9 of the decree, shall
have attributions to authorize bear away and bear off as well as customs clearance of
naval craft; flag and register Mexican vessels and naval artefacts; grant permissions
for offering maritime passenger transport services and nautical tourism within the
waters of jurisdiction; regulate and monitor that the nautical routes meet the required
conditions for safety, depth, marine signs, maritime traffic control and nautical
assistance; and inspect vessels, among others.
The duties and responsibilities of the NAUPPRO should also be (re-)evaluated
and confirmed. This unit currently has the functions of a coast guard. It is under the
control of the Commander of the Navy Zone at each port, who is the President of the
UCMAR. However, its guidelines concerning duties and responsibilities are not
clear enough with respect to its duties under the UCMAR. Yet, these units have the
responsibility of port protection under the control of the Commander of the Navy
Zone, and they must ensure control and compliance with ISPS Code requirements at
the port and give all necessary information to the Commander, who holds the role of
Chairman of the UCMAR, may inform the rest of this group of actions taken by the
NAUPPRO. The actual Guidelines of NAUPPRO are currently too general and
rather vague. Due to their military discipline, they do not take actions to ensure
compliance with ISPS Code requirements if they do not receive concrete and specific
orders or if it is not clearly established and requested in their procedures. The
development of rules/protocols with specific and concrete duties for this unit is
recommended. Security duties performed by the NAUPPRO may include, among
others, considering that currently they only attend the ISPS Code section related to
port installations:
• Control/verification that all maritime ports and terminals are operating with an
updated Statement of Compliance (SOC).
• Revision and control that all ports and terminals have employed a certified
PSO/PFSO with an updated and valid certificate.
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• Revision and control that all personnel from ports and terminals with security
duties have been certified with the necessary training concerning the required
course 18.2 as established in the ISPS Code.
• Revision and control that all personnel from ports and terminals without specific
security duties have been certified with the necessary training concerning the
required course 18.3 as established in the ISPS Code.
• Develop and keep the official register of maritime security incidents for that
specific port.
• Revise and control that all PSO/PFSO keep their own registers updated for
reporting maritime security incidents.
• Participate in the revision and analysis of Port Security Assessments (PSA) and
Port Facility Security Assessments (PFSA), for terminals.
• Participate in the inspections for approval of PSA/PFSA.
• Participate in the revision and analysis of Port Security Plans (PSP) and Port
Facility Security Plans (PFSP) and make observations for necessary modifica-
tions to those plans.
• Participate in inspections and audits for approval of PSP/PFSP before the issu-
ance of the Statement of Compliance (SOC).
• Carry out random inspections on scene and general inspections to verify the
compliance of PSP/PFSP.
• Plan, coordinate and carry out security drills (level 3) at a minimum interval of
once a year with no more than 18 months between them.
• Participate in the evaluation of security drills (level 3).
• Participate in and make the necessary observation for the external security audit,
which shall be performed with a minimum interval of once a year.
• Develop and keep updated the register of approved PSA/PFSA; PSP/PFSP; drills;
inspections and other relevant operations for availability to IMO, in the case of
mandatory audits.
Agreement number 039 for the creation and activation of 19 NAUPPROs at the
main maritime ports of Mexico was published on the 31st of March, 2014, on the
Official Diary of the Federation. However, only 14 in total have been created and
activated up to this point. The activation of NAUPPROs at the ports of La Paz,
Puerto Vallarta, Puerto Chiapas, Matamoros and Dos Bocas is still lacking; at this
last port, the official creation of the UCMAR is also lacking.
The Presidential Decree recently reformed the country’s legal framework and
allowed the complete shift not only of maritime security, but also of the safety aspect
(including the port-state control function) from a civil authority (MCT), to a military
one (MMAR). The previous failures of the Mexican Designated Authority are
associated with a large number of security incidents and various accidents which,
through poor inspections, have contributed not only to loss of property at sea, but
also to human casualties and significant marine pollution. Aranda (2016) pointed out
that while the Chamber of Senators analysed the initiative of law, three maritime
accidents that occurred that summer can be used as evidence of deficiencies in the
system under MCT. The Harbour Master of Tampico Port has also been denounced
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for corruption and abuse against fishermen. More specifically, MCT employees were
accused of corruption by the owners of the fishing vessels “Rastreador”,
“Banpesca”, “Fenicio”, “Astur” and “Tampico Star”. All these argued that they
were forced to hand over a shrimp carriage quota to personnel from that institution,
to be able to work (Vergara 2016).
The initiative emphasized the convenience of defining one National Maritime
Authority to comply with national and international obligations and the need to
delimitate and redistribute the attributions that are exercised by both institutions, the
MMAR and MCT. However, several duties and responsibilities are still “shared”.
While the MMAR is responsible for implementation and compliance with the ISPS
Code, the MCT holds the port authority role and is responsible for imposition of
sanctions related to violations of the Code. On the positive side, the new legal regime
emphasises that MMAR currently has the human and material resources necessary to
comply with the exercise of the national sovereignty and authority in the Mexican
marine zones, as well as to guarantee the compliance of the port with the national
(maritime) legal framework.
In summary, the reforms to Article 8 SECOND of the referred “Law of Naviga-
tion and Maritime Trade” established the new attributions of the Ministry of Marine,
and empowered MMAR to approve licenses for passenger and tourism maritime
transport services with small boats, authorize vessels to bear away and bear off as
well as customs clearance. Flag and registration issues of vessels, administration of
the national registers of maritime crews and ships, as well as inspection and
verification of national and foreign vessels are included in those tasks. Additionally,
compliance with international conventions as well as national legislation and official
Mexican norms related to maritime safety and security is another of its tasks.
At the same time, the Decree reformed Article 8 of the “Law of Navigation and
Maritime Trade”, concerning the new attributions of the MCT, confirmed that MCT
will continue to lead the administration of ports, as well as the training framework of
the merchant marine. A significant inconsistency is that the decree modifies Article
7 of the “Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade” and establishes that the “National
Maritime Authority” is exercised by the Federal Executive Power through MMAR
for the exercise of national sovereignty, dealing with maritime safety and security
issues, as well as exercising the Right of the State to be applied at the Mexican
marine zones, while Article 9 B establishes that MCT will exercise its functions at
the ports through the Offices of Services to the Merchant Marine. Additionally, the
“Law of Ports”, Article 16, clearly establishes that the Port Authority is exercised by
the Federal Executive Power through MCT, which will be exercised through the
“Offices of Services to the Merchant Marine” established at all ports.
Vessel inspections are currently performed at the dock in the ports of Mexico,
while according to common practice this should be done outside in the open ocean
between 12 and 24 miles, in the contiguous zone. MMAR should evaluate the
allocation to Harbour Masters of a certain number of the interceptor-patrols they
already have or assess the acquisition of some Ocean Patrol Vessel(s) Defender II,
which is a relatively small naval vessel designed to perform coastal defence duties,
but large and seaworthy enough to patrol offshore areas in the open ocean.
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Concerning the offshore area of Campeche, the control centre for maritime traffic
was formerly managed and operated by Pemex, a private company. To ensure the
proper exercise of the maritime authority in this area, MMAR should recover the
control and operation of this centre.
3 Research Methodology of Field Activities
The research methodology of the current study includes semi-structured interviews
with Harbours Masters, Directors of Customs Maritime Units, Directors of ports,
PFSOs from ports and certain number of hydrocarbons terminals, Presidents of
UCMAR (1st Commander of the Navy Zone, Navy Sector or Navy Station) and
Commandants of the port and maritime police (Naval Unit for Port Security, also
called NAUPS) and the Gulf’s Navy Force. Additionally, participant observation at
the terminals and Harbours Master’s installations and ports, including not only the
land areas but also the maritime passages took place; visits were made on board
oceanic patrols of the Mexican Navy. The visits to the mentioned ports in Mexico
had an average duration of a week at each port.
The poll of data included the leaders of the mentioned institutions from the ports
of Altamira and Tampico (Tamps.), Tuxpan, Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos (Ver.),
Dos Bocas (Tab.), Ciudad del Carmen (Campeche), and Progresso (Yuc.) as well as
another Hub Port from the Pacific in Mexico. By doing this, the researcher covered
the four pillars for the operation of the port. The pool of data is deemed sufficient,
based on the fact that it includes eight out of sixteen FIPAs in Mexico where the
ISPS Code applies, representing 50% of them and seven out of seven (100%) FIPAs
situated in the Gulf of Mexico, where oil exploration and production activities take
place. One State-Owned Integrated Port Administration (Ciudad del Carmen, Cam-
peche) where most of the oil activity is concentrated was also included in the study.
Two loose interviews with top directors from MMAR were performed on key
themes identified from issues prevalent in the analysis of the interviews with
Presidents of the UCMAR and Federal FIPAs. From the total number of persons
invited to participate, representing Master of Harbour offices at these nine cited
ports, only one of them rejected the invitation. The same figures correspond to
representatives from the maritime customs units (one) and directors from FIPAs
(one) as well as the PFSO from that same port, who due to extreme work volume had
to decline the interview.
The purpose of the study was described to the participants via an information
cover-sheet letter where the research objectives were explained, clarifying that their
participation was voluntary, confidential and without any economic contribution, or
gifts. The Research Ethics Committee of the World Maritime University approved
the study. The total of interviewed participants was 57 persons, all of whom worked
in areas of maritime safety and security. Interviews were carried out in the partici-
pants’ workplaces by the researcher, tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data
was examined line-by-line, and the main categories and themes were identified and
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coded using thematic analysis and constant comparison of data. The researcher
searched thoroughly for all divergent views to form a rich description of different
factors.
4 Results
From the interviewed subjects with functions of Master of Harbour, 75% expressed
their approval to be transferred to the MMAR and supported the law decree, while
25% strongly disapproved of the transfer between the institutions. An important
conclusion is that the people interviewed were either very much in favour or very
much against the change. 87.5% of Directors of maritime customs units and 75% of
Directors of FIPAs supported the law decree; at the same time, 100% of Presidents of
UCMAR held a positive view. The same figures correspond to Commandants from
the NAUPPRO (coast guard-navy), whereas 87.5% of Port Security Officers (PSO)
supported the transfer of Master of Harbours to MMAR; and 80% of the interviewed
subjects functioning as Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) from hydrocarbon
terminals supported the transfer.
Twelve categories were identified that either prevent or promote the transfer of
Harbours Master from MCT to MMAR: (I) poor performance of Harbours Masters
from the MCT; (II) acute lack of human and material resources available for
Harbours Masters to comply with their duties and responsibilities in a satisfactory
manner; (III) high exposure to corruption on the part of Harbours Masters related to
Mexican crime ring organizations due to death threats against them or their families;
(IV) fear on the part of Harbours Master of losing their jobs in a late stage of their
productive life; (V) uncertainty on the part of Masters of Harbours with respect to
their salary level, working rights and pension schemes; (VI) improvement of salary
and working rights for Masters of Harbours and their personnel with the transferral
to MMAR; (VII) already high participation of the Mexican Navy performing duties
that correspond to Harbour Masters; (VIII) fear on the part of directors of port
administrations of lack of knowledge, stubbornness and unwillingness/inflexibility
to negotiate on factors related to business issues with respect to authorities from the
Mexican Navy; (IX) security improvement for offshore installations and vessels
serving the oil market; (X) trust in a significant improvement of maritime safety and
security on the part of directors of maritime customs units with the transfer of
Harbour Master offices to the Ministry of Marine; (XI) bigger and better capabilities
to combat crime ring organizations that are using port installations for transport of
drugs, weapons, money laundering and transport of stolen hydrocarbons, and finally;
(XII) need to provide juridical support and attributions to the MMAR for activities
already performed by the Navy and which are currently outside their juridical
attributions.
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5 General Discussion
A number of participants’ quotes are used to better illustrate the associated data.
Concerning category (I) poor performance of Masters of Harbours, one of the quotes
that best illustrates the situation is taken from participant number 6 who said:
“unfortunately, the master of harbours have lost a lot of authority and it is very
sad that nobody takes them seriously anymore”. This situation might be explained
with category (II) acute lack of human and material resources available for Harbour
Masters to comply with their duties and responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. The
statement that best explains this aspect is from participant 1-G, who claimed that:
“the Maritime Designated Authority somehow is suffering a separation of attribu-
tions and material resources, because since 1940 the Mexican Navy; [. . .], used to
give all the required support to Harbours Masters [. . .] but when they were
transferred to MCT, [. . .] all the naval craft and necessary equipment was left
with MMAR, including navy vessels, ocean patrols, boats for search and rescue
operations and helicopters. Then, with these limitations the MCT started to function
since 1976 and until today”. Interestingly enough, 100% of the participants pointed
out the acute lack of resources for Harbour Masters to carry out their duties in an
adequate manner.
Another reason for the loss of authority of Harbour Masters, can be explained
with category (III) high exposure to corruption on the part of Harbour Masters
related to Mexican crime ring organizations due to death threats against them or
their families; as the case of participant 36 who affirmed “I have one year and seven
months that I am working under death threats. Constant threats by phone [. . .] I
have moved my home and my family out of the city. There is no other way. And what
can I do? I have the need to work. But tell me, where is not the same”?
Participants highlighted the already high participation of the Mexican Navy
performing duties that correspond to Harbour Masters (category VII). Yet, several
directors of ports manifested their fear of lack of knowledge and inflexibility to
negotiate on factors related to business issues with the Mexican Navy (category
VIII). To illustrate this aspect, one of them (26) is quoted: “I believe that the marina
has given courses to their people but I do not think that they have much experience
and knowledge concerning the operation and administration of merchant marine”.
This was a view was shared by a few Harbour Masters. One of them (18) affirmed:
“[. . .] one of our functions [. . .] is the fluidity of the port. They are accustomed to
command, and to apply correctness regardless of the problem, here everything is
about flexibility and judgment. They do not have it”. On the other hand, 75 per cent
of as FIPAs’ directors were very positive about the transferral. To illustrate their
attitude, respondent 49 quoted: “[. . .] I believe that the objective of this project is to
strengthen the Harbour Master to be able to do their duties in an efficient and
effective way concerning vigilance and control of ports.”
Category number (X) envisions a significant improvement of maritime safety and
security on the part of directors of maritime customs units with the transfer of
Harbour Masters offices to MMAR; this can be explained with a quote from
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participant 6: “I have had the opportunity to work in the ports where the control of
the Harbour Master was already been taken by the Ministry of Marina and it has
been immensely positive. There was a huge leak of information that could only be
controlled with the interference of the Navy. It has been very good. [. . .] I am
waiting for them to do so, here too”. In the agreement between MMAR and the MCT
(2009), it is stated that the financial and operative capacity of crime ring organiza-
tions has allowed them to access strictly confidential information. Therefore, it is
important that MMAR implement an anti-corruption programme for the transfer of
MCT employees to Marina to stop old corruption and leaking of information
practices.
A statement from respondent number 36 reflects category (XI): bigger and better
capabilities to “fight” crime ring organizations using port installations for criminal
activities: “the infrastructure to properly exercise the maritime authority is in
MMAR through the Navy. The international conventions originally signed by the
MCT are already taken by the MMAR, why? It may be because we do not have the
equipment and human resources that they have”.
6 Conclusion and Recommendations
It is a rather self-explanatory fact that the Presidential Decree under discussion has
significantly influenced the Mexican legal maritime framework; it allowed the shift
of maritime safety and securities responsibility, from a civil authority (Ministry of
Communications and Transport, MCT) to a military one (Ministry of Marine,
MMAR). The very high level of acceptance between the four pillar institutions
involved in maritime safety and security operations (both at port and at sea) such
as Maritime Customs Units, Military Navy Zone-with its respective UCMAR,
Federal Integrated Port Administrations, maritime police-represented by the Navy
Unit for Port Protection (NAUPPRO), and finally the Harbour Masters themselves is
a very strong indicator.
However, Mexico has to significantly improve the current level of performance;
even if the change of the designated authority may contribute to the achievement of
this goal, the MMAR must ensure the application of integrity and anti-corruption
programs during the transferral process, to disconnect from the main causes of past
failures. Further reforms to the Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade, Law of Ports
and the regulation of the UCMAR shall be enacted with regard to appointing the
institution responsible for implementation and compliance with the ISPS Code, with
respect to maritime security, in relation to the security requirements for the operation
of vessels. The transfer of the Port Authority from MCT to MMAR should be
evaluated to avoid triangulation of the activities related to the maritime authority,
such as imposition of sanctions. Most FIPAs are under the control of MCT and the
simultaneous execution of both roles (acting as the performer and evaluator) should
be avoided.
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Strengthening the maritime security regime and especially its interface with
energy resources remains an action of priority in order to “avoid unnecessary
casualties” as a result of illicit activities and theft. Similarly, in order to enhance
the level of maritime domain awareness (MDA) in Mexico, as well as introduce a
forward way of thinking about conducting maritime security operations, the MMAR
could also recover control of maritime traffic centres (which are currently operated
and administrated by Pemex, including the offshore and oil production area of
Campeche). Better information is a prerequisite for the optimal allocation of
resources. The allocation of offshore patrol vessels or “Deterrence” patrols, as well
as the required personnel to operate them at the disposal of Master of Harbours could
allow the latter to perform vessel inspections at the contiguity zone if they consider
so necessary. Additionally, tailor made training will also be needed to build the
necessary human capacity and expertise that it is not yet available; the introduction
of a “no-blame” culture could also be considered. Finally, MMAR must also avoid
misuse of high security trained resources in duties that are outside their competence
and especially avoid allocating to the maritime police (NAUPPRO), duties and
responsibilities that must be performed by staff belonging to Harbour Masters.
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Abstract
This paper aims to improve port security measures in developing countries via integrating
the procedures of incident reporting and the associated follow up investigation, hinging on
the Mexican experience. The analysis examined port security at Mexican ports, where
stakeholders were interviewed on the subject to identify the challenges and opportunities
for security incident reporting, updating of security incident records and facilitation of the
follow up investigation. Then, a qualitative security model was developed; under this new
framework, incident reporting, incident investigation, the re-assessment of security threats
through the Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and the necessary modifications to
the Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) were all integrated. These subjects were all
incorporated into a “transparent port security incident reporting tool”. This tool was
implemented at all ports inMexico, where the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code (ISPS Code) applies, by the National Maritime Authority. This demonstrated in a
real case through “action research”, the improvement of port security framework in the
country. Measurements were executed every quarter throughout the year 2017 and the
incident-reporting instrument was adjusted accordingly. The results demonstrated a sig-
nificant improvement in reporting security incidents, with the increase from absolutely
nothing (zero) to 57 providing a strong indicator of success. In addition, 56% of those
reported maritime incidents were also associated with recommendations to be integrated
into the PFSA and respective PFSP. Collecting accurate and immediate information/
evidence material while reporting security incidents is crucial for effective incident
investigation and continuous improvement of the PFSP.
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1 Introduction
Concerning port (and maritime security), one of the most important instruments of
international law is the set of maritime security regulations developed by the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO) that are formulating the International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code); the ISPS Code is “the comprehensive set of
measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities, developed in response to
the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the
United States” (International Maritime Organization 2012). Whereas Part A of the
Code establishes the mandatory provisions, the non-mandatory (“recommended”) Part
B comprises guidelines about how to comply with the mandatory requirements of Part
A (International Maritime Organization 2017). In any case, core instruments of the
ISPS Code are security incident reports and security incident investigation.
The ISPS Code Part A establishes in section 17 that a Port Facility Security Officer
(PFSO) shall be designated for each port facility. Section 17.2 establishes the duties and
responsibilities of the PFSO; from these, it is noteworthy that according to paragraph 8,
this person is involved with “reporting to the relevant authorities and maintaining
records of occurrences which threaten the security of the port facility.” Therefore, it
is the responsibility of the Port Security Officer (PSO) or Port Facility Security Officer
(PFSO) to deal with security incident reporting and keep the associated records
updated. Furthermore, security incidents must be considered in the evaluation of risk
for the Port Security Assessment (PSA) or Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA)
and integrated into the Port Security Plan (PSP) or Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) to
constantly reduce risks and continuously improve port (and maritime) security. Avila-
Zuñiga-Nordfjeld and Dalaklis (2017a) have already pointed out that “the analysis of
security incidents’ root causes is the cornerstone of the PFSA, which is the base of the
PFSP; but, if a new security threat is identified, adjustments are necessary. Therefore, it
is crucial to keep security incident records updated.”
In addition, it must be well documented within the respective PFSP the procedures
for reporting security incidents. Port facility security incidents are normally divided into
two categories: (1) those considered sufficiently serious/grave that the PFSO/PSO must
report to relevant authorities for their official investigation. These include, but are not
limited to, unauthorized access to restricted areas within the port facility; unauthorized
carriage or discovery of drugs, weapons, or prohibited items within the port facility
(including those found in ships’ carriage); incidents for which the media is aware; bomb
warnings and unauthorized disclosure of the PFSPs, among others; (2) those security
incidents of less serious nature. These events require updating of the security records,
but theymight be investigated directly by the PFSO/PSO to discover the causes and take
the corresponding actions to implement measures in order to avoid their repetition in the
future. These may include breaches of screening points, inappropriate uses of passes or
terminal identification cards, suspicious behavior in or near the port facility, and
unsecured access points (International Maritime Organization 2012). In any case,
security threats, breaches of security, and security incidents, including date, time,
location, response to them, and the person-authorities to whom they were reported,
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must be recorded and documented in the security incidents records. In certain countries,
the maritime designated authorities have specified the type of maritime and port security
incidents that must be immediately reported to them for official investigation. Indicative
examples include terror attacks; bomb warnings; hijack, armed robbery against a ship;
discovery of firearms, drugs, weapons, and explosives; and unauthorized access to port
facilities and restricted areas (International Maritime Organization 2012).
After almost 14 years from the ISPS Code’s implementation, Mexico does not comply
yet with its requirements at an acceptable level. On the positive side, some improvement is
recently recorded because of themaritime reforms of 2014 and the latest maritime and port
reform of December 2016, when the National Maritime Authority was transferred from
the Secretariat of Communications and Transport (SCT) to the Secretariat of the Navy1
and called SEMAR hereinafter (Avila-Zúñiga-Nordfjeld and Dalaklis 2017a). Avila-
Zúñiga-Nordfjeld and Dalaklis (2017b) explained that in Mexico, it is the Centro
Unificado Para La Protección Marítima Y Portuaria (CUMAR),2 which is responsible
for the port andmaritime security. According to the Law of Ports Article 19 SECOND, the
CUMAR is a group of inter-institutional coordination between the SEMAR and the SCT
for the application of maritime security measures; effective prevention and/or dealing with
maritime and port security incidents is the primary aim (Cámara de Diputados del H.
Congreso de la Unión, México 2017b). Article 19 THIRD, II paragraph establishes that
the CUMAR shall apply all the dispositions and response measures within the framework
of the Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 1974 Convention, comprising the ISPS Code.
According to its Regulation, provision 6: “a CUMAR shall be established at all the 16
ports (FIPA3s, where the Code applies.” Additionally, provision 8 of this regulation
establishes that it is the Commander of the Navy Military Zone of each jurisdiction,
where a CUMAR is established, who shall be the President of that respective CUMAR
(Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, México 2017a).
Additionally, serious maritime incidents must be officially investigated as required by
the Code of the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Inves-
tigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (the Casualty Investigation Code–CI
Code). The CI Code was adopted by IMO on 16 May 2008 through resolution
MSC.255(84), establishing diverse provisions in Chapter XI of the SOLAS Convention,
making several parts of the Code mandatory (International Maritime Organization 2008).
The Code establishes the State obligations, responsibilities, and different techniques of
casualty and incident investigation. Concerning the State obligations, it must be highlighted
that IMO Resolution A.1070 (28) imposes an obligation on Flag States to implement
mandatory instruments (IMO 2013). In the case of Mexico, the CI Code was adopted and
published in the Official Diary of the Federation on 21 November 2013 (Código de
Normas Internacionales y Prácticas Recomendadas para la Investigación de los Aspectos
de Seguridad de Siniestros y SucesosMarítimos–Código de Investigación de Siniestros, in
Spanish). Though the CI Code mainly focuses on safety issues, it also addresses maritime
security incidents in Chapter 19, which deals with “acts of unlawful interference.” In such
cases, authorities responsible for ISPS’s compliance must be involved. Provision 19.1 of
the CI Code states: “If in the course of a marine safety investigation it becomes known or is
1 Secretaría de Marina, in Spanish and represented with the acronym SEMAR.
2 Unified Centre for Port and Maritime Security in English, and referred to as CUMAR thereafter.
3 Federal Integrated Port Administration
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suspected that an offence is committed under articles 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quarter of the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navi-
gation, 1988, the marine safety investigation Authority should immediately seek to ensure
that the maritime security Authorities of the State(s) concerned are informed.”
The safety or security official investigation in relation to a marine casualty or a port and
maritime incident, respectively, must run in parallel to the judicial investigation. The
objective of such investigation, following the purpose of the CI Code, is not to deal with
apportionment of blame or liability, but to learn the lesson and understand the causal factors
of why a particular incident occurred. Another objective is to prevent similar accidents/
incidents from reoccurring, via reporting them to IMO (in the case of serious marine
accidents is essential and mandatory), so that the entire maritime community can learn of
the specific event and avoid similar mistakes in the future. Of significant importance is also
the fact that in the case of very serious maritime security incidents, there must be a re-
assessment of the PFSA/SSA and adjustment of the PFSP/SSP, accordingly, as required by
the ISPS Code. Part II of the CI Code comprising chapters 4–14 contains mandatory
provisions, while Part III including chapters 15 to 26 contains recommended practices
regarding maritime accident and incident investigation. Chapter 6 provides the obligation
for Coastal and Flag states to conduct a marine safety investigation into every very serious
marine casualty/incident; with the understanding that every incident that results in “signif-
icant loss of life, severe damage or pollution with significant political implications” is
considered as a very serious one and, therefore, it must be officially investigated (IMO2014).
Even though the official security incident investigation is not judicial (it runs parallel
to the judicial), official maritime and port security investigators from the Maritime
National Authority have the burden of proof. This means that they have the obligation
to prove their conclusions reached in an incident investigation, which must follow the
basic principles of natural justice and procedural fairness, as well as present evidence if
required. The Maritime Authority shall also ensure that other relevant authorities and
interested parties as terminal operators, ship owners, Flag Administration, P&I clubs
and other port and terminal insurance’s representatives, classification societies, salvage
organizations and lawyers representing cargo owners, crew members are properly
notified and that they are given instructions about how to handle of evidence material.
The ship’s master, crew, and personnel shall also be reminded about the prohibition of
removal of evidence and their right in respect of legal representation for interviews/
testimonies, as well as their right to be protected against self-incrimination, also for the
official maritime incident security investigation.
It is common that after a maritime incident, both the maritime security investigation
body and the judicial authorities attend the event simultaneously to investigate the incident
and collect evidence. Inmost cases, in the absence of specific legislation to the contrary, the
judicial body would have priority and would immediately start to conduct interviews and
collect testimonies for a possible prosecution. This deviates from the principles of incident
security investigation and, therefore, it is important that incident security investigators
conduct a separate analysis not directly based on the judicial proceedings. This, of course
with the override understanding that cooperation between authorities will allow to conduct
both judicial and security incident investigations in parallel, as IMO (2014) points out by
referring to the CI Code, chapter 9. Furthermore, Chapter 21 of that Code, provision 21.2
establishes the obligations for the marine safety investigating State(s), which shall ensure
the implementation of an appropriate framework within the State for, among other aspects:
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1. The designation of investigators to the marine safety investigation including an
investigator to lead the marine safety investigation;
2. The provision of a reasonable level of support to members of the marine safety
investigation from other authorities;
3. The development of a strategy for the marine safety investigation in liaison with
other substantially interested States.
These three aspects of Provision 21.2 of the CI Code concerning the obligation of the
State should also apply for port (and maritime) security incidents. The maritime
security investigation State should also provide every effort to facilitate the maritime
or port security investigation in order to improve maritime security at its own ports and
territorial sea and to protect its own national interests.
As mentioned before, in the case of Mexico, the institution responsible for the
implementation and compliance with the ISPS Code is the CUMAR; this institution is
also responsible for revision and approval of PFSA/PSA and PFSP/PSP (as well as the
Ship Security Assessment-SSA and Ship Security Plan-SSP for vessels bearing the
national Flag). Therefore, the CUMAR is also liable to investigate serious maritime and
port security incidents and ensure the re-assessment of PFSA/PSA and PFSP/PSP,
SSA/SSP (of national Flag) after a serious maritime or port security incident. The
CUMAR representatives are the first authority notified on a security incident and the
first to arrive at the place of the event. They should continue to cooperate with the
judicial authorities for the judicial investigation. In parallel, but separately, they shall
perform their own maritime or port security investigation of that particular event,
according to the principles of the CI and ISPS Code. Finally, they should provide
recommendations to PFSO/PSO (or Ship Security Officer-SSO) about how to prevent
such events from reoccurring and ensure that these Officers include those threats into
the PFSA/SSA and that PFSP/PSP/SSP are amended accordingly.
Recalling that there is a growing concern about maritime and port infrastructure as
targets of a terror attack, as well as factoring in the importance to keep high maritime
and port terminal security standards, investigation procedures of security incidents were
studied, along with the way of reporting those port security incidents. The issue was
examined from the unique perspective of Mexico’s coastlines and associated port
infrastructure and at the same time addressing the demands placed on the CUMAR
by international and national legislation. To facilitate this, a Model for Port and
Maritime Security Incident Investigation was developed. On the bases of this Model,
a new and “transparent incident-reporting tool” was created, building the bridge
between PFSA, PFSP, and port security incident investigation, as illustrated in the
paragraphs that follow. Due to its lengthy extent, the transparent incident-reporting tool
is presented in full detail as Annex I in the English version and within Annex II in the
Spanish one. Additionally, the crossovers of the respective research areas are depicted
in Fig. 1.
2 Research objectives
The first objective of this paper is to study the current situation of port security in
Mexico, with particular focus on the compliance of security assessments, security
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plans, incident reporting, and incident investigation to develop an analytical transparent
incident-reporting tool that integrates all the procedures of these ISPS Code
requirements.
The aim is that this instrument supports security incident reporting and improves
PFSA, its respective PFSP and port/maritime security incident investigation. Acquiring
all relevant information of a particular incident in this instrument will facilitate to learn
the lesson from that event and use it for updating of PFSA and respective Security
Plans. It would also provide all necessary information to official investigators to follow-
up the event and instruct the implementation of measures to prevent its re-occurrence.
The second objective of this paper is to examine port security at Mexican ports from
an incident reporting and investigation perspective, by implementing this instrument at
all ports in Mexico where the ISPS Code applies. This, with the support of the National
Maritime Authority, demonstrating in a real case through “action research,” the contri-
butions of this instrument to improve incident reporting, incident investigation, PFSA
and PFSP.
The third objective of this paper is to demonstrate the use of this tool for a multilevel
analysis of port security threats to identify the problem areas and contribute to set up the
strategies for the development of a national maritime security policy.
3 Research methodology
The research methodology includes semi-structured interviews conducted to Master of
Harbors, Directors of Customs Maritime Units; Directors of ports; PFSOs from ports
and certain terminals that are dealing with hydrocarbons; Presidents of CUMAR (1st
Commander of the Navy Zone, Navy Sector or Navy Station); Commandants of the
Unidad Naval de Protección Portuaria and called hereinafter UNAPROP.4 At the same
4 Naval Unit for Port Security.
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Fig. 1 Model for port and maritime security incident investigation
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time, participant observations at Maritime Customs Units, Master of Harbors installa-
tions, ports, and port terminals—including not only the land areas, but also the related
maritime passages—were conducted; all these were visited on board patrol vessels that
were made available by the Mexican Navy. The visit to the mentioned ports in Mexico
was conducted from the 10th of October 2016 to the 9th of December 2016, with an
average of a week devoted to each port. Another 6-day visit to one of the three largest
ports of Mexico in the Pacific area was conducted in April 2016, where semi-structured
interviews and participant observation were performed. The poll of data included the
leaders of the mentioned institutions from the ports of Altamira and Tampico (Tamps.),
Tuxpan, Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos (Ver.), Dos Bocas (Tab.), Ciudad del Carmen
(Campeche), and Progresso (Yuc.), as well as another hub port from the Pacific in
Mexico. By doing this, the four pillars for the operation of ports were covered. The pool
of data is deemed sufficient, based on the fact that it includes eight out of 16 FIPA in
Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, representing a coverage of 50% of them and
seven out of seven FIPAs situated in the Gulf of Mexico, where oil exploration and
production activities take place, achieving a 100% coverage of them. One State-Owned
Integrated Port Administration (Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche) where most of the oil
activity is concentrated was also included in the study.
From the persons invited to participate and representing Master of Harbor offices at
these nine ports, only one of them rejected the invitation. The same figures correspond
to representatives from the maritime customs units (one) and directors from FIPAs
(one), as well as the PFSO from that same port that due to extreme work volume had to
decline the interview. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were used to allow new
viewpoints to emerge freely, particularly about opinions and perceptions concerning the
participants. This method is valuable to study opinions and fears of people when
changing processes and systems, especially after the shift of maritime safety and
security responsibility, as well as port state control from SCT to SEMAR. The purpose
of the study was described to participants in an information cover-sheet letter where the
research objectives were clearly described, explaining that their participation was
voluntary, confidential, and without any economic contribution or gifts. The total
number of interviewed participants was 57 persons, all of them practicing in areas of
maritime safety and security, or customs units. Interviews were carried out in the
participant’s workplaces via taped recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data was exam-
ined line-by-line, and the main categories and themes were identified and coded using
thematic analysis and constant comparison of data.
At that stage of the research and after the establishment of 15 different themes,
“Action Research” was integrated into the methodology with the aim to improve the
level of maritime security in the country under examination. Action research is a form
of interactive inquiry process that balances problem solving; actions are implemented in
an interactive context with data-driven and collaborative analysis. This approach allows
researchers and practitioners to evaluate their work and understand the underlying
problem causes, enabling organizational change by implementing solutions. It was
previously mentioned that based on the findings from the interviews and participant
observation, a new and “transparent incident-reporting tool” was developed; it was then
implemented at all ports in Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, by the National
Maritime Authority. This demonstrated in a real case through “action research,” the
contributions of this instrument to improve incident reporting, incident investigation,
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Port Facility Security Assessments (PFSA), and Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP), as
the ISPS Code requires. Measurements were done every quarter throughout the year
2017 and the incident-reporting instrument was adjusted accordingly when incidents
without code were reported, adding new codes.
4 Results
On the basis of the interviews/observation, 15 themes were identified across the studied
groups (CUMARs & UNAPROPs, Port Administration Directors; Maritime Customs
Unit Directors; Port Security Officers (PSO) and Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO)
and Harbor Masters). These issues affect port security either in a negative or positive
way. It is also important to highlight that these findings were developed before the
transferal of the National Maritime Authority from the MCT to MMAR, which entered
into force on 17th of June 2017. However, the CUMAR was responsible for imple-
mentation and compliance of the ISPS Code since 21st of April 2014. These themes are
the following:
1. High discontent among Maritime Customs Units Directors concerning the rota-
tion of customs authority agents between maritime customs units, airport units,
and cross-border units;
2. High reluctance by port administrations and PSO to allow port security authorities
from the CUMARs and UNAPROPs permanent interconnection to CCTV sys-
tems in real time;
3. High reluctance by port terminals managers and PFSO to allow PSO and the
UNAPROPs permanent interconnection to CCTV systems in real time from port
terminals installations;
4. High reluctance by Maritime Customs Directors to allow port security authorities
from the CUMARs and UNAPROPs permanent interconnection to CCTV sys-
tems in real-time concerning customs warehouse and other vulnerable customs
areas;
5. Separate IT and CCTV systems rooms between Naval authorities and Customs
authorities;
6. High reluctance by port terminals managers and PFSO to share their PFSP with
the representatives from port security authorities from the CUMAR (responsible
for inspection and approval of PFSP) in order to inspect it, revise it, and approve it
and to develop the PSP details for MARSEC (maritime security) level 3, a
responsibility of the CUMAR;
7. Poor development of maritime security exercises (that relate to level 3). These
activities were performed without access to PFSP from port terminals [exercises
to be conducted once every calendar year, with no more than 18 months between
them];
8. Lack of human and material resources at the UNAPROPs to cope with the ISPS
Code duties;
9. Poor development of PSPs. They only consider risks and threats in the common
port areas, installations, and roadways within the port, but not within the port
terminals, neither analyze the impact of security incidents of the terminals against
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each other and particularly, specific high risks terminals against other considered
of less risk.
10. Poor training of private security agents concerning port security risks and threats,
as well as use of fire weapons.
11. Satisfactory level of cooperation between the maritime customs unit authorities
and the UNAPROPs for inspection of goods and vessels at the customs ware-
house with the ZVB system and other no intrusive security systems. The ZVB is a
mobile screening system using X-ray for screening of cargo and vehicles. It uses a
backscatter technology to provide photo—images of suspected objects within the
cargo such as explosives, currency, drugs, psychotropic materials, forbidden
chemicals, and trade-fraud items;
12. With the exception of one port, none existence of official records of port and
maritime security incidents (before the implementation of the “transparent inci-
dent reporting tool”);
13. Non-existence of PFSP’s amendments officially requested by port security au-
thorities following port security incidents;
14. Non-existence of official re-assessment of PSA/PSSA requested by port security
authorities following port security incidents;
15. Non-existence of official investigation of port security incidents (other than the
judicial one) made by port security authorities.
Concerning the implementation and results of the “transparent incident reporting tool,”
the results demonstrate a significant improvement in reporting port security incident
records, which increased from zero to 57 during the first year of the tool’s implemen-
tation. During the first quarter of 2017, 20 port security incidents were reported. For the
second quarter of that year, the related figure was 9, which represented a decrease of
55.00%, compared to the first quarter. During the third quarter, a total of 17 port
security incidents were recorded, which represents an increase of 88.88%, compared to
the previous quarter. For the fourth quarter, 11 port security incidents were reported.
This represents a decrease of 35.29%, compared to the previous period. In addition,
56% of the reported maritime incidents followed recommendations to be integrated into
the PFSA and to be considered for improvement of PFSP. As it can be observed in
Fig. 2, the type of security incident that was reported most is the code IFP-007, which
relates to “confiscation of drugs, narcotics, or psychotropic material.” The second place
is shared by the classification codes IFP-006 (confiscation of weapons/firearms); IFP-
009 (unauthorized access to restricted areas, including fishermen and stowaways); IFP-
017 (vehicles abandoned in the port installations or its surroundings); IFP-019 (failures
in control areas); and the category “without code.” The last category served a special
purpose: this type of incidents was assigned a code for the new quarter in relation to the
period they were recorded (Fig. 3).
5 General discussion
A number of participants’ quotes are used to better illustrate the associated data.
Concerning category (I), one of the quotes that better illustrates this is from one of
the interviewed directors of maritime customs units, who pointed out that:
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The rotation that exists, if it is not made in an integral way and I will clarify some
points regarding the integral, the rotation is not very convenient; it can even be
harmful for us. I mean that we have the specialization that some agents may be in
a Border Customs Unit. Others may be entirely in an Airport Customs or a
Maritime Customs Unit, the way of working in each of the points is definitely
very different, huh! (…) But the frequency with which they are rotating the
people sometimes is inadequate, or the type of people which they are sending to
us in the rotations is also inadequate. There are some very special places, and I am
going to say it clearly: The Northern border. If they send to us, if they send me an
element of the northern border, since it arrives here, my hair starts to fall. I cannot
generalize it, but it is a high percentage, which implies that I supervise it, if I have
to supervise a person once, I have to supervise that particular person five times or
more, then the rotation generates some complication. A rotation from an Airport
Customs Unit to a Port Customs Unit is not so serious, the only problem is that it
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slower the processes. It is the people coming from the border units, which have
represented problems for us.
Regarding themes II, III, and IV, concerning high reluctance by port administra-
tions and PSO, port terminals managers, and PFSO and Maritime Customs Units
directors, respectively, to allow port security authorities from the CUMAR and
UNAPROPs permanent interconnection to CCTV systems in real time, the fol-
lowing quotes illustrate the situation. “One representative from a UNAPROP said
regarding the access to the CCTV from the Federal Integrated Port Administration
(FIPA) installations,
We should have the management of the security cameras and CCTV systems,
here in the Port, but we do not. The complete management of the CCTV
system for the port is run by the port administration. We have something that
is supposed to be a mirror of the CCV system here; but we are not connected
to all the cameras; only to those that they allow us to have. In the case of a
security incident in the areas that we are not connected to, with cameras, we
get it recorded in DVR but that’s not in real time. It is after the event, so we
do not know with certainty if the DVR has been edited.
Another agent of the UNAPROP from another port lamented the following concerning
the PFSO collaboration to CCTV systems:
No, no, and no! In this case, when we made the last security exercise at level 3,
the only port terminal that cooperated with us was one of containers, all the other
ones denied us the access to their CCTV systems. Even that one, was very
reluctant and its cooperation was not in real time. They brought with them a
DVR with the records of the last week before the exercise (…). They did not give
us access to the CCTV system because since they are private terminals, their
general managers or CEO of the companies from Mexico City did not allow
them. That is what they said.
On the other hand, one of the directors of the Maritime Customs Units said about the
subject:
We are not allowed to do that. That would have to be negotiated in a higher level,
at a minister level, I think. But until now they (the CUMAR and UNAPROP)
have not requested access to our CCTV. However, I could not allow it, without
discussing with the General Director.
These arguments might also be the reason for a separate IT and CCTV systems
rooms between Naval authorities and Customs authorities at the ports, as represented
by theme V.
This pattern about high reluctance of sharing CCTV systems in real time with
the CUMARS & UNAPROPs was broadly shared across the studied groups and
only in one case, port security authorities reported to have fully access to this
system in real time for the common areas of port installations, excluding port
Integrating the procedures of reporting port security incidents and...
terminals and its related berths. A similar approach [to that for CCTV systems]
was found regarding theme VI: “high reluctance by port terminals managers and
PFSO to share their PFSP with representatives from the CUMAR (responsible for
inspection and approval of PFSP). This in order to inspect it, revise it and approve
it, (their duty by law) and to develop the PSP for MARSEC (maritime security)
level 3 (responsibility of the CUMAR).” In the 100% of the cases, the port
security authority’s representatives from the CUMAR and UNAPROPs reported
that they did not have a copy of the PSP/PFSP for both the port and its terminals.
In this regard, one of the quotes that best illustrate the identified problem is the
following:
The Port Security Plan (developed by the PSO for the port), we have never
seen it, we have one, but it is made by us. About their plan (Port Security
Plan), I do not know if it is well developed, or which authorities do they
include to attend security threats. I do not know if they include us, because
they have never ever let me see it, and I have requested it many times. I
know it is our responsibility to review it and they know it too, but they have
their plan under four locks and they have not allowed us to see it. I have
been asking for the PSP for two years. Personally, I have written here the
Port Security Plan, but the one prepared by us for level 3, where I include
Customs authorities, the port administration with its entire people, as it
should be, and other local authorities; but until now, they have not let me
see their PSP. Even when I have let them see ours for the practices and
exercises in which we have participated, but they have not given me their
plan or let me see how it is integrated. We have participated in all the
practices they have done, but according to what they have requested at the
time, because they have their own plan.
Concerning theme VII, “poor development of maritime security exercises at level 3,
most performed without access to PFSP from port terminals”; another representative
from the UNAPROPs said:
In the last exercise at level 3 made by the CUMAR it was requested the PSP
to the PSO. He was also inquired in his character of PSO for the whole port,
to gather the PFSP for the port terminals operating in the port. But the PFSO
from the terminals denied to deliver it to him, I know it, because I saw when
he requested it and they said no, only one of them accepted to show it to him
but not to make a copy or to take it with him to the tactic room where the
exercise was planned and implemented. I do not know… but the exercise
was developed without any PFSP from the terminals.
Furthermore, all the interviewed representatives from UNAPROPs, the unit with
duties of coast guard coincided in pointing out the lack of personnel, regarding
theme VIII, “Lack of human and material resources at the UNAPROPs to cope
with the ISPS Code duties,” one of the interviewed persons from the referred
unit answered:
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We lack personnel. I believe that here, at this UNAPROP we are not operating at
100%. No, because we do not have the 100% of the positions authorized for this
unit, according to the organic personnel list. The organic list is for 43 elements
and I do not have them. I have only three and 33 commissioned from the Infantry
of Marina. In total, we are 36, but only half per shift.
Due to the high reluctance of the PFSOs to share their PFSP, the development of
PSP is rather poor, since Port Security Officers mainly focused on risks and
security threats for the common port areas, installations and roadways within the
port, as the port assets. However, they do not include the different port terminals
within their analyses, neither examine the impact of security incidents of terminals
against each other and the rest of the port installations and particularly, specific
high risks terminals against other considered of less risks (theme IX). Another
critical subject is the theme X. Since most of PSO/PFSO do not have a military or
police background, they lack training about use of fire weapons; as a result, they
do not include this aspect in the performance evaluation of security drills. It was
observed poor training of private security agents at 70% of the visited terminals
with armed personnel when they were asked to assemble and disassemble their
weapons and lock and unlock them. Therefore, it is necessary the cooperation with
personnel from the UNAPROP to execute this type of security drills under a
realistic approach. It is not a coincidence that according to the IMO, security
drills, in general, shall be conducted every 3 months, to test individual elements of
the PFSP, including the response to security threats, breaches of security and
security incidents, taking into account the types of operations, personnel changes,
the types of ships interfacing with the facility, and other relevant circumstances
(International Maritime Organization 2012).
A subject that created high concern was about theme XII, “none existence of
official records of port and maritime security incidents (before the implementation
of the “transparent incident reporting tool”). All UNAPROP personnel interviewed
concurred in the argument that there were no security incidents reported, because
those that occurred were not considered serious. Despite this, it was observed and
documented with photo-evidence through the visit to port installations and port
terminals, situations where fishermen were within the navigation channels of the
ports and at the berths of port terminals, as well as several unauthorized persons
selling food at one of the ports. Personnel from the UNAPROPs were questioned
about the issue and they answered that these people were not dangerous, so they
were just invited to leave the place without further enquires. Additionally, when
they were questioned about cases of stowaways in ships or in the rail wagons
within the port areas, one of them replied:
Yes, yes. But, it almost always has been by mistake, why? They usually do not
aim to enter the port. Normally they are from Central America and they just want
to go to the United States. They argue that they took the wrong train because they
thought it was going to the North and they did not know that it was to enter the
port. That they thought it was the “beast” and in that case, what we do is to
deliver them to the National Institute of Migration, so they do what they have to
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do according to their duties and responsibilities. There have been about four or
five of these cases in the time that I am here (two years).
The port security incidents occurred at the different ports and port terminals were
not considered serious enough to be recorded and therefore, there is an absence of
PFSP’s amendments officially requested by port security authorities following port
security incidents (theme XIII). Neither of official re-assessment of PSA/PSSA
requested by port security authorities following port security incidents (XIV).
Consequently, there is none existence of official investigation of port security
incidents (no the judicial one) made by port security authorities or by the National
Maritime Authority either (XV). To illustrate this theme, it was chosen the quote
of one of the participants that best illustrate the situation:
Mmm, how to say it? “We make an informative letter about the control and
situation of the port with the observations we have, in the sense of port security.
Like certain areas that can serve to hide so they are more protected; but it is sent
as an informative note, but officially request modifications to the port security
plan on the bases of our observations, or findings, no.
This instrument combined with the use of statistics by incident code and port/port
facility, at a macro level, provides the State with crucial information to set up
strategies for developing a National Maritime Security Policy. It allows the State
to clearly identify threats and allocate material, economic, and human resources
accordingly, as required at each port, applying a risk-based approach to port and
maritime security management. It bears emphasis that “the intangible security
assets and management of those assets or the way regulation is implemented that
can make the most difference” (Mileski et al. 2015) in the benefits that may accrue
to all concerned from effective port and maritime security.
Although this instrument was successfully implemented and tested at all ports
where the ISPS Code applies, in Mexico, with most type of port facilities, it can
easily be adapted to other countries facing the same problems worldwide, recog-
nizing that the “safety and security of maritime domain are critical aspects for
sustainable development” (Chintoan-Uta and Ramos Silva 2017). It can also be
modified to include other type of incidents not considered in the format by adding
the type of security incident and allocating the respective incident code.
Edgerton (2013), cited by Kusi (2015), said that when security strategies and
measures are appropriately designed, functions as enablers, facilitating cost-effective
and reliable operations for all stakeholders.
6 Conclusions
The maritime security standards in Mexico, concerning security incident reporting,
inspections and revisions to PSA/PFSA, prior to the transferral of the Maritime
National Authority from SCT to SEMAR in June 2017 was rather poor. Yet,
SEMAR was responsible for maritime security since the 21st of April, 2014 when
the presidency of the CUMAR was transferred from Masters of Harbors to
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Admirals, Commanders of the Navy sector, zone or region for the specific port.
Commanders of the Navy at the zone in the different ports before this reform were
appointed as vice-presidents of this Unified Centre for Maritime Security, accord-
ing to the Law of Ports. However, because of lack of knowledge and poor training,
they were not fully aware of the changes and their new responsibilities, which
resulted in the fact that port and maritime security duties (concerning the ISPS
Code), were rather neglected.
On the positive side, important solutions were implemented in 2017. ISPS Code
related training was provided by appropriate qualified people, to members of the
CUMARs and UNAPROPs; the National Maritime Authority also implemented
the “transparent incident-reporting tool” at all ports of the country. This brought a
significant improvement on reporting of incident security incidents and updating
of incident security records, during the first year of its implementation. Moreover,
56% of the reported incidents were followed with recommendations to be consid-
ered for PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP. Slowly but surely, the port and maritime
security in Mexico is improving in a significant way and the country is getting
ready to exploit in a safer and secure manner; it’s more of 11,000 km of coastline
both on the Pacific and Atlantic oceans through its ports and related infrastructure.
7 Future research areas
Further research in this topic include examining the implementation of the
CUMAR and UNAPROPs recommendation to the PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP, as
well as the development of security incident-reporting in the country. This might
be done by developing statistics, using the 2017 figures as weight for next years.
Other areas include necessary law reforms to integrate the part of the ISPS Code
(SSO, SSA and SSP) that currently are not reflected in the CUMAR’s Regulation.
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